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The James Long Lectures on Buddhism
for 1900—1902 A.D.

BY THE

REV. W. ST. CLAIR-TISDALL, M.A., 'C.M.S.

AUTHOR OF

'THE RELIGION OF THE CRESCENT,' ETC.

'Ayaṃ eva Ariyo Atthaṅgiko Maggo'

Dhammacakkappavattana-Suttam, § 3.

Πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται.

PLATO: *Protagoras*, 326, B.

LONDON

ELLIOT STOCK, 62, PATERNOSTER ROW, E.C.

1903

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TO
SIR WILLIAM MUIR, K.C.S.I., D.C.L., ETC.,
VICE-CHANCELLOR AND PRINCIPAL OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF EDINBURGH,
IN TOKEN OF RESPECT AND ADMIRATION,
THIS LITTLE WORK
IS, WITH HIS PERMISSION,
DEDICATED

twined O. 15/03
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PREFACE

THE four lectures contained in this volume are those which, in a somewhat shorter form, have been delivered at the Universities of Cambridge (Westminster College) and Durham, at Manchester Cathedral, and at many other places, during the last two years, under the auspices of the Trustees of the James Long Lectureship Fund in connexion with the C.M.S. I gladly embrace this opportunity of acknowledging the kindness with which my attempt to show what the main features of Buddhism in its original form were has been everywhere received.

It will be observed that I have throughout dealt with Buddhism *at its best*—that is, with the doctrines taught by Buddha himself, and not with the corrupt forms of Buddhism now found in Tibet, Mongolia, China, Japan, and other lands. To deal with these latter at all satisfactorily would have enlarged the book to many times its present size, and would have tended to distract the reader's attention from the original and purest form of the philosophy which I have tried to explain. It would be difficult to find anything to say in favour of these corrupt forms of Buddhism, and to deal with them thoroughly would require far more learning than I possess. ✓

Having for many years been an earnest student of religions and philosophies, and at the same time of Oriental languages, it has been my principle never to accept any statement second-hand, as it were, regarding any religion or philosophy, but to test everything for myself, and to go to the root of the matter, as far as possible, by consulting authoritative documents in the original languages. This plan I have pursued in the present work, just as I did in a previous course of James Long Lectures on Muḥammadanism, published in 1895 under the title of 'The Religion of the Crescent.' In order, however, to enable the student to test the correctness of the views I have enunciated, on all important points I have quoted in the notes the original documents upon which my statements are based. I have also, of course, consulted the leading English, German, and French works on Buddhism, as far as I could, and gladly acknowledge my indebtedness to not a few of them. But I trust that, being naturally 'Nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri,' I have not adopted a single opinion without having carefully tested its correctness to the best of my ability.

Should this little work in any degree enable the thoughtful reader to attain a correct and impartial view of the true nature of Buddhism in its original form, and should it prove useful to Christians living among Buddhists in producing in their minds more true sympathy with the latter, and thus aid them to understand how best to present the great truths of the Gospel to those whose own gloomy philosophy so clearly proves their deep need of *Christ*, I shall be more than repaid for the many months of steady work which I have devoted to the preparation of these pages.

In my quotations from the original Buddhist Scriptures

I have in almost every case quoted from the valuable edition of these works issued by the Pāli Text Society. It is unnecessary for me to testify to the care with which the series has been prepared for publication, but it would afford me much pleasure to know that this little book had been of use in calling attention to the value of this edition. Buddhist philosophy deserves more serious study than it has yet received—at least, from the majority of the professed admirers of Buddhism in England and America. The only way to obtain a real knowledge of it is to study its *origines* in the books of the Pāli Canon. What would be thought of one who professed a great admiration for Plato or Aristotle, but was unable to read a line of these authors in the original? If those who praise Buddhism so much, as many do nowadays, are really in earnest, let them study the philosophy seriously, as this edition enables them to do. They will thus be better fitted to form a correct judgment regarding Buddha's place in philosophy, and be far less liable to deceive themselves and others regarding it. Professor Rhys Davids' Hibbert Lectures and other works on Buddhism, together with Dr. Hoey's admirable English version of Oldenberg's 'Buddha,' will also prove of great value to the student, as will many other works mentioned in the appended Bibliography.

It remains for me to express my recognition of the deep debt of gratitude which I owe to Dr. Hoey for very carefully reading over these lectures in manuscript, and for the many valuable suggestions and the kind encouragement he has afforded me. Dr. Hoey when in India devoted much care to the task of identifying the various places¹ mentioned in early Buddhist works in

¹ It is unfortunate that no two neighbouring places visited by either of the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims have been identified with absolute

connexion with the life and labours of Buddha, and I am greatly indebted to him for the information on this subject which he has so kindly given me, and also for the map which he has himself provided for this book. I have made great use of his two articles 'On the Identification of Kusinārā, Vaiṣālī, and other Places mentioned by the Chinese Pilgrims,' published in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* (vol. lxi., part i., No. 1, 1900, and vol. lxx., part i., No. 1, 1901). It is to Dr. Hoey's assistance in this matter that I am indebted for the opportunity of laying before the reader the very latest geographical discoveries in connexion with the 'Holy Land of the Buddhists.' I have also to thank Professor Rhys Davids for very kindly perusing the manuscript of this work and advising its publication.

W. ST. C.-T.

BEDFORD,
December, 1902.

certainty, nor has the course taken by them between any two points been ascertained beyond all doubt. Hence it has not been possible to calculate with accuracy the value of either a *yojana* or a *li*. But the value of the identifications proposed by Dr. Hoey in the two papers contributed on this subject to the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* seems to me to be very considerable. The map will enable the reader to follow any further discoveries that may be made. The probable site of Śravastī has been discovered, and will soon be made public.

NOTE ON THE PRONUNCIATION OF
THE ENGLISH LETTERS EMPLOYED IN
THESE PAGES TO TRANSLITERATE
PĀLĪ AND SANSKRĪT WORDS

ALL the vowels, except *a*, have the same pronunciation as in Italian, *o* and *e* being properly, however, always *long*. When *a* is not marked long, it is pronounced like *u* in *but*. The dotted letters *ṭ*, *ḍ*, *ḷ*, *ṛ*, are cerebrals, pronounced by applying the point of the tongue to the palate. *T* and *d* are pronounced as in Italian, more softly than in English. *Sh* is a cerebral, while *ṣ* is the ordinary English *sh*. *C* is pronounced as *ch* in *church*, which word would in Pāli be written *carc*. *Kh*, *gh*, *ṭh*, *ḍh*, *ṭh*, *ḍh*, *jh*, *bh*, have each letter pronounced separately, as in *inkhorn*, *hit him*, etc. *Ṁ* has a nasal sound; *ṅ* is pronounced as in Spanish, *ny*; *j* and the remaining letters as in English, except that *g* is always hard.

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INTRODUCTION

GREAT as has been the progress made by the civilized world in our own times in learning and science of every kind, theoretical and practical, in no department of study have greater facilities for progress been afforded than in that of Comparative Religion. If we have not advanced as much in this matter as in Medicine, in Telegraphy, in Mechanics, it is perhaps because we have not been equally earnest in our endeavours, and have not employed the true scientific method. The study has perhaps been left too much to men with some very decided bias, often an anti-Christian one, and their efforts have too often been directed, not to eliciting the truth from carefully observed facts, but to establishing some preconceived theory of their own. They have been followed by distinguished essayists and novelists, men and women of great literary ability, but with no particular training in this important branch of study, possibly without any great knowledge of languages and of philosophy to qualify them for conducting a careful and scientific investigation into such a deep and abstruse subject. Sciolists have then entered the field, and, in the most light and airy manner, have—to their own complete satisfaction, and with the smallest possible modicum of thought and study—settled for ever those

deepest of all questions which for ages have occupied the attention, and too frequently baffled the investigation, of some of the most thoughtful of the human race. Busy men too frequently accept the lucubrations of such writers or talkers as representing proved and generally accepted facts, and hence their faith in Christianity becomes shaken, and nothing definite is given to put in its place.

The cure for this is that the study of the surviving non-Christian religions and philosophies of the East should be undertaken in earnest—at least as much so as that of the ancient philosophies of Greece and Rome. Instead of that, what do we see? Men ignorant of Greek would never venture to express an opinion upon the philosophies of Plato, of Aristotle, of Zeno, and would not be listened to if they did. But anyone without the slightest knowledge of Pāli may set himself up as an exponent of Buddhism, and may even persuade people to accept him as an authority upon the subject. Surely this is not as it ought to be.

There is a deep difference between Religion and Philosophy, it is true, yet they are sufficiently near akin to one another in many respects to render it possible to study both in somewhat the same manner. They both profess to solve some of the most important problems of existence, the difference being that philosophies are avowedly mere human guesses at their solution, while religions claim to be Divine revelations. Nor is it unreasonable to suppose that perhaps such a claim may have some foundation in fact—that the different non-Christian faiths may enshrine, so to speak, some fragments of Divine truth, perhaps some scanty reminiscences of an early Revelation. But whether this be so or not, they claim our reverent and thoughtful study as

being of deep human interest, seeing that they have, in most cases, exercised an immense influence for good or evil upon multitudes of our fellow-creatures, and have formed the consolation or the torment of their devotees. Their existence is a fact, and as such must play some part in the Divine scheme. Hence they must, if carefully studied, be capable of teaching us something, if not of God's great purposes, at least of human nature and of human needs. Religions, like philosophies, even by their errors and failures may teach us man's inability to 'find out the Almighty unto perfection,' and thus enable the Christian, not merely to prize more truly the light which has shone upon us 'in the face of Jesus Christ,' but also to understand better than he otherwise could the necessity of some parts of Divine Revelation which might not perhaps be plain to him in any other way.

The study of religions is a necessary part of the study of Anthropology, of History, of Ethics, and of Philosophy. De Quatrefages and others have shown that man has always had a religion. Even such a (practically) Atheistic Philosophy as that taught by Buddha has had to yield place to the religions which have sprung from it in Tibet, in Ceylon, in Burma, and elsewhere. Does not this prove that Religion is a necessary part of our human nature? And if, as Lucretius held, false religions have often proved scourges to humanity, and led to the commission of inhuman deeds of cruelty, does not that, explained by the proverb 'Corruptio optimi pessima,' tend to show that what is needed is, not the rejection of religion, but its amendment, the substitution of the true for the false? The student of philosophy, when he finds school succeeding school, and men of the keenest intellect 'in wandering mazes lost,' should, from the failure of each and every such purely human system, learn that

such a 'raft' is not enough to carry man safely over the ocean of existence, but that 'some word of God'—nay, rather, 'The Word of God' Himself—is requisite.

The thoughtful man of the present day can no longer content himself with the scoff which declares that to the ignorant every religion is equally true, to the philosopher equally false, and to the politician equally useful. Those who, in accordance with the false liberality of our own time, profess to look upon all religions as alike good for those who believe in them, may at least learn from the *study* of these faiths that this view is not the outcome of learning, but of ignorance. True learning explodes this idea, as it has exploded many other similar fallacies. While a modicum of truth may be found in all religions and in all philosophies, the honest student will soon learn that, in order properly to estimate the value of any system, and even to understand its teachings aright, it is not enough to cull pretty-sounding sentences or lofty moral sentiments from its leading books. Men have often done this, and then, reading Christian meanings into words expressive of very different ideas, given them forth to the world as proving that men do not need the Gospel. The honest and the only profitable course is to study the system as a *whole*, endeavouring to ascertain the exact meaning of each maxim, taking the bad with the good, and thus forming a fair judgment on the whole system of religion or philosophy which we are studying. In these lectures it will be seen how easy it is to misunderstand, *e.g.*, such Buddhist terms as 'Immortality' (*amata*), 'Law,' 'Ignorance,' and many others, if they are taken apart from their context. Nor, again, can theory be separated from practice. Each religion especially, to be properly understood and judged, must be historically studied in its origin and its growth, in its development and its

decay ; and the teaching of history regarding the influence for good or ill which it has, *when its precepts have been carried into practice*, exercised on its professors, must be taken into account as well, for 'the tree is known by his fruit.'

While something may doubtless be learnt (as we shall see) from Buddhism, just as (though not to the same extent as) from Platonism, Aristotelianism, the philosophy of Kant, or any other such system, yet the recognition of this fact does not compel us to applaud the attempts that are even now being made in certain quarters to revive Buddhism in its original form. To do this is to endeavour to put back the hands of the clock of the world's history, of the human understanding. As well—nay, better far—attempt to revive Platonism, a far nobler philosophy. Why should we not, on the same principle, try to re-establish the Copernican theory, or strive to bring once more into vogue the medical system of Galen and Hippocrates? The fact is that these systems, whether of Science or of Philosophy, have had their day, and to electrify them into even a semblance of vitality is impossible. Their work is done, the world has outgrown them. The Buddhism which it is attempted to revive is not really believed in even by the most zealous of its Western advocates.

The stream can rise no higher than its source. A revived Buddhism could not attain a higher moral or intellectual level than that occupied by Buddha himself in what were dark ages indeed in comparison with our own. We have seen what comes of such revivals under far more favourable circumstances in connexion with another faith, a religion and not a philosophy—the Muḥammadan. Made not by outsiders but by earnest believers in the creed, such attempts have resulted in the

production of a Mahdî, a Khalifeh, a Mad Mullâ, who have very fairly reproduced the character and the conduct of Muḥammad. A revival of pristine Buddhism might, if successful, show us characters more peaceful, it is true, but not less out of place at the present period of the world's history.

The world has not yet outgrown the Jesus of the Evangelists, and does not seem very likely soon to do so. If, therefore, those who long to revive *something*, and 'to work some deliverance in the earth,' would strive to revive in men's hearts something of the old faith and zeal, of the love and devotion, of early Christian times, they would be more likely to see their efforts crowned with success, they would be doing infinitely more good to their fellow-men, and be bringing nearer that glorious and now, perhaps, not so very

'far-off' Divine event,
To which the whole creation moves.'

LECTURE I

LIFE AND WORK OF THE BUDDHA

'Majjhena Tathāgato dhammam deseti.'

'Fecisti nos ad Te: et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in Te.'—AUGUSTINE: *Conf.*, lib. i., § 1.

THE period at which Buddhism arose in India was one which, whether we consider it from a political or from an intellectual standpoint, must undoubtedly be regarded as one of the most remarkable in the history of the world. The fall of Babylon in B.C. 538, when the Persian Empire under Cyrus arose on the ruins of the Assyrio-Babylonian, was one of the great turning-points in history, for it marked the passing away of the temporal power of the Semites and the accession of the Âryan (Japhetic) family of nations to the sovereignty of the world. In a somewhat similar manner, though more gradually, had the Semites themselves, more than a thousand years previously, wrested the pre-eminence from Accadians, Elamites, and Egyptians, members of another great division of the human race, known in the Bible as the Hamitic family. From the time of Cyrus to the present day the world has been ruled by the Âryan race, and their elevation to this exalted position took place in the lifetime of Gotamo Buddha.

The same period which witnessed the growing political ascendancy of the Âryan family of nations—that which

may be approximately included between the sixth and the fifth centuries before the Christian era—was noted for its fertility in the deepest religious and philosophical thought. To it we trace back the origin of Hellenic as well as that of Indian philosophy. And, although our ignorance of the time at which Zoroaster lived renders it impossible to assert with any certainty that the great religious and intellectual movement associated with his name coincided with the period of which we are now speaking, yet much may be said in favour of such a supposition. Nor was this great outburst of mental, and in some measure of spiritual, earnestness and effort by any means confined to the Âryan nations, as we learn from a study of the contemporary Chinese¹ and Hebrew writings. Over the whole, or nearly the whole, of the civilized world at that epoch there seems to have brooded a spirit of inquiry which is perhaps without a parallel in the intellectual history of mankind. With its results, as far as the Western world is concerned, all students of Greek philosophy are acquainted. Completely independent, doubtless, of the almost contemporary movement of Grecian thought, there gradually diffused itself in India at the time of which we write, and perhaps somewhat previously, a very general feeling of dissatisfaction with the religious doctrines of the Brâhmanical faith—of unbelief in the deities then worshipped by the Indian Âryans. This gave rise to a desire to obtain by thought and investigation some more satisfactory answer to the great problem of human existence and of human suffering than was afforded by the hymns of the Rîg Veda, the earliest ethnic scripture of the Âryan family, written in an ancient dialect, the meaning of which had almost ceased to be understood. Times had very

¹ Confucius was born in 551 B.C., and died in B.C. 478. Lao-tse was his contemporary and that of Buddha.

materially changed since the early Âryan conquerors of the Panjâb had poured forth their simple prayers to the gods of the elements and the great powers of Nature, as represented by Indra, Agni, the Maruts, the Âdityas, and similar deities. Men felt that there was, even in this world, something more necessary to render them truly happy than abundant herds of cattle, bountiful harvests, and victory over their foes. The lofty¹ conceptions of certain Divine attributes, which in early ages had been embodied in the Dyaush-pitâ and the Varuṇa of the Vedas, had now faded from men's minds along with much else of the ancient Âryan heritage of truth ; nor had they been able to replace these by any fuller and more realistic ideas regarding the Divine nature. On the other hand, their recognition of the existence of physical, mental, and moral evil in themselves and in the world at large, which knowledge had already to some degree found expression in more than one of the early hymns, had deepened. Thus, their lives and hearts had become darkened both by the loss of the realization of the Divine and by the acquisition of more correct ideas about man's actual condition in this life. The meaning of the sacrificial cultus of ancient times had been lost in the course of centuries. For these, among other reasons, thoughtful men felt their need of some fuller and more definite knowledge with regard to both this world and the next than the theories of the Upanishads could supply. Hence there gradually arose the six great systems of Hindū philosophy,² which

¹ See that grand hymn Ṛig-Veda x. 121.

² Called respectively the Sâṅkhya, the Yoga, the Nyâya, the Vaiśeshika, the Mīmāṃsâ, and the Vedânta *darśanas*. All these systems, as we have them, are post-Christian. But 'it seems likely that the founders of the six systems of philosophy . . . belonged to the same period of philosophical and religious fermentation which gave rise to the first spreading of Buddha's doctrines in India' (M. Müller,

testify to the immense amount of thought which the Indian mind in those ancient times had devoted to such matters. But even these philosophical systems,¹ though they appealed to a far larger portion of the community than did the philosophies of ancient Hellas, were far from satisfying even the intellectual, much less the moral and spiritual, needs of the mass of men. Perhaps they were dimly conscious that they required a religion in which they could truly believe, a revelation of God to the human heart. And, despairing of obtaining this, forgetting even God's existence, men fancied that they could by abstruse thought discover at least something more satisfying than anything which had yet been found. The Indian mind longed and sought for the best of all possible philosophies, hoping thereby, as on a raft (to use

'Six Systems of Indian Philosophy,' p. 117). It is probable that Jainism is more ancient than Buddhism (*vide, inter alia*, Thomas, 'The Early Faith of Aṣoka'), and doubtless exercised a great influence upon Buddha's mind. But we have not sufficient material to enable us to ascertain with precision what the very earliest Jaina tenets were.

¹ The question as to whether Buddha borrowed from any of these philosophies has been much discussed. Max Müller has pointed out that many ideas were common to all of these systems of philosophy, and that this common substratum had worked itself into the Indian mind in Buddha's time. This accounts for such resemblances as may be traced at times between Buddha's doctrines and now one, now another, of these philosophies ('The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy,' p. 137). Elsewhere he says: 'We have looked in vain for any definite similarities between the system of Kapila, as known to us in the Sāṅkhya-sūtras, and the Abhidharma or metaphysics of the Buddhists' ('Chips from a German Workshop,' vol. i., p. 226). Oldenberg ('Buddha,' English translation, p. 92, note) agrees with this dictum. Regarding the meaning of the word 'Abhidharma' (in Pāli 'Abhidhammo'), however, Professor Rhys Davids rightly denies that the term should be translated 'metaphysics.'

Plato's words), to cross in safety the sea of existence.¹ Men were longing for some positive system of teaching which, if not a sufficient answer to all the human spirit's questionings, might at least in some measure satisfy their minds. They were waiting for a philosophy which might solve some of the problems of human life, and might point out a way to escape from sorrow and suffering, if not in this existence, yet in some future state.

Buddhism, itself the natural² outcome of the age and country in which it arose, offered itself as the solution of these problems, the satisfaction of men's deep-felt need.

It is our object in these lectures to inquire into the nature and the value of the answer thus afforded, to seek to discover to what extent it is true and satisfactory. We shall deal with Buddhism as with any other system of philosophy ancient or modern, seeking to learn something from Buddha as we do from Socrates and Plato, from Aristotle, from Epictetus, from Marcus Aurelius, Descartes, Hegel, and Kant. In order to do this, it will be necessary to investigate the root-ideas and main principles of Buddha's teaching, and to consider in what degree Buddha succeeded in his noble and daring attempt to evolve a philosophy which might confer the greatest benefit upon the whole human race.

¹ *Εἰ μὴ τις δύναται ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιότερου ὁχήματος ἢ λόγου θεῖου τινὸς διαπορευθῆναι.*—'Phædo,' xxxv. 85 D.

² 'With regard to the relation of Buddhism to the six orthodox systems, it seems to me that all we can honestly say is that schools of philosophy handing down doctrines very similar to those of our six classical or orthodox systems are presupposed by the Buddhist Suttas. But this is very different from the opinion held by certain scholars, that Buddha and his disciples actually borrowed from our Sûtras. We know nothing of Sâṃkhya literature before the Sâṃkhya-kârikâs, which belong to the sixth century after Christ' (Max Müller, 'Six Systems,' pp. 119, 120).

For, indeed, nothing short of this was what Buddha aimed at achieving, and doubtless believed that he had achieved. Brâhmanism, in its earliest form, had originally been exclusively the faith of the Âryan conquerors of Hindûstân; and, although the descendants of the conquered might be permitted to attach themselves to one or other of the numerous lower castes which gradually arose, yet, even as early as the Laws of Manu, we find that none but members of the three highest (the original Âryan) castes were permitted to hear the words of the Vedas.¹ Any transgression of this rule, even when purely accidental, was severely, even inhumanly, punished. All foreigners, or *Mlechhas*, were beyond the pale; and the idea of admitting them to the full religious privileges of the Hindûs seems never even to have occurred to the most enlightened of the Brâhmans. The nearest approach to anything of the kind is to be found in the fact that the mendicant ascetic teachers, having left the world, did not recognise among their disciples any distinction of caste. Doubtless it was because all the members of the Order which he founded were mendicants that Buddha acted on the same principle, and not from any opposition to either the Brâhmans or to caste in general. But the fact remains that Buddha admitted to the ranks of his disciples, and to instruction in the law which he inculcated, all who desired it, to whatever nationality or caste they might belong.² In going far beyond the limits of India in

¹ Manu, *Dharmaśâstra*, book i. The laws of Manu are now supposed to have assumed their present form between 500 and 300 years before Christ, though the Hindûs ascribe to them a great antiquity. But they doubtless contain regulations which had been in force for centuries before they were written down and codified.

² He afterwards modified this in practice by forbidding the admission to the Order of certain classes of persons.

later times to proclaim the new faith, the monks of his Order were but carrying out the wishes and putting into practice the principles which their teacher had taught them. Nay, more, they believed that they were but obeying his express command.¹ In order properly to estimate the importance of Buddha's action in the matter, we must remember that no previous attempt had ever been made in the history of the world to found anything of the nature of a universal religion. Judaism, it is true, contained within those of its sacred books which existed before Buddha's time the Divine promise that, in future ages, all the nations of the world would receive blessing through the coming Saviour; but Judaism itself was as strictly limited to the Chosen People as was any other of the great national religions to the nation which professed it. It is a great proof of Buddha's liberality of sentiment as well as of his sincere conviction of the vital importance of the doctrines which he inculcated, and of their unflinching efficacy when carried out in practice, that he ventured to conceive such a grand philanthropic scheme. And it is not too much to say that the very fact that, for many centuries after his death, his disciples so successfully endeavoured by peaceful² means to pro-

¹ Mahāvaggo, i., § 11, 1; § 12, 1, etc.

² This does not imply that force was *never* used to spread Buddhism in India. Aśoka's language seems at least to suggest that he employed something more than merely moral influence. He says that, 'during the year and more' that had elapsed since he began to exert himself for the spread of the faith, 'those gods that were [held to be] true gods in Jambudvīpa [India] have been made [to be regarded as] men and false' — 'Etena cha aptalena Jambudīpasi ammisam devā[hu]saṃ ta muuisā misaṃ devakāṭā' (Sahasrām Edict). So also in the Rūpnāth Edict he says: 'Yi imāya kālāya Jambudīpasi amisā devā-husu te dāni masā katā' — 'Those [supposed] true gods which at this time were in Jambudvīpa are now made [to be regarded as] false.' (See Bühler's 'Three New Edicts of Aśoka,' pp. 25-27.)

pagate the tenets they had embraced proves that Buddhism had shown itself to be in some respects a great advance upon the attempts previously made in India to answer some of the great questions of the human mind and spirit. We are prepared, therefore, to find in the teaching of Buddha some elements of truth, however much error of one kind or another may be found mingled therewith. While gladly recognising these truths or half-truths, it will, however, be our endeavour not to permit ourselves to be, through any false liberality of thought, blinded to the existence of those errors in Buddhism which ultimately led to its extinction in the land of its birth. Nor should we fail to learn from the noble aspirations, the self-sacrificing life, and the many wise words of Buddha, as well as from his errors and failures, some lessons which may be useful to us in our own day and generation. A knowledge of the real nature and teachings of Buddhism should lead every thoughtful and earnest student to value more highly than ever before the Dayspring from on high which has visited us, to guide our feet into the way of peace.

At the very threshold of our inquiries it is of the first importance to a right understanding of Buddhism to remember the dread fact that, ere Buddha's time, India had entirely lost all true knowledge of God. So completely had all real belief in Him faded away, that in the whole of the literature of early Buddhism we fail to find any clear trace of the consciousness of the very possibility of His existence. Pantheism had, in the minds of all thoughtful men, developed into practical atheism. The Brâhmanical creed, *Ekamevâdvitīyam*, 'There is One Being, without a second,' resolved all things into the Deity—or, rather, into what the Greeks would call

to *θεῖον*, an impersonal, unconscious being, the *Sad-a-sat*¹ (Existent non-Existent)—and held that all the visible Universe was *Māyā*² or Illusion. In such a system there was no room for a Creator, and even human personality was considered a delusion. This was the general belief of the society in which Buddha was born, and it exerted a very great influence upon his whole system of philosophy. It was doubtless for this reason that the two great questions which presented themselves to Thales³ and other early Greek philosophers as imperatively demanding solution—the problem of the genesis of the Universe and the Nature of God—did not seem to Buddha deserving of serious attention. Yet the fact of the existence of a world of suffering, misery, and hopelessness was very patent to Buddha, and with

¹ 'Det begynnelösa högsta Brahman kallas icke varande och icke icke-varande' (Elkund, 'Nirvāṇa,' p. 75, quoting from Dahlmann, 'Nirvāṇa,' p. 54). Cf. Bhagavadgīta, xi., śl. 37, where Arjuna, addressing Kriṣṇa, says :

'Ananta deveṣa jagannivāsa
Tvam aksharam, *sadasat*, tat param yat.'

² This was in particular the doctrine of the Vedānta philosophy, but it largely affected the Sāṅkhya school also. The Bhagavadgīta and several Upanishads are connected with both systems: 'In der Philosophie des Mahābhārata—ihre technische Benennung ist Sāṅkhya-Yoga—ist Brahman noch immer dasselbe einige, ewige Sein, wie es in den Upanishaden verkündigt wird' (Elkund, 'Nirvāṇa,' résumé, p. vi).

³ Μέρη δὲ φιλοσοφίας τρία, φυσικόν, ἠθικόν, διαλεκτικόν. φυσικόν μὲν τὸ περὶ κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἠθικόν δὲ τὸ περὶ βίου καὶ τῶν πρὸς ἡμᾶς διαλεκτικόν δὲ τὸ ἀμφοτέρων τοὺς λόγους πρεσβεῖον. καὶ μέχρι μὲν Ἀρχελάου τὸ φυσικόν εἶδος ἦν ἀπὸ δὲ Σωκράτους . . . τὸ ἠθικόν ἀπὸ δὲ Ζήνωνος τοῦ Ἐλεάτου τὸ διαλεκτικόν (Diogenes Laertius, 'Vit. Phil.,' Proœmium xiii. 18). Thales held water to be the origin of all things (*ibid.*, lib. i., vi. 27), but among his recorded sayings are: Πρεσβύτατον τῶν ὄντων, θεός ἀγέννητον γάρ. κάλλιστον, κόσμος ποίημα γὰρ θεοῦ (*loc. cit.*, lib. i., ix. 35).

regard to that matter, at least, he parted company with the philosophy of his time. He felt that regard *that* fact there was no illusion, and upon belief in it his whole system was founded. The one great task which he set himself with all his might to accomplish was, Given the existence of a world of suffering, to find the cause of that suffering and the way to escape from it.¹ As has well been said,² 'His object was to get rid of the terrible burden of an existence without God and without hope,' which he felt to be 'all the more grievous because—on the theory of a belief in the transmigration of the soul or of repeated births—life does not end with physical death.' To Buddha life seemed not only to be entirely devoid of an object, and therefore valueless, but a curse instead of a blessing. But while all the happiness of life seemed delusory, or even worse, yet 'all that causes suffering—birth, sickness, death, separation from what is dear to us and union with what is hateful'³—remained. 'And this stream of misery and tears extends backwards to all eternity . . . and stretches forward to all the eternities. This is what is implied in the ceaseless passing of all beings . . . into life, until they die, and again from death, by means of repeated births, into a new existence full of suffering.' Buddha sought, and professed to have found, for himself and for all who would learn from him, a means of deliverance from this chain of existence, which, under such circumstances and

¹ 'Der Buddhismus ist eine Philosophie des Leidens und der Erlösung. Die Überzeugung von dem Elende des Daseins und das durchdringende Gefühl der Erlösungsbedürftigkeit geben dem Buddhismus Gestalt und Farbe' (J. Dahlmann, 'Buddha,' p. 15).

² Grau, 'The Goal of the Human Race,' English translation, pp. 145 *et seq.*

³ Grau, *op. cit.*, pp. 146, 147; *cf.* Oldenberg, 'Buddha: sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde,' p. 258 *et seq.*

apart from God, he rightly deemed to be never-ending misery and despair. In judging his system of philosophy, we must not forget at what he aimed¹ and under what circumstances he arrived at the conclusions which he reached.

The exact date at which Buddha lived has only recently been discovered. On the evidence of the inscriptions of King Aṣoka Piyadassi (*Priyadarshin*), Professor Bühler² fixes the year of his death at B.C. 477-478.

¹ The aim of the Sāṅkhya school of Kapila was very similar, for in Iṣvara-Kṛishṇa's 'Sāṅkhya-Kārikā' the leading principle of the philosophy of Kapila is thus stated :

'Duhkhatrayābhighātājijñāsā tadapaghātake hetau' (verse 1).

'From the assault of the threefold kinds of suffering [arises] the desire to know the method by which they may be repelled.'

The Bhagavadgīta shows that other questions more akin to Greek philosophy occurred to other minds, for there we find Arjuna asking Kṛishṇa :

'Kiṃ tad brahma, kim adyâtman, kiṃ karma, purushottama ?
Adhibhûtam ca kiṃ proktam, adhidaivam kim ucyate ?
Adhiyajñah katham ko 'tra dehe 'smin, Madhusûdana ?
Prayānakāle ca katham jñeyo 'si niyatâtmabhih ?'

'What is that *brahman* [=θεῖον], what the Over-soul, what *karma*, O best of beings ?

'And what is the so-called Over-existent, what is the Over-fate called ?

'How and what is the Over-sacrifice here in this body, O destroyer of Madhu ?

'And at the time of expiring, how art thou to be known to humble [bound] souls ?'

The 'threefold kinds of suffering' referred to in the Sāṅkhya philosophy are respectively the suffering which originates from one's self, that caused by animate things of this world, and that produced by the action of the deities (*devas*).

² Bühler ('Three New Edicts of Asoka,' p. 20) says that he agrees with Professor Max Müller, General Cunningham, and others, on the

His birth therefore occurred in B.C. 557-558, as he is said to have lived for eighty¹ years. Tradition states that the place of his birth was a grove named Lumbini,² near the city of Kapilavastu,³ at the foot of Mount Pvalpa in the Himālaya ranges, within the present territory of Nipāl. The traditional spot has quite recently been discovered, and an inscription of King Piyadassi (Aṣoka)⁴ found there states that, in the twentieth year of his reign, the King visited the spot, which on the stone itself he calls 'the birthplace of Śākya⁵-Muni.' His father, Suddhodano, is termed in the Buddhavaṃso⁶ a rājā,

evidence of the Edicts, in believing that the date of the Nirvāna of Buddha is B.C. 477-478. 'If, therefore,' he adds, 'the date 477-478 for the Nirvāna should eventually be proved to be wrong, the fault cannot be more than five or six years one way or the other.'

¹ In his last year, in the verses quoted in the notes to p. 17, he speaks of having lived fifty years since he left home at the age of twenty-nine. Again, in Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ, p. 23, when about to die, he says he is eighty years old (*vide* p. 57, below).

² 'Jāto Sakyānaṃ game janapade Lampuneyye' (Nālakasuttaṃ). The place is still called 'Rumin-dei'—*i.e.*, Lumbini Devī. See on the subject an article by Birdwood in the *Buddhist*, Colombo, October 1, 1897; also 'Sitzungsberichte der Königlich: Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin,' 1897, p. 594, and authorities quoted by Gründwedel, 'Mythologie des Buddhismus,' p. 197, note 5.

³ In Pāli 'Kapilavatthu.' This small city stood on the banks of the little river Rohiṇī (still called by the same name), probably, as Dr. Hoey thinks, somewhere near Taulihwā, a Nepalese Tahsīlī station between the Jamwār and Bāngangā Rivers, about seven miles north of the British frontier. The Aciravatī, a river often mentioned in the Buddhist Scriptures, is now known as the Rapti.

⁴ Aṣoka reigned from B.C. 257 to 220.

⁵ This title of Buddha merely means 'the Ascetic of the Śākya tribe' (see below).

⁶ Buddhavaṃsa, xxvi. 13:

'Nagaraṃ Kapilavatthu me rājā Suddhodano pitā,
Mayhaṃ janettikā mātā Māyā devī ti vuccati.'

which cannot mean more than the same title does in India to-day. Professor Oldenberg shows that we have absolutely no evidence that Suddhodano was a territorial monarch,¹ and hence all that has been said of Buddha's resignation of his ancestral kingdom falls to the ground. Buddha's mother was named Māyā, and his parents belonged to the Śākya tribe (in Pāli, Sakko). This tribe, as their name implies, was part of a fair-skinned Indo-Scythian² or Tâtar nation, the Śakas³ (Greek Σάκαι, Latin *Sacæ*), that overran a large portion of India before the Âryan invasion. They had become in process of time in great measure Âryanized, and hence Buddha's family belonged to the Kshattriya or warrior caste. Buddha's own original⁴ name was

So also *op. cit.*, ii. 66 :

'Imassa janikā mātā Māyā nāma bhavissati,
Pitā Suddhodano nāma ayaṃ hessati Gotamo.'

But in this last extract Suddhodano is not called a rājā ; see also Mahāvaggo, i. 54, 1.

¹ 'The idea that Buddha's father, Suddhodana, enjoyed this royal dignity is quite foreign to the oldest forms in which the traditions regarding the family are presented to us ; rather, we have nothing more or less to contemplate in Suddhodana than one of the great and wealthy land-owners of the Śākya race, whom later legends first transformed into the great King Suddhodana' ('Buddha,' p. 99). Elsewhere (pp. 416, 417) he denies the antiquity of the tradition which makes Buddha's father a King. *Vide* also Mon. Williams, 'Buddhism,' p. 22.

² *Vide* Mon. Williams' Sanskrit Dictionary, new edition, s.v. *Śaka*.

³ The tradition of Buddha's Scythian origin explains what is said about Manês' indebtedness to Scythianus (by which Buddha is evidently meant) in a Greek ecclesiastical historian (Socrates, 'Hist. Ecc.,' lib. i., cap. xxii.).

⁴ But Mon. Williams doubts this, and believes that this name was merely honorific, and conferred on him later ('Buddhism,' p. 23). Of course, the word 'Buddha' itself is an appellation which he did not acquire until after his attainment to Bodhī (see below), and means 'the Knower.'

Siddhārtha (in Pāli, Siddhattho), but he is also styled Gautama (in Pāli, Gotamo), which seems to have been a family name. Māyā, we are informed, died seven¹ days after her son's birth, and he was brought up by her sister,² his foster-mother, Mahāprajāpatī (in Pāli, Mahāpajāpati), who was herself also one of Suddhodano's wives. The sacred books of the southern Buddhists, which alone afford any information on the subject worthy of even the slightest consideration, contain no biography of the noble youth,³ the nearest approach to one being the short account in verse found in the twenty-sixth chapter of the Buddhavaṃso. But certain details are to be found scattered about among the other books⁴ of the Southern Canon. His youth was passed at Kapilavastu or in its neighbourhood, but the early Buddhist records tell us nothing whatever

¹ This is often asserted in the Pāli books. On Buddha's birth, see note at the end of the fourth lecture.

² Cullavaggo, x. 1, 3.

³ The story of the child's presentation to the Rishi Asito (Nālaka-suttam of the Sutta-Nipāto), or Kāḷadevalo (Jāt. Atṭh, i., p. 54), is evidently of later origin. It underwent great amplification in later times still (*vide* Beal, 'Romantic History of Buddha,' p. 56 *et seq.*), but even in the introduction to the Jātaka the legendary nature of the story is evident. It begins thus: 'On this same day the happy and delighted hosts of the Heaven of the Thirty-three held a celebration, waving their cloaks and giving other signs of joy, because to King Suddhodano in Kapilavastu had been born a son who should sit at the foot of the Bo-tree and become a Buddha. Now it came to pass at that time that an ascetic named Kāḷadevalo . . . went, after his daily meal, to the Heaven of the Thirty-three to take his noon-day rest,' etc. (from Warren's translation, 'Buddhism in Translations,' pp. 48, 49).

⁴ *E.g.*, in the Cullavaggo, the Aṅguttara-Nikāyo, and the Mahāparinibbāna-Suttam; also, mixed with many wonderful fables of later growth, in the Acchariyabahutasuttam of the Majjh.-Nikāyo. *Cf.* also accounts in the Dīgh.-Nik., Sutta-Nipāto, Mahāvaggo, Saṃyut.-Nik., etc.

of the philosophical studies to which he is sometimes supposed to have devoted himself. He resided with his father during the winter, summer, and the rainy season in one or another of the three¹ country-seats which early tradition has dignified with the title of 'palaces.' In accordance with the custom of early marriage, which then existed in India as it does now, he was married probably at the age of sixteen or seventeen years. We are uncertain as to the number of his wives. The Buddhavaṃso represents him as stating that he possessed no fewer than 40,000 of them,² but one is especially mentioned as the mother of Rāhulo, his only recorded

¹ Maj.-Nik., 75; so also in Aṅg.-Nik., quoted below, and Buddhavaṃso, xxvi. 14. This was customary in rich families (Cull., vii. 1, 1); compare what is said of the rich youth Yaso (Mahāvaggo, i. 7, 1). Of course, this account of Buddha's palaces may be borrowed from this latter passage, as from this very passage is borrowed (in the Lalita-Vistara, p. 521; Jātaka, i., p. 61, etc.) the story of Buddha's disgust at seeing the dishevelled condition of the sleeping women (so Rhys Davids and Oldenberg think: 'Sacred Books of the East,' vol. xiii., p. 102). In the Aṅg.-Nik. Buddha gives the following account of his early luxury: 'Sukhumālo ahaṃ, bhikkhave, paramasukhumālo accanta-sukhumālo. Mama sukhaṃ, bhikkhave, pitu nivesane pokkharāṇiyo hāriyākā honti; ekattha sukhaṃ, bhikkhave, uppalaṃ vappati, ekattha padumaṃ, ekattha puṇṇarikaṃ, yāvad evam athāya. Na kho pana es' ahaṃ, bhikkhave, kāsikaṃ candanaṃ dhāremi, kāsikaṃ, bhikkhave, su me taṃ veṭhanaṃ hoti, kāsikā kañcukā, kāsikaṃ nivāsanaṃ, kāsiko uttarāsaṅgo. Rattidivaṃ kho pana me su taṃ, bhikkhave, setachattaṃ dhāreyya mā naṃ phussi sītaṃ vā, uṇhaṃ vā, tiṇaṃ vā, rajo vā, ussāvo vā, ti. Tassa mayhaṃ, bhikkhave, tayo pāsādā ahesuṃ, eko hemantiko, eko gimhantiko, eko vassiko ti. So kho ahaṃ, bhikkhave, vassikapāsāde vassike cattāro māse nippurisehi turiyehi paricāriyamāno na heṭṭha pāsādā orohāmi. Yathā kho pana, bhikkhave, aññesaṃ nivesane dāsakammakarāporisassa kaṇḍjakaṃ bhojanaṃ diyyati bilaṅga-dutiyaṃ evam eva su me, bhikkhave, pitu nivesane dāsakammakarāporisassa sālīmaṃsodano diyyati' (quoted by Oldenberg, 'Buddha,' p. 418).

² Buddhavaṃso, xxvi., canto 15.

child. Traditions differ as to the name she bore. That which has been most generally adopted by European scholars is Yasodharā,¹ but this name is not given to her in the canonical Pāli books, where she is sometimes spoken of as Bhaddakaccā.² The fact that in the sacred books she is generally styled simply Rāhulamātā,³ 'the mother of Rāhulo,' makes it probable that even in very early times her name was unknown.

This is all that can be stated with any certainty about Buddha's early life. From the time of his marriage until he attained the age of twenty-nine years he lived the life of a 'householder,' and no event of that period is known to us except the mere fact of his son's birth. Nor do the more ancient Pāli books afford us the information at precisely what time before he left his home his son Rāhulo was born. But not long after the recluse had attained Buddhahood, when his visit to his home is mentioned, his son is called 'young⁴ Rāhulo.' This does not conflict with the later legend, which states that the child was an infant⁵ when the 'Great Renunciation' took place.

¹ *E.g.*, by Sir Edwin Arnold in the 'Light of Asia'; also by Mon. Williams, 'Buddha,' p. 25. She is so called in the 'Romantic History.'

² Buddhavaṃso, xxvi. 15. Childers (Pāli Dictionary, *s.v.*) says she is mentioned in the Pāli books also as 'Bhaddakaccāna.' In the books of the Mahāyāna, or 'Great Vehicle,' which are held as canonical by the Northern Buddhists, though they are of very late date as compared with those of the Southern Canon, she is often called 'Gopā.' She is called 'Yasodharā' in the Buddha-carita (i. 26, 46, *et passim*). *Vide* the subject discussed in Rhys Davids' 'Buddhism' (Non-Christian Religious Systems Series), p. 50 *et seq.*

³ This is so even in the Jātaka (i. 58, 60, etc.).

⁴ Mahāvaggo, i. 54, 1, 2.

⁵ This is stated also in the introduction to the Jātaka (i. 60 *et seq.*). We are there told that Buddha named his son Rāhulo, or a 'hindrance,'

When Siddhârtha was twenty-nine¹ years of age, leaving his home and all the pleasures of life, he retired into the wilderness, and became an ascetic anchorite. At that time in India there was nothing at all uncommon in such conduct, nor has the practice of thus retiring from the world by any means ceased in the India of our own time. The laws of Manu enjoin that every Brâhman shall spend his old age as a solitary ascetic. This, doubtless, was a practice which was in vogue for centuries before those laws were drawn up in their present form. It was incumbent upon Brâhman, because their priestly caste seemed to make it more natural for them than for others to leave the things of the world and to aim at attaining union with the Divine. But this same course was the only one open to any man at all anxious about spiritual things, if he wished to attain to calm of heart. Asceticism, coupled with meditation, was then, and had for ages been, considered to be the one means of freeing one's self from the fetters of existence, the necessary condition for spiritual progress. Buddha was not himself a Brâhman by caste; yet under these circumstances we may well understand that he, feeling the vanity of all mere earthly joys and sensual pleasures, and finding therein nothing to quench the thirst of his spirit, was readily drawn to follow the usual procedure in

evidently because likely to bind him to worldly life (*Bodhisatto taṃ sutvā*, — the news of his son's birth, — *Rāhulo jāto, bandhanaṃ jātan-ti āha* : *loc. cit.*).

¹ Buddhavaṃso, xxvi. 14. So also in Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ it is stated in the verses :

‘Ekūnatimso vayasā, Subhadda,
 Yaṃ pabbajim kimpusalānvesī.
 Vassāni paññāsamādhikāni
 Yato ahaṃ pabbajito, Subhadja,
 Ñāyassa dhammassa padesaṃvattī.’

such cases. Many, both before and after him in all ages and in all lands, having learnt that the world cannot give them peace of heart, have similarly determined to forsake the world with all its joys and sorrows, its pleasures and its temptations, and to seek for something higher and nobler than the things of sense.

The reason for his retirement from the world will become clearer if we for a moment glance at some of the leading philosophical ideas of the time.

Plato has well and truly observed of the Greek nation that their great characteristic was the love of knowledge.¹ This is in great measure true of other divisions of the Âryan race as well, but it certainly holds good even more of the Indian Âryans than of those of ancient Hellas. Hence perhaps it is that the philosophy of the Upanishads makes Ignorance (*Avidyā*) the cause of so many of the evils of life. Not only does each of the sacred books of the Brâhmaṇs bear the title of *Veda* (Knowledge), but in India, in early ages as well as at present, *Knowledge* is supposed to possess magical efficacy, especially such knowledge as enables its possessor to burst the bands² of Illusion (*Māyā*) and to recognise the truth of the Hindū creed, *Ekamevādviṭyam*, thereby attaining to *yoga* or *union* with the *Paramātmā*, the Supreme Soul, the only truly existent Being. The supposed efficacy of Knowledge was, in the opinion of the Hindūs, rivalled only by that of austerity, or asceticism (*tapas*, self-torture), which might even be

¹ 'De Republica,' book iv., § 11.

² So in the Sāṅkhya philosophy the *Purusha*, ultimately by *Knowledge* (*Jñānam*), reaches the conviction of his own non-existence :

'Evaṃ tattvābhyāsānnāsmi na me nāhamityaparīśeṣhaṃ :
Aviparyayādviśuddhaṃ kevalamutpadyate jñānam '

'Sāṅkhya-Kārikā,' verse 64.

carried so far as to exalt the Brâhman ascetic above the gods themselves. Sanskrit poetry is full of tales of how certain Brâhman¹ not only ventured to enter into contest with the gods for supremacy in virtue of their austerities, but even caused the gods to quake for their power, and compelled them to devise temptations for the Brâhman in order to induce the latter to relax their exertions. Buddha would therefore naturally hold it as a fact requiring no proof that, either by means of asceticism or through attaining the requisite degree of knowledge (to be obtained not by study but by intense meditation), he might gain rest and peace, deliverance from passion and from all the transitoriness of worldly joy and sorrow, pleasure and pain. We shall find that he adopted both these methods, the latter only after failing to obtain what he sought by means of the former.

As has already been pointed out, in leaving his home in order to wander about the country as a religious mendicant, Buddha took a step which, while to us Europeans of the twentieth century it may appear strange, seemed quite natural to the people among whom he lived—as, indeed, similar conduct actually does to a Hindū of to-day. But this very fact should lead us to feel the deepest sympathy, not with Siddhârtha alone, but with all those countless myriads—some of them, it may be, in some respects, among the noblest of men—who have deeply felt the pangs of spiritual thirst, that thirst of the soul of the universality of which Homer of old spoke so eloquently,² and have known no better than did his heroes where to find the Water of

¹ Vide examples in, e.g., Bopp's '*Indralokagamanam, nebst anderen Episodien,*' and '*Diluvium, cum tribus aliis Mahâbhâratae Episodiis.*'

² Πάντες δὲ θεῶν χατέουσ' ἄνθρωποι ('*Odyss.*,' iii. 48).

Life, wherewith to quench its flames and allay their tortures. It is, we may be sure, no slight longing, no trifling unrest of mind, that forces men to leave all the tender ties of home and family, to forsake all the innocent pleasures as well as the alluring vices of the world, to go forth homeless and friendless, to wander ceaselessly from town to town, from village to village, from one teacher to another it may be, trying to stifle the noblest as well as the lower and baser instincts of humanity, and thus to gain for their desolate souls that peace and rest of heart for which they yearn in vain.

In the *Aṅguttara-Nikāyo*, Siddhārtha, after attaining Buddhahood, is represented as explaining to his disciples the reason why he forsook his home and withdrew from the world. Having described his wealth and the comfort and luxury in which he had been brought up,¹ he spoke thus :

‘Then² these thoughts arose with me. “A weak-minded, everyday man, although he is himself liable to decay, and is not free from the power of old age, feels horror, revulsion and disgust, if he sees another person in old age. The horror which he then feels recoils upon himself: I also am subject to decay, and am not free from the power of old age. . . .” While I thus reflected, O mendicants, in my own mind, all that buoyancy of youth, which dwells in the young, sank within me.’ He proceeds to use similar language regarding his thoughts concerning and his dread of sickness and death, and thus concludes, ‘While I, O mendicants, thus reflected in my mind, all that spirit of life which dwells in life sank within me.’ Again, in

¹ See the original quoted in notes to p. 15.

² I quote, with but few changes, Oldenberg’s translation (‘*Buddha*,’ p. 102).

another passage he says: 'I,¹ indeed, . . . being still young, in the time of adolescence, endued with bright youth, in the first time of life, my mother and father being unwilling and tearful and weeping, having shaved off my hair and beard, having put on yellow robes, having gone forth from home into homelessness, seeking "What is happiness?" searching out the supreme, best state of calm, went to where Âlâro Kâlâmo was.'

We thus learn that Siddhârtha's reason for 'the Great² Renunciation,' as it has been called, was his conviction that all worldly happiness was transitory, and his desire to attain to a peace and calm which nothing could disturb or end. He sought this first for himself alone, and only afterwards did the thought occur to him that what had brought peace to him would be equally beneficial to others.

On³ beginning his life as an anchoret, Siddhârtha first attached⁴ himself to a hermit named Âlâmo Kâlâmo,⁵ as we have just read. After a while, leaving him, the

¹ 'So kho ahaṃ . . . daharo 'va samāno, susukâlake, sobhadrena yobbanena samannâgato, paṭhamena vayasā, akâmakânaṃ mâtâ-pitunnaṃ, assumukhânaṃ, rudantînaṃ, kesamassuṃ ohâretvâ, kâsâyaṇi vatthâni acchâdetvâ, agârasmâ anagâriyaṃ pabbajito samāno, kimpkusala-gavesî, anuttaraṃ santivarapadaṃ paṇiyesamāno, yena Âlâro Kâlâmo, ten' upasaṃkamim' (Mahâsaccaka - Suttaṃ). A somewhat similar passage occurs in the Soṇadaṇḍa-Suttaṃ of the Dîgha-Nikâyo.

² 'Mahâbhinikkhamaṇaṃ,' Pâli; 'Mahâbhinishkramaṇaṃ,' Sanskrît.

³ A later legend, which we first meet with in the introduction to the Jâtaka, relates that the sight of a decrepit old man, a sick man, a corpse, and a monk, finally decided Siddhârtha to leave the world (Jâtaka, i. 58, 59). The writer there quotes from the Dîgha-Nikâyo. A much amplified and still more legendary account is given in the 'Romantic History of Buddha,' Beal's translation, p. 115 *et seq.*

⁴ The Jâtaka (i. 66) says that first of all he went to Râjagâhaṃ, and there met King Bimbisâro; but this probably took place later.

⁵ Cf. Mahâvaggo, v. 13, 1, and the Ariyapariyosâna-Suttaṃ. The Lalita-Vistara mentions this, though it cannot be quoted as an authority (Lal.-Vist., p. 295 *et seq.*).

young devotee went for instruction to another recluse named Uddako¹ Râmaputto. In each case he expressed his desire to 'walk² the religious walk,' according to their respective rules, hoping thus to attain to the *Nirvâna*³ which the Hindūs sought. But, though practising the self-concentration and the other methods which they enjoined until he became exactly like themselves, Siddhârtha ultimately found that he could not thus attain his goal. The conclusion he reached in each case is thus expressed in his own words: 'This Law conducts neither to disgust with the world, nor to release from passion, nor to annihilation, nor to quietude, nor to supernatural knowledge, nor to perfect Buddhahood, nor to *Nirvâna*, while it leads to rebirth in the Realm of Nothingness.' The 'Realm of Nothingness' is the name of the third of the heavens of the Formless Beings (*Arûpabrahmalokâ*), and it is so called because its inhabitants believe that nothing exists.⁴

Failing thus to obtain the 'supreme, best state of

¹ *Mahāvaggo*, i. 5, 2; *Lal.-Vist.*, p. 296 *et seq.*

² 'Icchâm' aham, âvuso, imasmim dhammavinaye brahmacariyam caritun-ti' (*Ariyapariyosâna-Suttam*).

³ The Hindū idea of *Nirvâna* differed considerably from that which Buddha ultimately taught his followers to aim at. It may be briefly explained as consisting of the loss of one's personality in the Divine, or, rather, deliverance from the delusion of personality. See Elkund, '*Nirvâna*,' p. 75: '*Nirvâna* är nu just att blifva detta Brahman, blifva ett därmed, få sitt lif "absorberadt i Brahman." Det är detsamma som att finna och kanna sitt sjalf, Åtman, såsom Brahman. "Nå *Nirvâna*" och "blifva Brahman" äro ett. "De göra sig lösa från alla söndrande kvaliteter och ingå i det eviga kvalitetslösa varat." Vide also Dahlmann, '*Nirvâna*,' pp. 54, 55, 68.

⁴ Childers, *Pāli Dictionary*, s.v. *Ākiñcaññāyatanam*. Buddha's words are: 'Tassa mayham, bhikkave, etad ahoṣi: *Nāyaṃ dhammo nibbidāya, na virāgāya, na nirodhāya, na upasamāya, na abhiññāya, na sambodhāya, na nibbānāya samvattati, yāvad eva ākiñcaññāyatanūpapattiyā ti*' (*Ariyapariyosâna-Suttam*).

calm' for which he sought, Siddhârtha then resolved to endeavour to attain it by practising extreme self-mortification. Travelling through Magadha, he reached the town of Uruvelâ,¹ on the banks of the river Nerañjarâ; and there, dwelling in the woods, holding his breath, abstaining almost entirely from food, he strove to obtain the calm for which he longed. Five² other ascetics there joined him, but Siddhârtha outstripped them all in his self-inflicted privations, and won their admiration by his devotion to his task. At last, however, finding that he was no nearer his goal, he desisted from this method, and partook of more abundant food. His companions, deeming him a renegade, left him alone in disgust, and went away to Banâras. This period³ of fruitless search is said to have lasted for seven years, reckoning from the time when Siddhârtha left his home to the date of his enlightenment.

One night, as he sat meditating in the woods near Uruvelâ, under a *pīpal*,⁴ or *Ficus religiosa*, since known

¹ Still called 'Urwal'; it stands on the eastern bank of the river Sôn, not far from Buddhagayâ, to the south of Patnâ. The Nerañjarâ (Sanskrit 'Nairañjarâ') is the modern Sôn.

² Their names were Koṇḍañño, Vappo, Bhaddiyo, Mahânâmo, and Assaji. See note to Mahāvaggo, i. 6, 5; 'Sacred Books of the East,' vol. xiii., p. 90.

³ Oldenberg ('Buddha,' p. 420), in support of the statement that seven years elapsed before Buddha's enlightenment, quotes the following passages :

'Satta vassâni Bhagavantam anubandhim padâpam
Otâram nâdhigacchissam sambuddhassa satimato.'

Padhâna-Suttaṃ of the Sutta-Nipâto.

'Tena kho pana samayena, Mâro pâpimâ satta vassâni Bhagavantam anubaddho hoti otârâpekho otâram alabhamâno' (Mâra-Samyuttaṃ of the Saṃy.-Nikâyo, iv., § 4, 2).

The Hindûs regard this tree as sacred, and no one will venture to utter an untruth under a *pīpal*-tree; hence, probably, Buddha chose one to reflect under.

as the Sacred Bo-Tree¹ (*Bodhi-rukkho*, or Tree of Buddhahood), he fell into deep reflection. This resulted in his passing in some mysterious manner from one degree of abstraction to another, until he at last reached omniscience (*sambodhi*), and not only knew the past and future, but also discovered the cause and cure of all human existence and consequent suffering. Only after this had he the right to the title of *Buddha*, or 'the Knower.' His own account runs thus²:

'When I thus knew that' (the Four Noble Truths which formed the basis of all his later teaching), 'when I thus beheld that, my mind was released from the defilement of sensual desire, my mind was released from the defilement of earthly existence, my mind was released from the defilement of heresy, my mind was released from the defilement of ignorance. In the emancipated arose the knowledge, "I am emancipated, rebirth is extinct, the religious walk is accomplished, what had to be done is done, there is no more need for this present existence": thus did I perceive.'

The lofty position which Buddha after this claimed for himself is thus stated in the words which he is said³ to have uttered shortly afterwards in answer to a gymnosophist, Upako of the Ājīvaka sect, who asked him,

¹ A branch of this tree was planted in Ceylon (at Anurādhapura) in B.C. 288, and is well known to exist there still.

² 'Tassa me evaṃ jānato, evaṃ passato, kāmāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccittha, bhavāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccittha, diṭṭhāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccittha, avijjāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccittha. Vimuttasmim, "Vimutt' amhīti," ūānaṃ ahoṣi, "khīṇā me jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ, nāparaṃ itthattāyā" ti abbhāññāsim' (Mahāsaccaka-Suttaṃ). Vide also Vibhaṅga-Vinaya Pīṭakaṃ, iii., p. 4 *et seq.*; Bhayabherava-Suttaṃ of the Majjh.-Nikāyo; Dvedhāvitakka-Suttaṃ of the Majjh.-Nik.; and Oldenberg, 'Buddha,' p. 424.

³ Mahāvaggo, i. 6; 7-9. I have slightly altered the translation given in 'Sacred Books of the East,' vol. xiii., p. 91.

'Who is thy teacher? Whose doctrine dost thou profess?' Buddha replied in these words:

'I have overcome all foes; I am all-wise; I am free from stains in every way; I have left everything, and have obtained emancipation by the destruction of desire. Having myself gained knowledge, whom should I call my master? I have no teacher; no one is equal to me; in the world of men and of gods no being is like me. I am the holy one in this world; I am the highest teacher. I alone am the absolute omniscient one (*sambuddho*); I have gained coolness (by the extinction of all passion), and have obtained Nirvâṇa. To found the kingdom of the law (*dhammo*) I go to the city of the Kâsîs (Banâras); I will beat the drum of immortality¹ in the darkness of this world.' He went on to boast of having reached 'extinction of the defilements,'² and of having overcome all states of sinfulness.

In such a philosophy as this there is no room for God. It is not strange, therefore, to find that Buddha never seems to have sought for God at all. One of his disciples in our own time is, therefore, practically correct in saying³

¹ By 'immortality' (*amata*) Buddha means 'Nirvâṇa.' It is so called as the state in which there can be no death as there is no existence. We might, perhaps, equally well call it 'eternal death.'

² The 'defilements' are those four mentioned above—viz., sensual desire (*kâmo*), earthly existence or individuality (*bhavo*), heresy (*dittḥi*), and ignorance (*avijjâ*) of the Four Noble Truths.

³ Subhadra Bhikscho, 'Buddhistischer Katechismus': 'Es giebt kein Gott-Schöpfer, von dessen Gnade oder dessen Willen der Bestand der Welt abhinge. Alles entsteht und entwickelt sich durch und aus sich selbst, kraft seines *eigenen* Willens und gemäss seiner inneren Natur und Beschaffenheit (seinem *Karma*). Einen persönlichen Gott-Schöpfer hat nur die Unwissenheit der Menschen erfunden. Die Buddhisten aber verwerfen durchaus den Glauben an einen persönlichen Gott und halten die Lehre von einer Schöpfung aus Nichts für einen Irrwahn' (p. 40).

that Buddhism teaches that there is no God,¹ the Creator of the world.

If it be asked in what that knowledge consisted which Buddha deemed himself to have acquired, and in what way it seemed to him efficacious in emancipating him from all 'world fetters' (*samyojanāni*), this will be best understood from a study of the language he used in the first sermon which he is stated to have preached after attaining Buddhahood. The Mahāvaggo states that, after spending four times seven² days in meditation under various trees, during which time he at first thought of ceasing to exist, and thus entering at once on the enjoyment of his emancipation from all suffering, he at length decided to remain alive in this world in order to teach to others the way of deliverance which he had evolved from his own inner consciousness or intuition.³ The tradition says that he was induced to come to this reso-

¹ The very discussion of the question by whom the world was created was condemned as 'talking about absurd and frivolous subjects of conversation.' So we find it said in the Brahmajāla-Suttaṃ Atthakathā: 'Lokakkhāyikā ti, "ayaṃ loko kena nimitto?"—"Asukena nāma nimitto." "Kāko seto atthīnaṃ settatā;" "balākā rattā lohitassa rattattā," ti. Evamādikā lokāyata-vitaṇḍā-sallāpa-kathā.' The contempt for any such inquiry is shown by the questions here compared with it.

² The later traditions say 'seven times seven days' (Buddhaghosa's Commentary; Beal, 'Romantic Legend,' p. 236 *et seq.*; Lalita-Vistara, p. 488 *et seq.*; Jātaka Atthav., vol. i., p. 77 *et seq.*; Dīpavaṃso, i. 29, 30). A later story, contained in the Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ (p. 30 *et seq.*), and Māra-Samyuttaṃ of the Sutta-Piṭakaṃ (cap. i., §§ 1-3), and afterwards amplified in the Lalita-Vistara (p. 489 *et seq.*), represents the evil principle Māra as tempting Buddha to enter Nirvāṇa at once, so that his doctrine might not be preached to the world. The 'Romantic History' places a long series of temptations and assaults *before* the attainment of Buddhahood (pp. 199-224).

³ Cf. Mahāvaggo, i. 1: 23.

lution by the humble entreaties of Brahmā Sahampati,¹ the being who, in Buddhist mythology, rules over the highest of all the heavens. This archangel, as we may term him, most humbly kneeling before Buddha, said, 'Let the Tathâgato² preach the doctrine! There are beings whose mental eyes are darkened by scarcely any dust; but if they do not hear the doctrine they cannot attain emancipation. These will understand the doctrine.' We can the better understand this urgency when we remember that the *devas* are also subject to the miseries of existence, and their only hope of deliverance lay in accepting the doctrine of Buddha.

Learning that his former instructors Âlâmo Kâlâmo and Uddako Râmaputto³ had died, Buddha resolved to go to teach his five former companions, who had gone to Banâras. He found them there in the deer-park Isipatano.⁴ At first they refused to show him any respect, but at last consented to listen to his teaching. Buddha then delivered his first sermon, which is called the 'Discourse regarding the Inauguration of the Dominion of the Law.'⁵ It sets before us an epitome of the main principles⁶ of the philosophy which he taught. Nearly

¹ He is evidently identical with the Brahmâ of the Hindûs, though we do not know the exact meaning of the title 'Sahampati.'

² Mahâvaggo, i. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, i. 6: 1-4.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, § 5 *et seq.*

⁵ Dhammacakkappavattana-Suttaṃ. It is quoted in Mahâvaggo, i. 6: 17-29.

⁶ Of this sermon Subhadra Bhikschi says: 'Diese Predigt enthält in kurzen Worten die Grundzüge der ganzen Lehre' ('Buddhistischer Katechismus,' sixth edition, p. 18, § 45). His interpretation, however, of the title of the discourse, which he renders 'Verkündigung der moralischen Weltordnung, oder die Gründung des Reiches der ewigen Gerechtigkeit,' is incorrect. Many other writers also, by using *Christian* technical theological terms as translations of Buddhist ones, convey to

every other recorded address deals, generally speaking, with the same subjects, amplifying and explaining them in detail. If we thoroughly grasp the meaning of the instruction contained in this discourse, we shall have a very fair idea of the leading doctrines of Buddhism in its original form. Omitting repetitions, it may be rendered as follows :

‘ These are the two extremes, O mendicants, which ought not to be practised by an anchorite.

‘ Which two ?

‘ Both this, which in lusts is devoted and attached to lust and pleasure, is low, common, worthy of a profane person, ignoble, pernicious ; and this, which is devoted to self-mortification, is painful, ignoble, pernicious. Having shunned both these extremes, O mendicants, the Tathāgato has thoroughly comprehended the Middle Course, which produces insight, which produces knowledge ; it conducts to quietude, to supernatural knowledge, to perfect Buddhahood, to Nirvāṇa.

‘ And which, O mendicants, is that Middle Course which the Tathāgato has thoroughly comprehended, which produces insight, which produces knowledge, which conducts to quietude, to supernatural knowledge, to perfect Buddhahood, to Nirvāṇa ?

‘ This is verily the Noble Eightfold Path, namely : Perfect opinion, perfect resolve, perfect speech, perfect employment, perfect conduct, perfect exertion, perfect thought, perfect self-concentration.

‘ This indeed, O mendicants, is that Middle Course¹

the ordinary reader an altogether false idea that Buddhism has much in common with Christianity.

¹ With this ‘ Middle Course,’ compare what Aristotle says : “*Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ πῶς, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ’ ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ*

which the Tathâgato¹ has thoroughly comprehended, which produces insight, which produces knowledge, which conducts to quietude, to supernatural knowledge, to perfect Buddhahood, to Nirvâṇa.²

στοχαστική τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἰκανῶς ἐληγται (Nic. Eth., ii. 9). Cf. Horace's well-known verses :

' Auream quisque mediocritatem
Diligit, tutus caret obsoleto
Sordibus tecti, caret invidenda
Sobrius aula.'

'Odes,' ii. 10.

¹ This title of Buddha is by Rhys Davids and Oldenberg ('Sacred Books of the East,' vol. xiii., pp. 82, 83, note) explained as meaning the Perfect or the Perfected One. But Mon. Williams (Sanskrit Dictionary, new edition, s.v.) explains it as meaning, 'He who comes and goes in the same way,' as the Buddhas who preceded him. Cf. the use of the similarly formed word 'yathâgata' in Lalita-Vistara, p. 162, where it means the girls 'just as they came.'

² In the original (copying from the *Parittan*) this sermon runs thus :

'Dve 'me, bhikkhave, antâ pabbajitena na sevitabbâ.

'Katame dve ?

'Yo, câyaṃ kâmesu kâmasukhallikânuyogo, hîno, gammo, pothujaniko, anariyo, anattasamhito : yo, câyaṃ atta-kilamathânuyogo, dukkho, anariyo, anattasamhito. Ete kho, bhikkhave, ubho ante anupagamma, majjhimâ paṭipadâ Tathâgatena abhisambuddhâ, cakkhukaraṇî, ñâṇakaraṇî, upasamâya, abhiññâya, sambodhâya, nibbâṇâya samvattati.

'Katamâ ca sâ, bhikkhave, majjhimâ paṭipadâ Tathâgatena abhisambuddhâ, cakkhukaraṇî, ñâṇakaraṇî, upasamâya, abhiññâya, sambodhâya, nibbâṇâya samvattati ?

'Ayaṃ eva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, seyyathidaṃ : Sammâdiṭṭhi, sammâsaṅkappo, sammâvâcâ, sammâkammanto, sammââjîvo, sammâvâyâmo, sammâsati, sammâsamâdhi.

'Ayaṃ kho sâ, bhikkhave, majjhimâ paṭipadâ, etc.

'Idaṃ kho pana, bhikkave, dukkhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ : jâti pi dukkhâ, jarâ pi dukkhâ, vyâdhi pi dukkhâ, maraṇaṃ pi dukkhaṃ, appiyehi sampayogo dukkho, piyehi vippayogo dukkho, yam pi icchaṃ na

‘This again, indeed, O mendicants, is the Noble Truth of Suffering : Birth is painful, decrepitude is painful, sickness is painful, death is painful, association with unloved objects is painful, separation from loved objects is painful, the desire which one does not obtain, that, too, is painful—in short, the five elements¹ of attachment to existence are painful.

‘This again, indeed, O mendicants, is the Noble Truth of the Cause of Suffering : It is that thirst which leads to renewed existence, connected with joy and passion, finding joy here and there, namely : thirst for sensual pleasure, thirst for existence, thirst for non-existence.²

labhati taṃ pi dukkhaṃ :—sañkhittena, pañc’ upādānakkhandhā dukkhā.

‘Idaṃ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhasamudayaṃ ariyasaccaṃ : yāyaṃ taṇhā ponobbhavikā, nandī-rāga-sahagatā, tatra tatrābhinandinī, seyyathīdaṃ : Kāmatāṇhā, Bhavataṇhā, Vibhavataṇhā.

‘Idaṃ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhanirodham ariyasaccaṃ, yo tassā yeva taṇhāya asesavirāga-nirodho cāgo paṭinissago mutti anālayo.

‘Idaṃ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhanirodhagāmini paṭipadā ariyasaccaṃ.

‘Ayaṃ eva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, seyyathīdaṃ : sammādiṭṭhi,’ etc.

‘Idaṃ dukkhaṃ ariyasaccan-ti, me, bhikkhave, pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhuṃ udapādi, ñāṇaṃ udapādi, paññā udapādi, vijjā udapādi, aloko udapādi’ (Mahāvaggo, i. 6 : 17-23).

¹ The ‘five elements of existence’ are Form (*rūpa*), Sensation (*vedanā*), Perception (*saññā*), Functions (*saṃkhārā*), and Consciousness (*viññāṇa*). The ‘functions’ are those of Body (*kāyasamkhāro*), Speech (*vācīsamkhāro*), and Thought (*cittasamkhāro*). Vide the *Sammādiṭṭhisuttanta* of the *Majjh.-Nik.*, quoted in ‘Sacred Books of the East,’ vol. xiii., p. 76, note. The first consists of inhalation and expiration ; the second of attention and investigation ; the third of ideas, sensations, and all attributes of mind except attention and investigation.

² Vide Childers’ *Pāli Dictionary*, s.v. *Vibhavo*, and *Vijesiṅho’s Commentary* quoted there. The latter says that ‘bhavataṇhā’ means a desire for an eternity of existence, while ‘vibhavataṇhā’ means a desire

‘This again, indeed, O mendicants, is the Noble Truth of the Cessation of Suffering, which is the cessation and total absence of desire for that very thirst, its abandonment, surrender, release from it, non-attachment to it.

‘This again, indeed, O mendicants, is the Noble Truth of the Course which leads to the Cessation of Suffering.

‘This is verily the Noble Eightfold Path, namely: Perfect opinion,’ etc.

‘That “this is the Noble Truth of Suffering,” (to understand this) in me, O mendicants, has sprung up insight into matters previously unheard of, knowledge has sprung up, wisdom has sprung up, learning has sprung up, intuition has sprung up.’

After repeating the same assertion with reference to each of the other Noble Truths, Buddha thus continued his discourse :

‘As¹ long as my thus triply modified twelfefold knowledge of and acquaintance with these four Noble Truths, O mendicants, was not correctly and thoroughly clear, just so long, O mendicants, did I perceive that I had not

for annihilation in the very first form of existence. ‘Both of these doctrines are odious to Buddhists, the first striking at the doctrine of Nirvāṇa, and the second at that of Karma.’

¹ ‘Yāva kīvañca me, bhikkhave, imesu catusu ariyasaccesu evaṃ ti-parivaṭṭaṃ dvādasā-kāraṃ, yathābhūtaṃ, ñāṇadasaṇaṃ na suvisuddhaṃ ahoṣi, n’eva tāvāhaṃ, bhikkhave, sadevake loke, samāraṇe, sabrahmaṇe, sassamaṇabrāhmaṇiṇiṃ pajāya, sadevamanussāya, anuttaraṃ sammāsambodhiṃ abhisambuddho paccaññāsiṃ.

‘Yato ca kho me, bhikkhave, imesu catusu ariyasaccesu evaṃ ti-parivaṭṭaṃ dvādasā-kāraṃ, yathābhūtaṃ, ñāṇadassanaṃ suvisuddhaṃ ahoṣi, athāhaṃ, bhikkhave, sadevake loke, samāraṇe, sabrahmaṇe, sassamaṇabrāhmaṇiṇiṃ pajāya, sadevamanussāya, anuttaraṃ sammāsambodhiṃ abhisambuddho ti paccaññāsiṃ.

‘Ñāṇaṇca pana me dassanaṃ udapādi : ‘Akuppā me ceto-vimutti, ayaṃ antimā jāti, n’atthi dāni punabbhavo-ti’ (Mahāvagga, i. 6 : 27-29).

attained to perfect knowledge of the highest, perfect omniscience regarding the world of gods, regarding that of Mâro, regarding the Brahmâ-world, regarding (all) beings, including monks and Brâhmanṣ, gods and men.

‘And indeed, O mendicants, since the time that my thus triply modified, twelvefold knowledge of and acquaintance with these four Noble Truths has become correctly and thoroughly clear, I have now perceived, O mendicants, that I have attained to perfect knowledge of the highest, perfect omniscience regarding the world of gods, regarding that of Mâro, regarding the Brahmâ-world, regarding (all) beings, including monks and Brâhmanṣ, gods and men.

‘And again the knowledge and conviction has sprung up in me, that my mind’s emancipation is unchangeable; that this is my last birth, that henceforth (for me) there is no rebirth.’

The story goes on to tell how, when Buddha had by this discourse ‘inaugurated the dominion of the law,’¹ then the *devas* who inhabit this earth of ours, and who are the lowest in rank of all the superhuman intelligences, cried aloud, ‘Thus² in the deer-park Isipatano at Banâras hath the Worshipful One³ established the highest dominion of the Law, which cannot be subverted by either monk or Brâhmanṣ or by a god or by Mâro or by Brahmâ or by anyone in the world.’

¹ Literally, ‘set going the wheel of the law’; but the *wheel* is the chariot-wheel of a Sovereign, and the expression means what we have indicated. *Vide* Childers’ Pâli Dictionary, *s.v.* Pavatteti.

² ‘Evaṃ Bhagavatâ Bârânasiyaṃ Isipatane Migadâye anuttaraṃ dhammacakkaṃ pavattitaṃ, appaṭivattiyaṃ samaṇena vâ, brâhmanaṇa vâ, devana vâ, Mârena vâ, Brahmuna vâ, kenaci lokasmin-ti’ (Mahâvaggo, i. 6 : 30).

³ ‘Bhagavâ,’ a common title of Buddha. It may also be rendered ‘Lord.’

On hearing this shout, the gods of the many heavens of the Brâhmanical and Buddhistic mythology re-echoed the cry to the highest heaven of heavens. 'Thus,¹ in that moment, in that instant, in that second, the shout reached the Brahmâ-world; and this whole system of ten thousand worlds quaked, was shaken, and trembled, and an infinite, mighty light was seen through the world, which surpassed the light that can be produced by the divine power of the *devas*.'

The immediate result of this address was the conversion of all the five mendicants. Of one of them, Koṇḍañño,² first, and of two others a little later, it is asserted that they almost instantaneously attained to a conviction of the truth of the important doctrine which the Buddhists term the 'eye³ of the law,' and which is thus expressed, 'All that has an origin has also an end.'⁴ It is on this doctrine or axiom that the Buddhist bases his hope of ultimately attaining Nirvâṇa.

All the lengthy addresses or sermons which Buddha is recorded to have delivered during the many years which elapsed between his attaining Buddhahood and his death treat of the same general dogmas which are enunciated in this first sermon. The 'Noble Eightfold Path' in which he taught men to walk had as its object the deliverance of his followers from the suffering which constituted, in his opinion, the whole of existence in each and every one of the worlds. It is true, as we have learnt from this discourse, that Buddha claimed to possess perfect knowledge of all things; but, while

¹ Mahâvaggo, i. 6 : 31. I have adopted here the translation given in 'Sacred Books of the East,' vol. xiii., p. 93.

² Mahâvaggo, i. 6 : 29, 32, 33.

³ Dhammacakkhum.

⁴ 'Yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ, sabbaṃ taṃ nirodha-dhamman-ti' (Mahâvaggo, i. 6 : 29).

displaying that knowledge in the matter of the details of his numerous previous births, he always brought it to bear solely on the elucidation of the doctrines briefly enunciated in the preceding discourse. In fact, so far was Buddha from encouraging inquiry into the origin of the universe, the existence and the nature of the Deity, and other such deep and all-important matters, that he directly discouraged his disciples from considering them at all, teaching them that such investigations were practically useless, and likely to distract men's attention from what he held to be the only matter of any real and vital importance—progress in the way of escape from the suffering and misery of existence. His system, therefore, does not in any way deserve the title of a religion, for that cannot be a religion in which God is left out. Buddhism is, and professes to be, a purely human philosophy, or, rather, a system of exact knowledge (*γνῶσις*), though this knowledge was in practice extremely limited in its extent. Buddha did not, indeed, deny the existence of superhuman intelligences¹—the *devas* or gods of the Hindu mythology; on the contrary, the canonical Pāli books continually mention their existence, as we have seen to be the case in the passages recently quoted. But even the very highest of the gods are bound with the same chain of existence and consequent misery and suffering as are men. Their power

¹ 'Götter leugnet der Buddhismus nicht, legt Ihnen aber auch keine besondere Wichtigkeit bei: er bedarf ihrer einfach nicht, weder zur Stütze seiner Moral noch zur Erlangung der Erlösung. Wer an Götter glauben will, mag es thun, nur darf er nicht vergessen, dass die Götter, wie alle lebenden Wesen, vergänglich und in der Wiedergeburt unterworfen sind, wenn ihr Lehen auch nach Millionen Erdenjahren zählt, und dass der zur Erkenntniss gelangte Heilige, vor Allem aber der Buddha, weit über alle Götter erhaben ist' ('Buddh. Katechismus,' pp. 19, 20, note).

and knowledge are limited. They are all liable to death, and to be reborn in some lower condition, just as men are. For their emancipation from these and similar evils the gods need the same instruction and require to walk in the same 'Noble Eightfold Path' as do men. Buddha, in consequence of his omniscience and his having obtained deliverance from the fetters of existence, has become superior to all the gods,¹ and they are numbered among his admiring disciples. Even a Buddhist monk who has reached the highest grade of discipleship is greatly superior to the gods themselves. It is plain, therefore, that to call these beings by the title of gods at all is a misnomer, and is apt to lead to a misunderstanding of the attitude of Buddhism towards them.

The number of Buddha's followers gradually increased. Nobles and Brâhmaṇs, many rich men and some poor ones, came to him and were taught his law. Although Buddha (following in this, as we have already seen, the custom common among anchorit leaders) made no account of caste in itself, and did not deny to the poor and the outcast the privilege of entering the Order which he had founded, yet to understand his teaching required a certain amount of intellect. As *knowledge* formed so important a part of his teaching, it was not adapted for all, and hence it is that we find that his disciples

¹ This is plain, not only from the extracts given above, but also from the tales related (*e.g.*, in the Mahāvaggo, i. 16-18, 20) of the reverence paid to Buddha, and the services performed for him by the four Mahârâjas (the rulers of the lowest of the *devalokas*; their names are Dhatarattho, Virulho, Virūpakkho, and Vessavaṇo, and they are the Regents of North, South, East, and West respectively), by Sakko (Indra), Brahmâ, etc. Sakko, King of the inferior *devas*, says to the people of Rājagāhaṃ (Rājagrihaṃ, now Rājgir): 'I am the servitor of him who is wise, entirely self-controlled, the unrivalled Buddha, the Arahata, the most fortunate one upon the earth' (Mahāvaggo, i. 22 : 14).

belonged for the most part to the wealthy and leisured classes of society. All who wished to become full members of his Order were obliged to become mendicant monks, and to observe very strict rules of conduct. But, besides these *bhikkhus* or *samanos*, he had many lay adherents (*upāsakos*), whose main duty was to provide for the wants of the mendicants.

When the mendicants (members of the Order) amounted to sixty persons—which, if we may believe tradition, took place about five months after the first preaching of the law—Buddha assembled them at Isipatano, and sent them forth to proclaim to all men the doctrines which he had taught them. The account of this incident, which has had such far-reaching results in the history of a very large part of the Eastern World, is thus given in the Sutta-Pitakam :

‘At one time¹ the Worshipful One dwelleth at Banâras, in the deer-park Isipatano. There, indeed, the Worshipful One addressed the mendicants thus : “Mendicants, Venerable Ones.” Those mendicants hearkened unto the Worshipful One.

‘The Worshipful One said this: “I am freed, O mendicants, from all fetters, those which are divine

¹ ‘Ekaṃ samayaṃ Bhagavā Bârânasīyaṃ viharati, Isipatane migadâye. Tatra kho Bhagavā bhikkhū āmantesi ; “Bhikkhavo,”-ti, “Bhadante,”-ti. Te bhikkhū Bhagavato paccassosum. Bhagavā etad avoca : Mutto ’haṃ, bhikkhave, sabbapâsehi, ye dibbâ, ye ca mânusâ. Tumhe pi, bhikkhave, muttâ sabbapâsehi, ye dibbâ, ye ca mânusâ. Caratha, bhikkhave, cârikam bahujana-hitâya, bahujana-sukhâya, lokânukampakâya, atthâya, hitâya, sukhâya devamanussânam. Mâ ekena dve agamettha. Desetha, bhikkhave, dhammam âdikalyânam, majjhe kalyânam, pariyosâna-kalyânam. Sâttham savyanjanam kevala-paripunnam, parisuddham brahmacariyam pakâsetha. Santi sattâ aparajakkha-jâtikâ ; assavanatâ dhammassa parihâyanti : bhavissanti dhammassa aññâtâro’ (Mâra-Samyuttam, iv. : 1 § 5 : 1, 2 ; Mahâvaggo, i. 11).

and those which are human. You, too, O mendicants, are freed from all fetters, those which are divine and those which are human. Make an alms-pilgrimage, O mendicants, for the sake of many people, for the happiness of many people, because of pity for the world, by reason of, for the sake of, for the happiness of gods and men. Go ye not two together. Preach, O mendicants, the Law, which is good at the beginning, good in the middle, good at the end. Show forth with meaning and in word the only perfect, fully correct, religious walk. There are beings naturally but little defiled; not hearing the Law they are perishing: they will become knowers of the Law.”

He then announced his own intention of going forth as far as Uruvelâ on the same errand.

Much success seems to have attended the preaching of Buddha's disciples. Converts came with them to Buddha in considerable numbers, desiring to be admitted to full membership in his Order (*Saṅgho*). At first Buddha himself in person admitted them; but when ultimately it was found inconvenient, and even impossible, to maintain this arrangement permanently in use, because of the distance which many had to come and the difficulty of finding where Buddha was, the latter conferred upon his disciples the right to admit converts themselves, both to the *pabbajjâ* and to the *upasampadâ* ordination. The former word means ‘Renunciation,’ and this was conferred upon the novice; the latter denotes ‘Attainment,’ and was the ceremony by which the candidate, after being tried, was admitted to full membership. The directions given as to admission were these:

‘Let¹ (the candidate) first have his hair and beard cut off, let him put on yellow robes, adjust his upper robe

¹ Mahāvaggo, i. 12 : 3, 4.

so as to cover one shoulder, salute the feet of the mendicants, and sit down squatting : then let him raise his joined hands, and tell him to say :

“ I go to Buddha as a refuge ;
 I go to the Law as a refuge ;
 I go to the Order as a refuge :
 A second time, too, I go to Buddha as a refuge ;
 A second time, too, I go to the Law as a refuge ;
 A second time, too, I go to the Order as a refuge :
 A third time, too, I go to Buddha as a refuge ;
 A third time, too, I go to the Law as a refuge ;
 A third time, too, I go to the Order as a refuge.”¹

In accordance with his declared intention, Buddha set out for Uruvelâ. Although the account which the Mahâvaggo gives of certain previous circumstances cannot be said to be free from the fabulous, yet the story of what he did on this journey is so utterly absurd that it cannot be said to possess much historical value. But we quote some of the details here in order to show how even the comparatively sober Pâli books have coloured the incidents of a simple preaching expedition.

On the journey Buddha met with a party of thirty rich and dissipated young men. After an address from him they became his disciples.² When he reached the

¹ This formula is called the *Saraṇagamanam*, and in the original runs thus :

‘ *Buddham saraṇam gacchâmi,
 Dhammam saraṇam gacchâmi,
 Saṅgham saraṇam gacchâmi.
 Dutiyam pi Buddham saraṇam gacchâmi,
 Dutiyam pi Dhammam saraṇam gacchâmi,
 Dutiyam pi Saṅgham saraṇam gacchâmi.
 Tatiyam pi Buddham saraṇam gacchâmi,
 Tatiyam pi Dhammam saraṇam gacchâmi,
 Tatiyam pi Saṅgham saraṇam gacchâmi.*’

² Mahâvaggo, i. 14.

neighbourhood of Uruvelâ, he there found a community of one thousand *Jaṭilas*¹ (ascetics with matted hair),

¹ They recognised the authority of the Vedas (Mahāvaggo, vi. 35 : 2), lived in the woods (Jâtaka Atthavaṇṇanā ; cf. similar forest-dwellers in the Mahâbhârata), and offered the Agnihotra sacrifice (Mahāvaggo, i. 20 : 19). Among the marvels performed by Buddha on this occasion may be mentioned the following: Obtaining permission to spend the night in the room where the Jaṭilas kept their sacred fire burning, Buddha there found 'a savage Serpent-(*nāga*-)king of great magical power (*iddhi*), a dreadfully venomous serpent.' This creature, unable to restrain his wrath at the intrusion, 'sent forth fire. And the Worshipful One, turning his own body into fire, sent forth flames. When they both shone forth with their flames, the fire-room looked as if it were burning and blazing, as if it were all in flames.' Thus conquering the serpent, Buddha, the next morning, without injuring him, threw him into his alms-bowl, and exhibited him to Uruvelâ Kassapo. On that occasion 'dark blue and red, light red, yellow, and crystal-coloured flames of various hues appeared on the Aṅgirasos's [= Buddha's] body' (Mahāvaggo, i. 15). 'One beautiful night the four Mahârâjas, filling the whole grove with light by the brilliancy of their complexion, went to the place where the Worshipful One was. Having approached him, and respectfully saluted the Worshipful One, they stood towards the four cardinal points like great firebrands.' The same story is told of the conduct of Sakko (Indra) and of Brahmâ Sahampati. Once more, when Buddha wished to wash some rags to make himself a robe, Sakko dug a tank for him to wash them in, provided stones for him to beat them on (after the manner common among Indian washermen) and to dry them on, and a tree bent down one of its branches to help Buddha when he wished to come up out of the water. Buddha then in a single moment of time paid a visit to the *jambū* (rose-apple) tree which grows in the Himâlaya forest (on this tree, *vide* Hardy, 'Manual of Buddhism,' p. 18 *et seq.*). On another night Buddha repeated his visit to this tree, and then proceeded to the Heaven of the Thirty-three gods (Tāvatiṃsa) to pluck a flower. Another day 500 pieces of firewood, which the Jaṭilas could not split, at Buddha's command split of themselves. He also lit and extinguished their fires when the Jaṭilas could not do so. He created 500 vessels, with fire burning in them, for the Jaṭilas to warm themselves at on a winter night after they had bathed. During an inundation, Buddha caused the water in one place to recede, and then he 'walked about in the midst of the water on a dust-covered

presided over by three chiefs, each of whom bore the name Kassapo. The Mahāvaggo relates the most puerile tales of the wonderful exercise of magical power by which Buddha ultimately succeeded in converting all of these Jaṭilas, and in bringing them to do homage to himself. Not long afterwards he received a visit from Seniyo Bimbisāro, King of Magadha, who was accompanied by no less than 120,000 Brāhmaṇs and householders. In consequence of the address which Buddha delivered to them, 110,000 of these became full members of his Order, and the remaining 10,000 became lay adherents.¹ Bimbisāro then made Buddha a present of the Veḷuvanam ('bamboo-grove,' one of the royal pleasure-grounds² near his capital Rājagāham), as a place where he and his followers might sojourn when they visited that part of Magadha. It was in the same city of Rājagāham that two young Brāhmaṇs, Sāriputto (otherwise called Upatisso) and Moggallāno (whose other name was Kolito), entered the Order, of which they afterwards became two of the most distinguished³ members. Assaji was the means of their conversion, and the latter, in explaining the main principles of Buddha's doctrine at Sāriputto's request, quoted the following text, afterwards adopted as the creed or confession of faith of the Buddhists, and found inscribed in various alphabets on ancient monuments in many parts of India :

spot.' He then compelled the Jaṭilo Uruvelā Kassapo to acknowledge that he had not obtained *arahātship* and to seek admission into the Order. He was followed in this by all the Jaṭilas, who were convinced and converted by the recital of the 3,500 miracles which Buddha had performed in their midst (Mahāvaggo, i. 15-20).

¹ Mahāvaggo, i. 22 : 3.

² *Ibid.*, i. 22 : 17, 18.

³ *Ibid.*, i. 23.

‘Whatsoever conditions are sprung from a cause,
The cause of them the Tathâgato
Has told, and what is their end :
Thus spoke the Great Monk.’¹

This refers to Buddha’s teaching in reference to the origin of suffering and the way to escape from it. We shall deal with this more fully in the second lecture.

These two young disciples then betook themselves to the place where Buddha was. Taking with them 250 of their own followers, they prostrated themselves before him, and sought at his hands admission to the Order. Their example is said to have been followed by so many distinguished young Magadhan noblemen that the people of the country murmured at the spread of the new doctrines, as likely to lead ultimately to a decrease in the population.

After leaving Râjagâhaṃ, Buddha next proceeded to his native city of Kapilavastu, where he took up his residence in the place known as the Banyan Grove (Nigrodhârâmo), not far from the city where his father still lived. The Mahâvaggo gives a very plain and simple account of the interview which soon after took place between Buddha and the members of the family from which he had now been separated for more than seven years. The story is a very different one from the highly-coloured narrative which is found in later Buddhist writings, and from the highly poetical and touching description given by an English poet of our own time in

¹ ‘Ye dhammâ hetuppabhavâ,
Tesaṃ hetuṃ Tathâgato
Âha, tesañca yo nirodho :
Evaṃ vadi Mahâ Samano.’

Mahâvaggo, i. 23, 5 and 10.

The *dhammâ*, or ‘conditions,’ are the five *khandhos* or the twelve *nidânas* (*vide* Mahâvaggo, i. 1 : 2).

that delightful but utterly romantic and unhistorical work, 'The Light of Asia.'¹ The tale runs thus :

'In the forenoon the Worshipful One, having put on his under-ropes, took his alms-bowl, and, clad in his yellow robe (*cīvaram*), went to the dwelling-place of Sakko Suddhodano. Having gone thither, he sat down on a seat which had been prepared for him. Then the Princess, Rāhulo's mother, said to young Rāhulo, "This is thy father, O Rāhulo; go and ask him for thine heritage." Then young Rāhulo approached the place where the Worshipful One was. Having approached, he stood before the Worshipful One and spoke thus: "Thy shadow, O monk, is a place of bliss." Then the Worshipful One, having risen from his seat, withdrew; and young Rāhulo, following the Worshipful One from behind, said: "O monk, give me my heritage." By Buddha's direction, Sāriputto then admitted Rāhulo to the first grade of the monkish community.

But when news of this event reached Buddha's father, he was much grieved, and went to remonstrate with his son on what he had done. 'Then Sakko Suddhodano approached the place where the Worshipful One was. Having approached, and having respectfully saluted the

¹ Sir Edwin Arnold's work is, and professes to be, nothing but a poetical romance, founded for the most part upon the late Sanskrit romance entitled 'Mahābhinishkramaṇa-Sūtra' ('The Chapter of the Great Renunciation'), which is by neither of the great divisions of the Buddhist world accepted as a canonical work. Certain stories (like that of Kisā Gotamī, taken from the Commentary on the Dhammapadam) have been incorporated from other sources. It is strange, therefore, to find 'The Light of Asia' quoted as an authoritative work upon Buddhism, and to learn from the publishers' preface that some 'English Buddhists' have taken it as their religious manual. Does not this illustrate the Horatian maxim, 'Dulce est desipere in loco'? Regarding sciolists of this class one is inclined to say: 'Populus vult decipi: decipiatur.'

Worshipful One, he sat down near him. Sitting near him, Sakko Suddhodano said to the Worshipful One: "Sir, I ask a boon of the Worshipful One." Buddha's reply was a refusal to grant a boon without being previously informed for what he was about to be asked. 'Then Suddhodano said: "Sir, when the Worshipful One gave up the world, it was great pain to me: so it was when Nando¹ did so: my pain was extreme when Râhulo, too, did so. Love for a son, sir, cuts into the skin; having cut into the skin, it cuts into the inner cuticle; having cut into the inner cuticle, it cuts into the flesh; having cut into the flesh, it cuts into the ligaments; having cut into the ligaments, it cuts into the bones; having cut into the bones, it reaches the marrow, and in the marrow doth it abide. Please, sir, let not the venerable ones confer the *ṣabhajjâ* ordination on a son without the permission of his father and mother."'² In consequence of this request, Buddha for the future forbade the practice complained of.

After that, going to the city of Śrāvastī (Pāli *Sāvattī*),³ the capital of the kingdom of Kosala, Buddha there laid down as rules to be observed by his disciples the 'Ten Moral Precepts.'⁴ The consideration of these we must defer until the third of these lectures. Other precepts and prohibitions followed from time to time as occasion required, until at last that system of rules and the ceremonies attached to them which we find in the *Pāṭimokkham* was formed. In this system, as in all man-

¹ One of Buddha's half-brothers who had joined his Order.

² Mahāvaggo, i. 44 : 1-5.

³ General Cunningham identifies it with Sâhet Mâhet, some fifty-eight miles north of the city of Ayodhyâ. But this is probably incorrect. Its site has not been positively identified, but it will probably be found in the lower Nepal valley, north of the Gôndâ district.

⁴ Sikkhâpadâni (*vide* Mahāvaggo, i. 56).

made religions and philosophies, one is compelled to observe that the great error has been committed of representing as exceedingly evil certain things which are either quite allowable or perhaps only slightly unsuitable, while some of the grossest moral offences¹ are passed over with but slight censure or with none at all.

The Mahāvaggo very candidly mentions not a few instances² in which the prospect of 'living a life of ease and without pain' led men to become followers of Buddha, solely in order that they might share in the worldly benefits showered upon him and his disciples by the pious and wealthy lay adherents, whose duty it was to support the mendicants in that idleness which Buddhism so directly encourages. It is to be noted, however, that, when these things were reported to Buddha, he at once took steps to prevent³ as much as possible for the future the entrance of such unworthy disciples into his Order.

From the time of his visit to Kapilavastu until a very short period before Buddha's death, the Pāli records afford us no means of giving anything like a consecutive account⁴ of his life. It seems to have been uneventful, being mostly spent in wandering about the kingdoms of Kosala and Magadha, or, as they are now called, Oudh (Ayodhyâ) and Bihâr. His headquarters were at the capitals of these two States, named respectively Sāvatti (Śrāvastī) and Rājagāhaṃ (Rājagṛihaṃ). The munificence of royal and wealthy private adherents had provided the mendicants with parks in the neighbourhood of

¹ Mahāvaggo, i., 62 : 1 ; cf. 49 : 1, 2.

² E.g., Mahāvaggo, i. 30 ; cf. 44-47.

³ See the last paragraphs in the chapters last quoted.

⁴ Oldenberg, 'Buddha,' English translation, p. 141 *et seq.* ; Copleston, 'Buddhism,' p. 59 *et seq.* ; Mahāvaggo, ii.-vi., etc.

these cities, and to these they used to retire to spend the three rainy¹ months (*vasso*) of every year, a period during which it was impossible for them to move about the country without incurring the guilt of destroying multitudes of the animalcules which the combined influence of the moisture and the hot sun at that season calls into existence. As every Buddhist mendicant, on assuming the yellow robe (*cīvaraṃ*) which marks his profession, takes a vow to abstain from killing² any living thing, such a cessation of itinerating was necessary. Among the most celebrated of these calm and shady retreats, two are very frequently mentioned in the *Tipiṭakaṃ* as the places where most of Buddha's discourses were delivered. These were *Veḷuvanaṃ*, which we have already mentioned as having been given to Buddha by King *Bimbisāro* of *Magadha*, and *Jetavanaṃ*, which a great and wealthy merchant named *Sudatto* or *Anāthapiṇḍiko*³ had purchased by the payment of enough gold pieces to cover its whole surface, and had presented to the new Teacher.⁴ The purchase and gift of this park are represented in carving, and mentioned in an inscription on the stone pillars around the *Bhārhūt* tope, which is said to date from about two hundred years before Christ.

Buddha's leisure was not entirely devoted to meditation and repose, for it was often interrupted by visits from persons of distinction who came from long distances to hearken to his words of wisdom. We are informed, for example, that on one charming moonlit

¹ *Mahāvaggo* iii. contains the principal rules regarding the observance of *vasso*.

² See the ten *Sikkhāpadāni* in *Mahāvaggo*, i. 56.

³ That he had both names is clear from *Yakkha-Saṃyuttaṃ*, x. 8: 14, 15.

⁴ *Cullavaggo*, vi. 4

night Prince Ajātasattu, Bimbisāro's son, accompanied by a large retinue, came to see him. On that occasion Buddha was reposing in a park which belonged to the famous physician Jivako,¹ a lay adherent, whose marvellous cures are mentioned in the Mahāvaggo.² On another occasion Buddha received a visit from the wealthy young Licchavi³ nobles, when he resided near the city of Vesāli. There, too, the courtesan Ambapālī⁴ invited Buddha and his monks to lunch in a mango-grove which belonged to her, and which she afterwards presented to the Order. In the Pāli books we frequently read of such invitations to luncheon being accepted by Buddha. When no such provision was made for the supply of his daily wants, Buddha went forth in the morning, clad in his yellow robe and carrying his alms-bowl, thus silently begging food as he passed from door to door through the streets. Opponents as well as inquirers frequently sought his presence. On these occasions he is generally represented as victorious in the dispute, and he often succeeded in silencing his interlocutors, if not in converting them. When anyone came to seek admission to his Order, Buddha's address to the postulant was always, we are told, couched in the following words: 'Come hither, O mendicant: well preached is the doctrine; walk correctly to make an end of all suffering.'⁵

The Order (*Saṅgho*) which Buddha founded at first consisted merely of mendicant *monks*, whose shaven heads and yellow robes marked them off from the outer world.

¹ Mahāvaggo, viii. 1 *et seq.*; Oldenberg, 'Buddha,' p. 147.

² Mahāvaggo, viii.

³ Cf. Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ, p. 19.

⁴ Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ, pp. 20, 21.

⁵ 'Ehi, bhikkhu,' etc.

Only somewhat later, at the urgent entreaty of Buddha's foster-mother,¹ Mahâpajâpatî, were *women* admitted to membership in the Order. The term 'mendicant' (Pâli *bhikkhu* m., *bhikkhuni* f.) is that by which the disciples, of whichever sex, are usually spoken of. Lay adherents, male and female (Pâli *upâsako* m., *upâsikâ* f.), had the privilege of waiting on the monks, and supplying the wants of the latter out of their own substance. But gratitude for this was due, not to the pious lay-people, but to the mendicants, who thus afforded them an opportunity of obtaining merit. These lay adherents, however, formed no part² of the Buddhist Order or community proper. The monks who composed the latter were, even in Buddha's lifetime, bound in almost every detail of their daily life by most rigorous rules, and in particular by those of chastity and poverty. Every fortnight³ public confession was enjoined according to a set form of question and answer (the *Pâtimokkham*). Although no man was excluded from membership because of his low⁴ caste, yet very few converts are

¹ Cullavaggo, x. 1.

² Cf. Oldenberg, pp. 162, 163.

³ *Uposatho pannarasô*, the fifteenth day of the half-month: *Pâtimokkham*, *Nidānam* (= Introduction); *Mahāvaggo*, ii. 3 and 34. But the *Mahāvaggo* states that it was in imitation of the *Paribbâjikos* of the *Titthiyo* school that Buddha instituted this ceremony, and that he did so at the suggestion of King *Bimbisâro*, who recommended this because he saw that the people admired those anchorets on that account (*Mahāvaggo*, ii. 1 : 1-3; 2 : 3).

⁴ Oldenberg (p. 152) quotes the following passage: 'As the great streams, O mendicants, however many they be—the Ganges, the *Yamunâ*, the *Aciravatî*, the *Sarabhû*, the *Mahî*—when they reach the great ocean, lose their old name and their old descent, and bear only one name, "the great ocean," so also, O mendicants, these four castes—*Kshatriyas*, *Brâhmaṇs*, *Vaiṣyas*, and *Ṣûdras*—when they, according to the law and doctrine which the *Tathâgato* has preached, forsake

mentioned who did not belong to the noble and wealthy portion of society. Most of his first disciples seem to have been Brâhmaṇs or Kshattriyas, and it is very doubtful if an outcast would have been admitted under any circumstances. In not distinctly excluding members of the lower castes from membership in his Order, however, Buddha was, it must never be forgotten, merely following the custom¹ of earlier and contemporary monkish communities. At the same time there was a great difference in this matter between Buddhist theory and Buddhist practice. Professor Oldenberg remarks on this subject:² ‘I am not aware of any instance in which a *Candâlo*—the pariah of that age—is mentioned in the sacred writings as a member of the Order. For the lower order of the people, for those born to toil in manual labour, hardened by the struggle for existence, the announcement of the connexion of misery with all forms of existence was not made, nor was the dialectic of the law of the painful concatenation of causes and effects calculated to satisfy the “poor in spirit.” “To the wise belongeth this law,” it is said, “not to the foolish.” Very unlike the word of that Man who suffered “little children” to come unto Him, “for of such is the kingdom of God.” For children and those who are like children the arms of Buddha are not opened.’ And, again, ‘Princes³ and nobles, Brâhmaṇs and merchants, we find among those who “took their refuge in Buddha, the Law and the Order”—*i.e.*, who made their pro-

their home and go into homelessness, lose their old name and their old paternity, and bear only the one appellation, “Ascetics who follow the son of the Śakya house” (Cullavaggo, ix. 1 : 4). See the whole attitude of Buddha towards caste, fully discussed in Copleston’s ‘Buddhism,’ cap. xvii., pp. 227-240.

¹ Oldenberg, pp. 63 and 154.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 156-158.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 163.

fession as lay believers; the wealthy and the aristocrat, it seems, here also exceeded the poor. To reach the humble and wretched, the sorrowing, who endured yet another sorrow than the great, universal sorrow of impermanence, was not the province of Buddhism.'

In this respect again we see how distinctly Buddhism shows itself to be, not a religion, but a philosophy. Like all philosophies of Europe and Asia, of ancient and modern times alike, Buddhism addressed itself to the chosen few, to the cultured and the wealthy. It had no message for the poor, the outcast, the sick, the oppressed, the guilty but penitent transgressor. Not 'to the poor,' but to the rich, was proclaimed the Law of the Middle Course, the Noble Eightfold Path. Certain entire classes of the population were for various reasons refused leave¹ to enter the Order. Buddhism was no better adapted to universal acceptance than were the—in some respects—similar philosophies of the Epicureans

¹ Mahāvaggo, i. 39: 1 and 7 (those suffering from any one of five diseases), cap. 40 (soldiers), cap. 44 (people who have been scourged), cap. 45 (branded), cap. 46 (debtors), cap. 47 (slaves), etc. *Vide* also S. Bhikschu's 'Budd. Katechismus,' p. 79, §§ 162, 163: 'Wer ist zum Eintritt in die Bruderschaft berechtigt?—Jedermann ohne Ansehen der Rasse oder Farbe, des Ranges, Standes, und Geschlechtes, der frei von den in der Satzung angeführten Aufnahmehindernissen ist.—Wen schliesst die Satzung von der Aufnahme aus?—Alle mit ansteckenden oder unheilbaren Krankheiten Behaftete; Kinder unter 15 Jahren, Sklaven und Leibeigene, so lange sie nicht ihre Freiheit auf rechtliche Weise erlangt haben; alle von den Behörden Verfolgte, so lange sie nicht ausser Anklage gesetzt sind oder ihre Strafe verbüsst haben; Schuldner, so lange sie nicht ihre Verpflichtungen erfüllt haben; Soldaten und Beamte jeder Art, so lang sie im Dienste sind, und Unmündige, welche die Erleubnis ihrer Eltern oder Vormünder nicht besitzen.' But we must remember that what was refused was admission to an Order of monks, and the object of the exclusion of such classes of persons was to prevent complaint that people had entered the Order for the sake of obtaining some mundane advantage.

and the Stoics, for ideas afterwards the property in some cases of the one,¹ in other instances that of the other school, are to be found in the earliest Buddhist writings. We are not surprised to find Kings like Pasenadi (*Prasenajit*) and Bimbisâro among Buddha's lay adherents, any more than to discover an Emperor Aurelius Antoninus among the professors of the philosophy of the Porch. And, if we find among the adherents of Zeno's school a slave like Epictetus, or among Buddha's disciples a man of humble position like the one solitary Thero² Sunîto, the exception merely proves the truth of the rule.

Buddha had, no doubt, a considerable amount of opposition to encounter, but it arose rather from the grief naturally felt by parents and relations at seeing their children and connexions renounce the world to become monks than from anything else. His teaching

¹ Buddha's attitude towards the mass of men—all that cannot become mendicants—is, in spite of some noble-sounding expressions of universal benevolence in the Three Piṭakas, very much that of the Epicurean Lucretius :

'Suave, mari magno turbantibus æquora ventis,
E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem ;
Non quia vexari quemquam'st iucunda voluptas,
Sed, quibus ipse malis careas, quia cernere suave est.
Suave etiam belli certamina magna tueri
Per campos instructa—tua sine parte pericli.
Sed nil dulcius est, bene quam munita tenere
Edita doctrina sapientum templa serena,
Despicere unde queas alios, passimque videre
Errare atque viam palantis quærere vitæ,
Certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate,
Noctes atque dies niti præstante labore
Ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri.'

Lib. ii., verses 1-13.

² *Vide* Oldenberg, p. 157, note ; extract from the Theragâthâ.

in this respect, however, was no new thing, but was in accordance with what had for a long time previously been held and taught in India as necessary for deliverance from carnal bondage. It differed, in fact, from the teaching of the Jainas and other similar sects principally in condemning the extreme asceticism and self-torture which the members of such sects then inflicted, and still in India continue to inflict, on themselves.

Instead of being opposed to and by the Brâhman̄s, as is generally supposed, Buddha reckoned large numbers of them among his disciples, and actually used the word Brâhman̄¹ not unfrequently to denote the very highest grade among those who walked in the Noble Eightfold Path. At other times also he uses the word in a good sense, and explains who are worthy of the appellation. For example, he says :

‘Not through matted locks, not through descent,
Not through birth, does one become a Brâhman̄ :
He in whom there is both truth and the Law,
He is happy, and he is a Brâhman̄.’²

Such teaching would, of course, displease the unworthy members of that caste, but it would win the support of all the respectable Brâhman̄s and of all the rest of the community. It was, moreover, neither new nor strange. Besides this, it must be remembered that the influence of the Brâhman̄s in that limited part of India in which Buddha passed his life was by no means

¹ *Vide, e.g.*, the whole of the last (the twenty-sixth) chapter of the Dhammapadam, entitled ‘Brâhman̄avaggo.’

² ‘Na jaṭāhi, na gottena,
Na jaccā hoti Brâhmaṇo :
Yamhi saccañ-ca dhammo-ca,
So sukhī, so-ca Brâhmaṇo.’

. Brâhman̄avaggo, ṣl. 393.

so great as in those districts in which the population was much more purely Âryan. He doubtless found the rivalry of other monkish and ascetic bodies a more serious hindrance; but on the whole he had no very great obstacles to encounter, no persecution to fear, no danger to shun. His method of teaching by delivering long discourses on the one subject with which his philosophy busied itself, the way to obtain deliverance from suffering, was similar to that still common in the East; and his extensive use of allegory and parable seems to everyone who has lived long in Oriental lands to be the most natural thing in the world. In his custom of leading men to right knowledge by dexterous questioning, Buddha resembled Socrates, but the latter developed that most excellent method of instruction to an incomparably superior degree.

About nineteen years¹ after attaining Buddhahood, Budda was joined by a large number of young nobles of his own clan. One of these, Ânando, was one of Buddha's cousins, and became his most devoted friend and disciple to the end of the great teacher's life. Devadatto, one of Ânando's brothers, was another of those who then attached themselves to the Order. He afterwards aimed at becoming Buddha's successor,² and endeavoured to attain to the longed-for pre-eminence by ousting Buddha himself from the headship of the Order. Devadatto hoped to gain the support of the more zealous of the monks by urging that the rules of self-denial which had been imposed upon them should be made much more rigorous. He demanded that five fresh and very strict rules should be made regarding the conduct of the

¹ The Therigâthâ says twenty-five years before Buddha's death, which is the same thing.

² Cullavaggo, vii.

members of the Order—*e.g.*, that they should not be permitted to accept invitations to lunch, that they should dress only in rags which they had picked up on rubbish-heaps, and so on. When Buddha refused to accede to this proposal, Devadatto left him, taking with him a portion of the Order. Even before this, the arch-heretic had made, we are told, at least two attempts upon Buddha's life, but in a miraculous manner these entirely failed. Devadatto is also said to have stirred up Ajâta-sattu to plot¹ against the life of the latter's father, Bimbisâro. When this plot was detected, Bimbisâro resigned his throne to his unnatural son.

No other event of much interest or importance seems to have disturbed the even tenor of Buddha's life. When he had spent between forty-four and forty-five years as a teacher, and had attained the age of eighty years, he died of an illness brought on by some error in diet.² The narrative of his last days is contained in the Mahâparinibbâna-Suttaṃ of the Sutta-Piṭakaṃ. It may be briefly related in the following way by somewhat condensing and curtailing that account :

Having been received with great respect at the town of Pâtaligâmo,³ Buddha there recited some verses, which,

¹ Cullavaggo, vii. 2.

² The Mahâparinibbâna-Suttaṃ (p. 41, ed. Childers) says he became ill through eating *sûkara-maddavaṃ*, prepared for him by a lay adherent named Cundo. The commentators explain the word as meaning 'hog's flesh.' Subhadra Bhikschi, however, thinks it means 'something of which wild boars are fond,' and says that it was probably something of the nature of a truffle ('Buddh. Katechismus,' p. 26, note). Dr. Hoey says that it 'is not boar's flesh, but *sûkara-kanda*, "hog's root," a bulbous root found chiefly in mounds and jungles, which I have seen Hindûs eat with avidity. It is a *phalahar*, permissible to eat on fast-days' (*Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, vol. lxix., part i., No. 1, 1900).

³ Mahâparinibbâna-Suttaṃ, pp. 12-14.

rightly understood, show his attitude towards the deities worshipped in different parts of India. Though deeming himself far superior to all the gods, Buddha none the less acknowledged their existence. He therefore said :¹

‘ In whatever spot the learned man fixes his abode,
There, having fed the virtuous, self-restrained, religious men,
Whatsoever deities there may be there, to them let him present a
gift.
They, having been revered, reverence him ; being honoured,
they honour him.
Thus they pity him as a mother her own son.
A man pitied by the deities always sees good things.’

It is evident that Buddha is here speaking of the way in which people, *other than members of his own Order*,²

¹ ‘ Yasmim padese kappeti vasaṃ paṇḍitajâtiko,
Sîlavant’ ettha bhojetvâ saññate brahmacârayo,
Yâ tattha devatâ assu, tâsaṃ dakkhiṇaṃ âdise :
Tâ pûjitâ pûjayanti, mânitâ mânayanti naṃ.
Tato naṃ anukampanti mâtâ puttā va orasaṃ :
Devatânukampito poso sadâ bhadrâni passatîti.’

Mahâparinibbâna-Suttaṃ, p. 14.

² Bishop Copleston does not seem to have observed this, for he speaks of these verses as ‘ inconsistent with the strictest Buddhism ’ (‘ Buddhism,’ p. 70). The view which I have here advocated is supported by the somewhat similar stanzas in the ‘ Ratana-Suttaṃ ’ (‘ Parittaṃ ’). There we find a great deal in praise of the Law and the Order, and at the same time such verses as these :

‘ Yânîdha bhûtâni samâgatâni,
Bhummâni vâ, yâni vâ antalikkhe,
Sabb’ eva bhûtâ sumanâ bhavantu,
Atho pi sakkacca suṇantu bhâsitaṃ.

‘ Tasmâ hi, bhûtâ, nisâmetha sabbe ;
Mettaṃ karotha mânusiya pajâya,
Divâ-ca ratto-ca haranti ye baliṃ :
Tasmâ hi ne rakkhattha appamattâ.

* * * *

should act. We are told that he perceived that many *devas* inhabited the spot where the people of Magadha were fortifying Pâtaligâmo, and he approved of the conduct of these people in both worshipping the gods, to gain their favour and protection, and in showing him respect and providing food for himself and his followers. We never find Buddha commanding his own mendicant Order to feed other ascetics. That they could not do, as they were themselves dependent upon the alms of the pious. Nor does he ever enjoin upon his followers the duty of worshipping the *devas*, from whom they could hope for no aid, and who were inferior to the Buddhist *arahats*.

While spending the rainy season in retirement at Beluva, near Vesâli, Buddha became dangerously ill.¹ On that occasion his faithful attendant Ânando urged him to give some parting directions to his followers, to be by them observed after his death. Buddha rebuked

‘Yânidha bhûtâni samâgatâni,
Bhummâni vâ, yâni vâ antalikkhe,
Tathâgatam deva-manussa-pûjitam
Buddham namassâma : suvatthi hotu.’

Ratana-Suttam, I, 2, 15.

Here we see that though ‘all the spirits which are here assembled, whether terrestrial or those which are in the air,’ are invoked, and are urged to ‘show benevolence towards human beings who bring you an offering both day and night : therefore preserve them carefully’; yet it is said : ‘We revere Buddha, the Tathâgato, who is *honoured by gods and men*.’ Such invocations, however, no doubt made it easy for Buddhists to fall into demon-worship, as they have done in Ceylon, and helped to encourage the development of later forms of Buddhism with hosts of deities of various kinds, as in Tibet.

¹ ‘Atha kho Bhagavato vassûpagatassa kharo âbâdho uppajji, Pabâlhâ vedanâ vattanti mâraṇantikâ’ (Mahâparinibb.-Sutt., p. 21).

him for this in an instructive discourse, part of which we here translate :

‘Moreover,¹ Ânando, what does the Order of Mendicants look for from me? The Law, Ânando, has been set forth by me, having made nothing esoteric² and nothing exoteric. There is not therein, in the affairs of the Tathâgato, a “teacher’s handful.”³ He whose words, Ânando, may be such as these, “I shall keep on foot the Order of Mendicants,” or, “To *my* ordinance is the Order of Mendicants subject”—let him,⁴ forsooth, Ânando, utter some command with regard to the Order of Mendicants. The word of the Tathâgato, indeed, is not thus: “I shall keep on foot the Order of Mendicants,” or, “To *my* ordinance is the Order of Mendicants subject.” Why should the Tathâgato, Ânando, utter some command for the Order of Mendicants? Moreover, Ânando, indeed

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 22, 23.

² Hence we see the absurdity of the modern fraud calling itself ‘Esoteric Buddhism.’ There *was* in ancient times an ‘Esoteric Buddhism,’ but its nature was such that it cannot be fully described in these pages. See, however, what Rājendralāla Mitra says of it in his introduction to the *Lalita-Vistara* (Fasc. vi., Calcutta, 1877), part of which will be found quoted in the notes to Lecture III., p. 157, below. This vile system cannot justly be attributed to Buddha, but those who now so learnedly discuss ‘Esoteric Buddhism’ should be careful lest their hearers should inquire more closely into what alone can rightly be so called. The modern theosophical system which claims the title is essentially *modern*. Our objections to the use of this title are only two, very similar to those which are known to apply to the phrase ‘*Holy Roman Empire*.’

³ ‘Na tath’, Ânanda, Tathâgatassa dhammesu âcariya-muṭṭhi’ (*ibid.*). A ‘teacher’s handful’ is some further knowledge kept back by the teacher that he may remain at least a little in advance of his pupils.

⁴ This passage doubtless refers to the words of Devadatto when he demanded that the leadership of the Order should be made over to him: ‘Ahaṃ bhikkhusaṅghaṃ pariharissāmi, niyyādetha me bhikkhusaṅghaṃ’ (quoted by Childers, *Pāli Dictionary*, p. 341).

I am now decrepit, old, aged, advanced in years. I have reached old age; my age is eighty years. Just as a broken-down waggon, too, Ânando, is with difficulty kept going, exactly so indeed, Ânando, is the Tathâgato's body with difficulty kept going, I consider. At whatever time, Ânando, the Tathâgato dwells, having, through ceasing to pay attention to all attributes,¹ through the cessation of certain sensations, attained to unconditioned concentration of mind, at that time is the Tathâgato's body comfortable. Therefore, since this is so, Ânando, being your own Lamp, abide ye as your own Refuge, recognising no other Refuge, having the Law as your Lamp, having the Law as your Refuge, recognising no other Refuge. And how, Ânando, does a mendicant abide as his own Lamp, his own Refuge, recognising no other Refuge, having the Law as his Lamp, having the Law as his Refuge, having no other Refuge? Here in the body, Ânando, a mendicant, meditating on (the impurity of) the body, abides strenuous, conscious, thoughtful: let him subdue the melancholy of longing in the world. Thus indeed, Ânando, a mendicant abides as his own Lamp, his own Refuge, recognising no other Refuge, having the Law as his Lamp, having the Law as his Refuge, recognising no other Refuge. For, Ânando, whosoever they be that, either now or on my decease, shall abide as their own Lamp, as their own Refuge, recognising no other Refuge, having the Law as their Lamp, having the Law as their Refuge, recognising no other Refuge—those mendicants, Ânando, shall to me stand in the foremost place, whosoever they be that are lovers of the Precepts.'

Who can fail to notice here how completely Buddha,

¹ That is to say, to greed, anger, and infatuation (*rogo, doso, moho*), the three things that cause suffering in the world (Samyutta-Nik., iii. 3: 3, 4).

quietly but firmly, repudiates the idea that any deity or deities can assist his followers in working out their deliverance from the fetters of existence?

Having recovered from this attack of illness, Buddha one day went his rounds at Vesâli¹ to beg, according to his usual custom. Afterwards he said to Ânando, 'Ânando,² take the mat to sit on; we shall go to pass the heat of the day at the C p laṃ shrine.' They did so. There M ro, the god of death and of all that causes death, approaching Buddha, tempted³ him to hasten his departure from this world, and from existence. Buddha's own account of this incident, supposed to be given on the same day to his attendant, runs thus:

'Just⁴ now, indeed, Ânando, at the C p laṃ shrine to-day, wicked M ro approached the place where I was, and, having approached, stood to one side. Standing to one side, indeed, Ânando, wicked M ro said this to me: "Sir, let the Worshipful One now become extinct (*or* enter Nirv na), let the Prosperous⁵ One become extinct. Sir, it is now time for the Worshipful One's complete extinction. Moreover, indeed, the Worshipful One did utter this speech, saying, 'I shall not become extinct, Wicked One, until the mendicants, my disciples, shall have become wise, well-trained, experienced, thoroughly instructed, keepers of the Law, observers of the Law and of the lesser directions, conforming to propriety, walking according to the lesser directions, having acquired as their own the position of teachers, until they shall have declared, proclaimed, promulgated, set going, detailed, made clear the miraculous law, quoted without con-

¹ Mah parinibb na-Suttaṃ, p. 23.

² 'Gaṇh hi,  nanda, nisidanaṃ; yena C p laṃ cetiyaṃ, ten' upasaṇ-kamiss ma div vih r y -ti' (*ibid.*).

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 24-26.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 31, 32.

⁵ *Sugato.*

troversy and correctly, and, holding fast and well what they hold fast, shall have preached it.' Moreover, now indeed, sir, the mendicants, the disciples of the Worshipful One, having become wise, well-trained, etc., are preaching the Law." Mâro went on to point out that not only the male and female mendicants, but also the male and female lay adherents, were fully competent to do without Buddha's further assistance, and again urged him to keep his implied promise of becoming extinct. Buddha tells us that he said in reply to this temptation :

'Be not¹ anxious, Wicked One; soon will the Tathâgato's extinction take place. After the lapse of three months from the present time, the Tathâgato will become extinct.' And, in concluding his recital, Buddha said, 'Just now, indeed, Ânando, at the Cápâlam shrine to-day has the Tathâgato, while thoughtful and conscious, renounced the aggregate² of his life.'

On hearing this sad news, Ânando began to entreat his beloved master to prolong his existence in this world to the end of the present vast world-cycle (Pâli *kappo*, Sanskrit *kalpa*). 'Sir,' he said, 'let the Worshipful One remain for a World-cycle, let the Prosperous One remain for a World-cycle, for the sake of many people, for many people's happiness, out of pity for the world, for the cause, for the sake, for the happiness, of gods and men.'³

¹ Mahâparinibbâna-Suttam, p. 32.

² 'Idân' eva kho, Ânanda, ajja Cápâle cetiye Tathâgatena satena sampajânena âyusañkhâro ossaṭṭho-ti' (*ibid.*). The 'aggregate of life' means the whole period that anyone has to live in any existence. Its length is determined by his conduct (*karma*) in that or any previous existence—'dasakusalakammehi âyusañkhâro pi 'ssa vaḍḍhati' (Attanagula-nañsam, p. 212; Childers, *s.v.* Sañkhâro, Pâli Dictionary, p. 455). Buddha means to say that he has resolved to die.

³ 'Titṭhatu, Bhante, Bhagavâ kappam, titṭhatu Sugato kappam, bahujanahitâya, bahujanasukhâya, lokânukampâya, atthâya, hitâya, sukhâya devamanussânan-ti' (*op. cit.*, p. 32).

But Buddha's mind is made up. He informs Ānando that on several occasions,¹ if the request had been made, it would have been granted. 'O, Ānando,² if thou hadst requested it of the Tathāgato, the Tathāgato would have rejected thy words just twice; then he would have acceded to the third request.' But it is too late now.

He proceeded, accompanied by Ānando, to a wood in the neighbourhood, called the *Mahāvānaṃ*, or Great Forest. In that wood there stood a building something of the nature of a pagoda, hence known as the Kūṭāgārasālā,³ which was the place of abode of the monks when spending the rainy season there. By Buddha's desire, Ānando assembled all the monks then living in the neighbourhood of Vesālī,⁴ and Buddha received them in the state-room (*upaṭṭhānasālā*)⁵ of the monastery, that they might hear his final address. When they were assembled, Buddha reminded them of the precepts he had given them, and urged them to walk in the Noble Eightfold Path with unceasing diligence. In conclusion he spoke thus:

'Come⁶ now, mendicants, I bid you farewell. Compounds are subject to dissolution. Succeed through diligence. Soon will the Tathāgato's extinction take

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 33-35.

² 'Sace tvam, Ānanda, Tathāgataṃ yāceyyāsi, dve 'va te vācā Tathāgato paṭikkhipeyya, atha tatiyakaṃ addivāseyya' (*op. cit.*, p. 35).

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁴ Dr. Hoey has very clearly proved that Vesālī must be identical with, or very close to, the modern town of Cherānd, at the junction of the Ganges, Sôn, and Gogra rivers (*J. A. S. B.*, vol. lxi., part i., No. 1, 1900).

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁶ 'Handa dāni, bhikkhave, āmantayāmi vo : vayadhammā saṅkhārā, appamādena sampādetha : naciraṃ Tathāgataṃ parinibbānaṃ bhavisati : ito tiṇṇaṃ māsānaṃ accayena Tathāgato parinibbāyissatī' (*Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ*, p. 37).

place; after the lapse of three months from now will the Tathâgato become extinct.

' My¹ age is full ripe, my life is brief,
Leaving you I shall depart : I have formed my own refuge.
Diligent, mindful, virtuous be ye, mendicants :
Very steadfast in resolve, guard your own minds.
He who shall continue diligent in this discipline of the Law,
Leaving birth-transmigration shall make an end of suffering.'

Buddha had resolved to die at the town of Kusinârâ (Sanskrit, *Kusinagaram*),² the capital of the Malla tribe. He therefore set out to travel thither with Ânando as his companion. Journeying along by short stages, as was the custom of the mendicants, they stopped for a time at a mango-grove at Pâvâ,³ which belonged to a smith named Cundo. It was at a feast which this lay adherent prepared in honour of Buddha that the latter ate the food⁴ which was the immediate cause of his death. Ill as he was, however, Buddha continued his journey, attended by Ânando and a considerable band of mendicants. When they reached the little river Kakutthâ,⁵ not far from Kusinârâ, Buddha bathed and rested for a while. Certain verses contained in the Mahâparinib-

¹ ' Paripakko vayo mayham, parittam mama jivitam,
Pahâya vo gamissâmi, katam me sarañam attano.
Appamattâ, satimanto, susilâ hotha, bhikkhavo,
Susamâhitasañkappâ sacittam anurakkhatha.
Yo imasmim dhammavinaye appamatto vihessati,
Pahâya jâtisamsâram, dukkhass' antam karissattî.'

Mahâparinibbâna-Suttam, p. 37.

² Near the modern town of Titaria (Dr. Hoey, article in *J. A. S. B.*, vol. lxi., part i., No. 1, 1900).

³ Now Pappaur, near Siwan (Dr. Hoey, *op. cit.*).

⁴ *Vide* note to p. 53, and Mahâparinibbâna-Suttam, pp. 41, 42.

⁵ This stream is probably either the Daha or the Satnar, both of which flow near the town of Titaria (Kusinârâ).

bâna-Suttam, which seem to be there quoted from an ancient metrical account of Buddha's life, relate what occurred in these words :

'Buddha,¹ having come to the River Kakutthâ
 With its pellucid, glad, calm waters,
 The thoroughly weary-looking Teacher plunged in,
 The Tathâgato, quite matchless in the world.
 Having both bathed and drunk, the Teacher crossed over,
 Pre-eminent in the midst of the Order of Mendicants.
 Here the Teacher, the Establisher in the Law, the Worshipful One,
 The great Sage, came to the mango-grove (Ambavanam).
 He addressed a mendicant, Cundako by name :
 "Spread for me my garment fourfold ; let me lie down."
 That Cundo, delighting in the Devoted One,
 Quite speedily spread the robe fourfold.
 The thoroughly weary-looking Teacher lay down.
 Cundo also sat down there in front of him.'

Having rested for a time, Buddha and his followers drew near to a grove of *śâl*-trees on the bank of the Hirañnavatî River near Kusinârâ. 'Go, Ânando,' said the old man, 'prepare thou for me between two twin *śâl*-trees a couch with the head northwards. I am exhausted, Ânando ; I shall lie down.'²

When he lay down on his simple couch, a strange scene is said to have been visible. 'Moreover³ at that time the twin *śâl*-trees burst into full bloom with untimely flowers ; they strew the Tathâgato's body ; they sprinkle and scatter them over it out of reverence for the Tathâgato. Divine coral-tree blossoms, too, fall from the atmosphere : . . . divine sandal-tree powders, too, fall from the atmosphere ; they strew the Tathâgato's body, they are sprinkled and scattered over it : . . . divine

¹ Mahâparinibbâna-Suttam, p. 47 : 'Gantvâna Buddhho nadiyaṃ Kakuttham,' etc.

² *Ibid.*, p. 49.

³ *Ibid.*

tabors, too, sound forth in the air : . . . divine chantings, too, go on in the air, out of reverence for the Tathâgato.'

But, though calling his disciples' attention to all this, Buddha valued something else far more. 'Not thus,¹ indeed, O Ânando,' he said, 'is the Tathâgato either honoured or revered or glorified or reverenced or respected. Whosoever, Ânando, whether male or female mendicant, or male or female lay adherent, continues to carry out in practice the law and the lesser directions, observing propriety, walking according to the lesser directions, he it is that honours, reveres, glorifies, reverences, respects the Tathâgato with the highest reverence.'

A monk named Upavâṇo then stood in front of Buddha and began to fan² him. Buddha repelled him, saying: 'Go away, mendicant; do not stand in front of me.' When Ânando remonstrated with his master for thus driving away one who had come a long distance in order to be near him, Buddha explained and defended his own conduct in these words:

'In³ large numbers in the ten spheres, Ânando, are the *devas* assembled to behold the Tathâgato, so that . . . all around, for a distance of twelve stages, there is not a space as large⁴ as the top of a hair that is not pervaded with mighty *devas*. The *devas*, Ânando, murmur, saying, "Lo, we have come from afar to see the Tathâgato. Sometimes, on some occasions, Tathâgatos arise in the world, perfect, omniscient; and to-day, at the last watch of the night, the Tathâgato's extinction will occur; and this big mendicant, standing in front of the Tathâgato,

¹ Mahâparinibbâna-Suttam, p. 49.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 50.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 50, 51.

⁴ Cf. the saying of Heraclitus, Πάντα ψυχῶν εἶναι καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρη (Diog. Laertius, lib. ix., cap. i., § 6), and that of Pythagoras, εἶναι τε πάντα τὸν ἀέρα ψυχῶν ἐμπλεων (*op. cit.*, lib. viii., cap. i., § 19, 32).

hinders us, and at the last moment we do not get the opportunity of seeing the Tathâgato." Thus do the *devas* murmur, Ânando.' When the latter inquired in what condition of mind he perceived the *devas* to be, Buddha replied: 'There are in the air, Ânando, *devas* concerned with earthly things; having strewn abroad their locks they wail; they fall as if down a sheer precipice; they turn about and revolve, saying: "Very soon will the Tathâgato become extinct; very soon will the Prosperous One become extinct; very soon will the Eye vanish in the world." . . . Moreover, those *devas* who are freed from passions, they quietly and composedly endure it, saying, "Compounds are impermanent; otherwise how would that be allowable here?"'

Ânando¹ was so much overcome with grief at the thought of his beloved master's approaching decease that he retired to weep in private. But Buddha, knowing this, sent for him, and did what he could to comfort him by praising him for his long and faithful service, and urging him to continue to walk in the Noble Eightfold Path.

Among other visitors who came to interview Buddha during his last moments was a monk named Subhaddo,² who belonged to a different sect. Struck by Buddha's conversation, this man joined the Order, and was the last convert made by Buddha.

The concluding scene is related in these words:

'Then indeed the Worshipful One addressed the mendicants: "Come³ now, mendicants, I bid you farewell. Compounds are subject to dissolution. Prosper ye through diligence." This was the last speech of the Tathâgato.'

¹ Mahâparinibbâna-Suttam, pp. 53, 54.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 56-60.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 61.

Then Buddha, becoming unconscious, passed through the four stages of ecstasy¹ (*jhānam*), and thus departed, or, in the language of the text we are quoting, 'became extinct.'²

Difficult as it is to separate the historical from the legendary in Buddha's life, yet it is clear that he was one of the most remarkable men—perhaps *the* most remarkable man—that India has ever produced. A great deal of the success of his teaching must have been due to his marvellous personal influence³ over those with whom he came in contact. He was a man of great earnestness, of moral courage and great self-control, of unconquerable resolution, of deep though thwarted sympathy. His regard for his fellow-men was shown by the zeal and self-denial with which he laboured, during the greater part of his long life, to teach them what he firmly believed to be the highest of all truths, the only doctrine which would enable them to obtain release from their misery. The system of philosophy which he founded has for more than two thousand years influenced for good or ill vast multitudes of men throughout a very large part of the East. Even from his very failure we may learn much, and still more from his zeal in spreading his cheerless creed. His intellect was not of the highest order, though his imagination was powerfully developed. He does not seem to have been a man of deep spirituality, as was Socrates; but with whatever great philosopher of ancient times he may be compared, Buddha loses nothing from the comparison.

The lines which Sakko is related to have uttered on Buddha's death sum up the whole of Buddha's 'gospel,' if we may so style a philosophy which teaches that the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 62.

² 'Parinibbāyi,' *idem*.

³ 'Six Systems,' p. 30.

only possible way in which any living being, in heaven or on earth, can escape from misery and suffering is by becoming extinct. These verses may be translated thus :

‘Lo! compounds are impermanent, subject to springing up and dissolution :

Having sprung up, they perish : happy is their suppression.’¹

To those who are content with such a creed, may we not well apply the words of the Dhammapadam, one of the best known of the tractates included in the Buddhist canon :

‘Shrouded in darkness, do ye not seek a torch?’²

Do not

‘Those wise answers of the far-off Sage—
So wise, they shut out God—and can enchain
To-day, in narrow bands of foolishness,
The subtle Eastern brain’³

—showing as they do man’s need of a Divine revelation—appeal to us, by their very sadness and despairing courage, to bear to Buddha’s disciples of the present day the good news of Him who said so long ago, and still says to the sorrowing, suffering, wandering, and doubting of our own times :

‘I am the Light of the World ; he that followeth Me shall not walk in the darkness, but shall have the Light of Life’?⁴

¹ ‘Aniccā vata sañkhārā, uppādavayadhammino :
Uppajjitvā nirujjhanti : tesam vūpasamo sukho-ti.’
Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ, p. 62.

For a translation of the commentary on these lines, *vide* Rhys Davids’ Hibbert Lectures for 1881, pp. 212-214.

² ‘Andhakārena onaddhā padīpaṃ na gavessatha?’
Dhammapadam, śl. 146.

³ L. Morris, ‘The Wanderer.’

⁴ ‘Εγώ εἰμι τὸ φῶς τοῦ κόσμου· ὁ ἀκολουθῶν μοι οὐ μὴ περιπατήσει ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ, ἀλλ’ ἔξει τὸ φῶς τῆς ζωῆς.

LECTURE II

THE CHIEF DOCTRINES OF BUDDHISM

'O miseras hominum mentes, O pectora cæca !
Qualibus in tenebris vitæ quantisque periclis
Degitur hoc ævi quodcumque est ! Nonne videre
Nil aliud sibi naturam latrare, nisi ut, *cui*
Corpore seiunctus dolor absit, menti' fruatur
Iucundo sensu, *cura semotu' metuque* ?
Ergo corpoream ad naturam pauca videmus
Esse opus omnino, *que demant cumque dolorem*,
Delicias quoque uti multas substernere possint.'

LUCRETIUS, lib. ii., 14-22.

THE whole of the doctrines of 'orthodox' Buddhism rest solely and entirely upon the dogmatic teaching of Buddha himself. These may in some instances seem to appeal to reason and experience; in other cases, however,¹ they absolutely contradict both. Yet all these statements are supported by the authority of the sacred books of the Pāli or Southern Canon, which were composed at uncertain and varying dates after

¹ As, for example, what Buddha is related to have stated about his own previous existences, about the gods and demons, the heavens and the hells, about the size and configuration of the various worlds and their inhabitants, about the cause of the eclipses of the sun and moon, and many other such matters, some of which are treated of in the present lecture.

Buddha's death—as far as their present form is concerned—and handed down by oral tradition among his followers until they were finally committed to writing from memory about eighty¹ years before the Christian era.

In the present lecture we are not called upon to deal with the *corruptions* of Buddhism, which have practically changed a philosophy with no room for God in it into a number of polytheistic religions. These religions, it is true, though varying very much among themselves, have for many centuries continued to exist in different countries, and they claim the allegiance of a very large number of our fellow-creatures. But they do not fairly represent Buddhism in its original form, and therefore can no more be dealt with as if they did than can Roman Catholic and Greek Christianity be fairly brought forward as giving a correct idea of the teaching of Jesus Christ. On the other hand, although Buddhism, as taught by its founder himself, can hardly be said to exist any longer except in the ancient Pāli books (though these, too, show evident proofs of the early growth of myth), yet it is essential to a proper comprehension of any one of the many forms of modern Buddhism to know what were the doctrines which Buddha taught. Making every allowance for the corrections which found their way into the books of the Pāli Canon before they assumed their present form, it is still possible by carefully studying those works to obtain a fairly correct general idea of the teaching of Buddha as it has been handed down by tradition from the lips of his earliest disciples.

The canonical books of the Buddhists consist of three main divisions, called the 'Three Piṭakas' (*Tiṭṭakam*, *tini piṭikāni*, or *piṭakattayam*). These are named respec-

¹ *Vide* Max Müller, 'Six Systems of Indian Philosophy,' p. 5.

tively the *Vinaya-Piṭakam*, or 'Basket of Discipline,'¹ the *Sutta-Piṭakam*,² or 'Basket of Discourses,' and the *Abhidhamma-Piṭakam*,³ or 'Basket of the Supplement to the Law.'⁴ Some parts of these works are in poetry, and some in prose; the prose is in most cases in the form of an introduction to the poetry, stating under what circumstances the verses were composed, or supplementing the statements made in them. Speaking generally, it seems evident that the verses are far more ancient than the prose, and may have been handed down for some centuries before the books assumed their present form. The Buddhist chronicles of Ceylon⁵ state

¹ This consists of the following five books, which are sometimes arranged in a different order: Bhikkhu-Vibhaṅgo, Bhikkhunī-Vibhaṅgo, Mahā-Vaggo, Culla-Vaggo, Parivāra-Pāṭho.

² It contains the following: Dīgha-Nikāyo, Majjhima-Nikāyo, Saṃyutta-Nikāyo, Aṅguttara-Nikāyo, Khuddaka-Nikāyo. This last contains fifteen tractates, which are these: Khuddaka-Pāṭho, Dhammapadam, Udānam, Itivuttakam, Sutta-Nipāto, Vimāna-Vatthu, Peta-Vatthu, Thera-Gāthā, Therī-Gāthā, Jātakam, Niddeso, Paṭisambhidā-Maggo, Apadānam, Buddha-Vaṃso, Cariyā-Piṭakam.

³ Consisting of Dhamma-Saṅgaṇi, Vibhaṅgam, Kathā-Vatthu, Poggala-Paññatti, Dhātu-Kathā, Yamakam, Paṭṭhānam (Childers, Pāli Dictionary, s.v. Tipiṭakam; Warren, 'Buddhism in Translations,' introduction, pp. xvii, xviii).

⁴ Cf., on the meaning Rhys Davids' Hibbert Lectures for 1881, pp. 49, 50. He shows that the word 'Abhidhamma' does not mean 'metaphysics.'

⁵ The Mahā-Vaṃso, quoted by Max Müller, 'Six Systems of Indian Philosophy,' p. 5; but see Childers, Pāli Dictionary, preface, p. ix, note. Professor Rhys Davids, in speaking of the *Vinaya-Piṭakam*, says: 'The great bulk of it must be older than the year 350 B.C. It received, however, its last touches about a century later, and it contains also some poetic portions . . . which may even reach back to the lifetime of the Buddha himself. In other words, these books were in existence, practically as we now have them, within about 150 years after the time of Gotama' (Hibbert Lectures, 1881, p. 43). But the fact that the Pāli of these books differs very considerably from the

distinctly that the Southern Canon was not reduced to writing till the first century B.C., under King Vattâ-gâmani (about 80 B.C.). 'Before this time,' they say, 'the wise monks had handed down the texts of the Tipiṭakam orally, and also the Atthakathâ (commentary). At this time the monks, perceiving the decay of beings, assembled, and, in order that the Law might endure for a long time, they caused it to be written down.' But when we remember how habitually in India literary compositions of enormous length were handed down from generation to generation by oral tradition, it is not difficult to believe that a great deal of the Three Piṭakas may be very ancient. It is not easy to identify for certain any of the tractates in the Canon with those mentioned by name in the inscriptions of Aṣoka;¹ yet the identity of the Buddhist formula, which may be called the creed of Buddhism, as given in the Mahāvaggo,² with that inscribed by Aṣoka's orders on monuments in so many

Magadhī of King Aṣoka's inscriptions, and seems much more recent in character, renders this somewhat doubtful. The absurd fables which are found even in the Three Piṭakas must have required a considerable time for their development. All this leads me to agree with Barth ('Religions of India,' pp. 102, 103, note) in doubting whether the Three Piṭakas are as ancient as Professor Rhys Davids thinks.

¹ Especially in the Bairat inscription; but see the matter discussed in Monier-Williams' 'Buddhism,' pp. 53-70, and Bishop Copleston's 'Buddhism,' pp. 269, 274. The tractates specially mentioned in that inscription are Vinaya-samukasa, Ariyavasa, Anâgata-bhaya, Muni-gâthâ, Upatisa-pasina, Moneyasûta, and the Sermon to Râhulo. Thomas ('The Early Faith of Aṣoka,' p. 23 *et seq.*) shows that Aṣoka was originally a Jaina (as was Candra-gupta, his grandson), and that the title 'devânampiya' ('beloved of the gods') which he bears in some of his inscriptions was a conventional title among the Jainas (as is evident from the Kalpa-Sutra). It is omitted in the Bhabra inscription, because the Buddhist faith '*ipso facto* repudiated all gods' (*op. cit.*, p. 55).

² Mahāvaggo, i. 23 : 5, quoted above, Lecture I., p. 41, note 1.

parts of India, and the fact that there is no discrepancy in the testimony as to the nature of Buddha's teaching given in the different parts of the Three Piṭakas—all this enables us to speak with a near approach to absolute certainty as to what the main doctrines were which he taught. There can be no doubt that the speeches attributed to Buddha in the Three Piṭakas represent very correctly what he actually said.

As we have already seen, Buddha had no room for God in his philosophy. Hence there could be no claim in favour of the inspiration of these books, or, indeed, of any portion of his teaching. It is all supposed to have flashed upon him suddenly on the night when he became a Buddha. He had previously learnt by experience the misery of existence—an existence apart from God. He now believed that he had learnt three other things—the cause of this misery and suffering, the possibility of its cessation, and the way to attain to that end. The explanation of these four points constitutes almost the whole of his teaching, and certainly its most important part. Hence it is that we so frequently find these foundation 'truths' repeated again and again in the sacred books.

We proceed to give a few more extracts, in order to let Buddha and one of his most eminent disciples respectively explain to us exactly what they thought it most necessary for men to know.

On one occasion, some time before his death, going to Koṭigāmo with a large company of mendicants, Buddha is related to have addressed them thus :¹

'O mendicants,² it is through want of knowledge and

¹ Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ, § 2, 1, p. 15.

² Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ, § 2, 1 : 'Catunnaṃ, bhikkhave, ariya-saccānaṃ ananubodhā appativedhā evaṃ idaṃ dīghaṃ addhānaṃ sandhāviṭṭaṃ, samsaritaṃ, mamañ-c'eva tumhākañ-ca. . . . Tayidaṃ,

non-comprehension of the Four Noble Truths that this long road, both mine and yours, has been traversed and transmigrated.' He then mentions the Four Truths: The Noble Truth of Suffering, that of the Origin of Suffering, that of the Cessation of Suffering, and that of the Way to the Attainment of the Cessation of Suffering, and continues:

'But when, O mendicants, the Noble Truth of Suffering has been fully known and comprehended, when the Noble Truth of the Origin of Suffering has been fully known and comprehended, when the Noble Truth of the Cessation of Suffering has been fully known and comprehended, when the Noble Truth of the Way to the Attainment of the Cessation of Suffering has been fully known and comprehended, the thirst for existence is eradicated, lust is exhausted; thenceforth there is no rebirth.' The text goes on to say: 'This the Worshipful One said; having thus spoken, the Prosperous One, the Teacher, said this furthermore:

“Through the non-perception of the Four Noble Truths as they really are,
The long road has been transmigrated in those, in those very births.
Those, these have been seen: lust is eradicated;
The root of suffering is utterly extirpated; henceforth there is no rebirth.”

bhikkhave, dukkham ariyasaccam anubuddhaṃ paṭividdhaṃ, dukkha-samudayam ariyasaccam anubuddhaṃ paṭividdhaṃ, dukkhanirodham ariyasaccam anubuddhaṃ paṭividdhaṃ, dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā ariyasaccam anubuddhaṃ paṭividdhaṃ, ucchinnā bhavataṇhā, khīṇā bhavanetti, n'atthi dāni punabbhavo ti. Idam avoca Bhagavā, idaṃ vatvā Sugato, athāparam etad avoca Satthā:

“Catunnam ariyasaccānaṃ yathābhūtam adassanā
Samsitaṃ dīgham addhānaṃ tāsū tās' eva jātisū:
Tāni etāni diṭṭhāni, bhavanetti samūhatā,
Ucchinnamūlaṃ dukkhassa; n'atthi dāni punabbhavo, ti.”

In the *Saccavibhaṅgo*, at Buddha's bidding, Sāriputto explains this doctrine at full length. 'Birth,' he says, 'is painful¹; old age is painful; sickness is painful; death is painful; grief, lamentation, pain, dejection, despair, are painful; the wish which one does not obtain, that, too, is painful; in short, the five elements of attachment to existence are painful.' He then goes on to explain the full meaning of each term, and to show how much misery is involved in birth and rebirth, in old age, sickness, and death, in grief, disappointment, and despair, and in physical pain. He points out how those beings who are liable to birth² feel within them the longing, 'Ah,³ would that we might not be born, would that birth came not to us!' The same longing is felt by all beings who are exposed to sickness, old age, and death; yet in all alike the longing is torture, for it is in vain. 'This is not to be obtained by longing.'⁴ After this he mentions the five elements of attachment to existence (*Panc'upādānakkhandhā*)—form⁵, sensation, percep-

¹ The original runs thus: 'Jāti pi dukkhā, jarā pi dukkhā, vyādhi pi dukkhā, maraṇaṃ pi dukkhā, soka-parideva-dukkha-domanassa-upāyāsā dukkhā; yaṃ p'icchaṃ na labhati, taṃ pi dukkhaṃ; sañ-khittena pañc' upādānakkhandhā dukkhā' (*Saccavibhaṅgo*, ii, § 1).

² Cf. Lucretius' remark on the babe's wailing when born (lib. v., vv. 222-227):

'Tum porro puer, ut sævis proiectus ab undis
Navita, nudus humi iacet, infans, indigus omni
Vitali auxilio, cum primum in luminis oras
Nixibus ex alveo matris natura profudit,
Vagituque locum lugubri complet, ut æquum'st
Cui tantum in vita restet transire malorum.'

³ 'Aho! vata mayaṃ na jātidhammā assāma, na-ca vata no jāt āgaccheyyā-ti' (*Saccavibhaṅgo*, § 9).

⁴ 'Na kho pan' etam icchāya pattabbaṃ.'

⁵ 'Rūp-upādānakkhandho, vedan-upādānakkhandho, saññupādānak-khandho, sañkhār-upādānakkhandho, viññan-upādānakkhandhā' (§ 10)

tion, components, consciousness—and classes under the Origin of Suffering the thirst¹ which manifests itself in desire for future existence, happiness, and joy, which thirst is comprised under three heads: Thirst for sensual pleasure, thirst for (eternal)² existence, and thirst for the (instant) cessation of existence. The Noble Truth of the Way to the Attainment of the Cessation of Existence is called the Noble Eightfold Path, and is explained (as we have already seen) as consisting in the following: ‘Perfect opinion, perfect resolve, perfect speech, perfect employment, perfect conduct, perfect exertion, perfect thought, perfect self-concentration.’³

The last and final step on this path leads the devotee through four stages of mystic trance (*jhānam*), the fourth of which is thus described: ‘Through abandonment of pleasure and abandonment of pain, and through the disappearance of the previously experienced enjoyment and dejection, having attained to painless, pleasureless indifference of mind and purity, to the fourth ecstasy, he thus abides. This, O friend, is called perfect meditation.’⁴

When a man has passed through all these various stages he has reached *Arahat*-ship, which is often called *Nirvāṇa* (*Nibbānam*).

Much discussion has taken place regarding the precise meaning of this term, but scholars are now in the main

¹ ‘Yāyaṃ taṇhā ponobbhavikānandirāga-sahagatā tatra tatrābhīnan-dinī: seyyathīdam: kāma-taṇhā, bhava-taṇhā, vibhava-taṇhā’ (iii., § 8).

² See Childers’ Pāli Dictionary, *s.v.* Vibhavo.

³ ‘Ayam eva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko Maggo: seyyathīdam: Sammādiṭṭhi, sammāsaṅkappo, sammāvācā, sammākammanto, sammā-ājīvo, sammā-vāyāmo, sammasati, sammāsamādhī’ (iii., § 10).

⁴ ‘Sūkhassa-ca pahānā, dukkhassa-ca pahānā, pubbe-ca somanassa-đomanassānam atthagamā, addukkhānam asukkhānam upekkhāsati-pārisuddhiṃ catutthajjhānam upasampajja viharati. Ayam vuccat’, āvuso, Sammāsamādhī’ (iv., § 8).

agreed as to what is denoted thereby. It literally means *extinction*,¹ the being *puffed out* of a flame. But it would be incorrect to understand by this the destruction of the human spirit, of the self, the personality, the *ego*; for the Buddhist does not acknowledge the existence of human personality, much less that of an immortal spirit, in man. A human being is said to be made up of the five 'elements of existence' (*Khandhos*) mentioned above—form, sensation, perception, components, consciousness. When he dies these are utterly destroyed, and the man entirely ceases to exist. But a new set of *Khandhos* is immediately produced, and these, which constitute a new being (technically called *Nāmarūpam*, 'name and form'), inherit and carry on the man's *character*² and his *Karma* (*Pāli-Kammaṃ*; literally, 'deed'), the net result of all his deeds, good and bad. The good produce good results and happiness in the next state of existence, which may be passed either in this or in some other world, or in some of the numerous Buddhist heavens. They place him in a better position for attaining merit, and thereby approaching nearer the *summum bonum* of the Buddhist's hope, *Nirvāṇa*. His evil deeds also have their own fruit, either in this or in some other life, for it is said :³

'The evil done by one is being suffered for by one's self,
The evil not done by one is being cleared away by one's self :
The pure and the impure separately : one does not purify another.'

¹ *Nirvāṇam* (*Pāli Nibbānam*) is derived from the negative or primitive particle *nis* and the root *vā*, 'to blow' (from which comes the Sanskrit *vāta*, Latin *ventus*, English *wind*), with the termination *-nam*. Hence it literally means 'the being puffed out,' or 'the state of being puffed out.' In Sanskrit the word is used as an adjective (*nirvāṇa*, m., f., n.), meaning 'blown out,' of a lamp.

² Hibbert Lectures, R. Davids, p. 92.

³ 'Attanā va kataṃ pāpaṃ attanā sañkilissati,
Attanā akataṃ pāpaṃ attanā va visujjhati :
Suddhī asudhī paccattaṃ : n'añño aññaṃ visodhaye.'

Dhanmapadam, ṣl. 165.

And, again :¹

'The wicked man, too, sees good, until his evil matureth ;
And when his evil matureth, then the wicked man sees evil things.
The good man, too, sees evil,
Until his good matureth ;
And when his good matureth,
Then the good man sees good things.'

Once more :²

'Here he grieves, hereafter grieves
The evil-doer, in both worlds he grieves ;
That man grieves, that man is afflicted,
Having seen his own vile deed.

¹ 'Pāpo pi passatī bhadrāṃ, yāva pāpaṃ na paccati ;
Yadā-ca paccatī pāpaṃ, atha pāpo pāpāni passati.
Bhadro pi passatī pāpaṃ,
Yāva bhadrāṃ na paccati ;
Yadā-ca paccatī bhadrāṃ,
Atha bhadro bhadrāni passati.'

Ibid., §ll. 119, 120.

² 'Idha socati, pecca socati
Pāpakārī, ubhayattha socati ;
So socati, so vihaññati,
Disvā kammakilīṭṭham attano.
Idha modati, pecca modati
Katapuñño, ubhayattha modati ;
So modati, so pamodati,
Disvā kammavisuddhim attano.
Idha tappati, pecca tappati
Pāpakārī, ubhayattha tappati ;
Pāpaṃ me katan-ti tappati :
Bhiyyo tappati duggatīṃ gato.
Idha nandati, pecca nandati
Katapuñño, ubhayattha nandati ;
Puññaṃ me katan-ti nandati,
Bhiyyo nandati suggatīṃ * gato.'

Ibid., §ll. 15-18.

* In the commentary explained as the Tusitā heaven.

Here he joys, hereafter joys
 The well-doer, in both worlds he joys ;
 That man joys, that man rejoices,
 Having seen his own pure deed.
 Here he is tormented, hereafter is tormented
 The evil-doer, in both worlds he is tormented ;
 " Evil has been done by me,"—thus [saying] he is tormented :
 More is he tormented, having gone to an evil state.
 Here he is happy, hereafter is happy
 The well-doer, in both worlds he is happy ;
 " Good has been done by me,"—thus [saying] he is happy :
 More happy is he, having gone to a good state.'

But it would be quite erroneous to suppose that the Buddhist thinks of this happiness or misery as a reward or as a punishment—that is, as having been portioned out for the well-doer or for the evil-doer by any Judge, any superhuman Intelligence or Ruler. No, the Buddha taught that each deed bears its own¹ fruit (*phalam*), bad or good, according to its nature. A man may, on account

With this compare Æschylus, quoted by Theophilus (' Ad Autolycum,' lib. ii., 37) :

Τό τοι κακὸν ποδώκες ἔρχεται βροτοῖς,
 καὶ τ' ἀμπλάκημα τῷ περῶντι τὴν Θέμυ.
 ὀρᾶς δίκην ἀναυδὸν οὐχ ὀρωμένην,
 εὐδοντι, καὶ στείχοντι, καὶ καθημένῳ·
 ἐξῆς ὀπάζει δόχμιον, ἀλλοθ' ὕστερον·
 οὐκ ἐγκαλύπτει νύξ κακῶς εἰργασμένον.
 ὦ, τι δ' ἂν ποιῆς δεῖνον, νόμιξ' ὀρᾶν τινά.

So also Simonides (*ibid.*) :

Οὐκ ἔστ' ἀνεπιδόκητον ἀνθρώποις κακὸν,
 ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ δὲ πᾶν μεταρρίπτει θεός.

¹ Cf. Æschylus, ' Agam., verses 757-760 :

Τὸ δυσσεβὲς γὰρ ἔργον
 μετὰ μὲν πλείονα τίκτει, σφετέρῃ δ' εἰκότα γένει.

But Æschylus thought of the results in *this* life, seen from a different point of view.

of some special good deed done here, be born again in one of the higher heavens as a god. After that, on account of an evil deed done in a previous birth, he may be born into this world once more in the form of a man suffering from some grievous infirmity. This is expressed by the remarkable lines :¹

‘The man long exiled, safely come from afar,
Relatives, friends, and well-wishers welcome when come :
Even so the well-doer, too, gone across from this world,
His good deeds accept, as relatives a dear one come.’

But this succession of births and deaths tends to go on to all eternity, for in each successive existence a stock of merit or guilt or both is ever being laid up, which must work itself out in future births. However much happiness there may be in any existence, even in that of one of the *devas*, it must be all embittered by the terrible thought that all is transitory and is destined to fade away, while death is sure to come at last, death which all beings, men and gods alike, dread ;² for, as Buddha said : ‘All beings that have not overcome death are subject to death, having death as their goal.’³

‘All beings will die : for life ends in death :
According to their deeds shall they go, entering on the fruit of
good and evil.’⁴

¹ ‘Cirappavāsiṃ purisaṃ dūrato sotthim āgataṃ
Nātimittā suhajjā-ca abhinandanti āgataṃ ;
Tath’ eva katapuññaṃ pi asmā lokā paraṃ gataṃ
Puññāni patiganhanti piyaṃ nātiva āgataṃ.’

Dham., ṣll. 219, 220.

² ‘Sabbe tasanti daṇḍassa, sabbe bhāyanti maccuno.’

Ibid., ṣl. 129.

³ ‘Sabbe sattā . . . maraṇa-dhammā maraṇa-pariyosānā maraṇam anattā’ (Kosala-Samyuttaṃ, III., iii., § 2 : 5).

⁴ ‘Sabbe sattā marissanti : maraṇantaṃ hi jīvitaṃ :
Yathā kammaṃ gamissanti, puñña-pāpa-phalūpagā.’

Ibid., 5.

Since the Buddha declares birth to be suffering, death to be suffering, and all existence to be suffering, it follows that the only thing worthy of attention is the means of escape from this suffering. In order to discover this, it is necessary to learn the cause of suffering—that is, of existence itself. For if one's deeds do not cease to bear fruit, for good or ill, as long as the elements of existence (*Khandhos*) are produced, it is clear that death by no means releases us from our misery, not being the end of existence. In the 'Discourse concerning the Inauguration of the Dominion of the Law,' Buddha asserts that the cause or origin of the suffering is thirst (*taṇhā*), and that this thirst is threefold—for sensual pleasure, for eternal existence, and for instant annihilation. If it were not for this thirst, this impulse to seek for these things, existence, and with it suffering, would cease. The way, then, to escape from suffering is to escape from this thirst. To do this, however, it is again needful to discover the source which gives rise to it. Regarding this, we are informed that Buddha reflected immediately after attaining Buddhahood, and the result of his reflections is thus stated in the *Mahāvaggo*:¹

'Then the Prosperous One during the first watch of the night fixed his mind upon the chain of Causation (*Paṭicca-*

So also it is said in the *Dhammapadam* :

'Na antalikkhe, na samuddamajjhe,
Na pabbatānaṃ vivaraṃ pavissa,
Na vijjatī so jagatippadeso,
Yatthaṭṭhitam nappasahetha maccu.'

Dham., sl. 128.

Note that the gods also must die and transmigrate as do men, though their lives are much longer and happier than ours. They are also exposed to *Māro's* attacks (*Samy.-Nik.*, V., v., § 7: 5).

¹ *Mahāvaggo*, I. i. 2.

samuppādo) in direct and in reverse order.' 'In¹ consequence of Ignorance arise the Aggregations' (*saṅkhārā* = *khandhā* according to the Commentary); 'in consequence of the Aggregations Consciousness; in consequence of Consciousness, Name-and-Form; in consequence of Name-and-Form, the Six Organs of Sense; in consequence of the Six Organs of Sense, Contact; in consequence of Contact, Sensation; in consequence of Sensation, Thirst; in consequence of Thirst, Attachment to Existence' (*Upādānaṃ*; literally, 'Fuel'); 'in consequence of Attachment to Existence, Existence; in consequence of Existence, Birth; in consequence of Birth, Old Age, Death, Grief, Lamentation, Pain, Dejection, Despair. Such is the origination of this whole mass of suffering. Again, in consequence of the destruction of Ignorance, which consists in deliverance from desire, the Aggregations are destroyed; in consequence of the destruction of the Aggregations, Consciousness; in consequence of the destruction of Consciousness, Name-and-Form; in consequence of the destruction of Name-and-Form, the Six Organs of Sense; in consequence of the destruction of the Six Organs of Sense, Contact; in consequence of the destruction of Contact, Sensation; in consequence of the destruction of Sensation, Thirst; in consequence of the destruction of Thirst, Attachment to Existence; in consequence of the destruction of Attachment to Existence, Existence; in consequence of the destruction of Existence, Birth; in consequence of the destruction of

¹ The Pāli text is as follows: 'Avijjā-paccayā saṅkhārā, saṅkhārapaccayā viññānaṃ, viññānappaccayā nāma-rūpaṃ, nāma-rūpappaccayā saḷāyatanam, saḷāyatanappaccayā phasso, phassappaccayā vedanā, vedanappaccayā taṇhā, taṇhappaccayā upādānaṃ, upādānappaccayā bhavo, bhavappaccayā jāti, jātippaccayā jarā-maraṇam soka-parideva-dukka-domanass'upāyāsā sambhavanti.'

Birth, Old Age, Death, Grief, Lamentation, Pain, Dejection and Despair, are destroyed. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.'

All this might be briefly summed up in a few words by saying that, when a man realizes how miserable Existence is, he will cease to long for it. As this longing produces a new Existence, there will be no new Existence when that longing ceases. All Existence is compared by Buddha to a fire.¹ When there is no more fuel, the fire goes out of itself.² The word *upādānam*, which technically denotes Attachment to Existence, literally means fuel. Hence in the famous sermon on Burning, addressed to some converts who had previously cherished the sacred fire and worshipped Agni, the Fire-god, Buddha said: 'O mendicants,³ everything is burning. . . . With what fire is it burning? I declare unto you that it is burning with the fire of Greed, with the fire of Anger, with the fire of Infatuation.' In another place, in a conversation with Pasenadi, King of Kosala, Buddha declares that these three things, Greed (*lobho*), Anger (*doso*), and Infatuation (*moho*), which are called the three Roots of Evil (*akusalamūlāni*), are the causes of injury, pain, and misery.⁴

¹ 'Sabbo ādipito loko : sabbo loko padhūpito :
Sabbo pajjalito loko : sabbo loko pakampito.'

Samy.-Nik., v., v., § 7 : 5.

Cf. Dham., §l. 146.

² 'Appamādarato bhikkhu pamāde bhayadassivā
Saññojanam añumthūlam dham aggiva gacchati.'

Dham., §l. 31.

³ Mahāvaggo, i. 21 : 2.

⁴ Samyutta-Nikāyo, Sect. I., iii., 3: 2-6 ; cf. 4: 'Lobho kho, Mahārāja, lokassa dhammo uppajjamāno uppajjati ahitāya, dukkhāya, aphāsu-vihārāya. Doso kho, Mahārāja, lokassa dhammo uppajjamāno uppajjati ahitāya, dukkhāya, aphāsu-vihārāya. Moho kho, Mahārāja, lokassa dhammo uppajjamāno uppajjati ahitāya, dukkhāya, aphāsu-vihārāya.'

The only way to get rid of suffering, therefore, is to suppress these feelings and everything else that leads to the Thirst for Existence. Buddha taught that self-torture, such as that practised by many of the ascetics of his time, and which he had for some time practised himself, could not accomplish this.¹ His method was what he calls the 'Middle Way'—the Golden Mean, as it were—between the two extremes, of Asceticism, on the one hand, and a worldly life on the other. What he meant by the Middle Way is clear from his own life, and from that which he taught his fellow-mendicants to live. Its object was to train the mind to absolute indifference to pleasure and pain, to life and death. When a man has reached this stage, he has burst all the bonds which bind him to existence, and therefore has² reached *arahat*-ship, the next step to Nirvāṇa itself. The *extinction* here referred to, however, is primarily the extinction of *passion*, not that of existence. But when passion has fully died away, the fuel which supports the flame of existence burns out, and the fire itself becomes extinct. Here we have the meaning of the term *Nirvāṇa*. A man who has attained this state of indifference and freedom from passion is often spoken of as having entered Nirvāṇa while still alive. At other times the entrance into Nirvāṇa is mentioned with reference to his death. The only way to attain to this state is by walking in the Noble Eightfold Path of Perfect Opinion, etc., the various steps in which have been already mentioned. The last stage in this Path is that of Perfect Self-concentration, or Perfect Abstraction from all out-

¹ See the whole subject discussed in Māra-Saṃyutta (Saṃyutta-Nikāyo, Sect. I., book iv.), cap. i., § 1. *Vide* also Dham., ṣl. 141, 142.

² Dham., cap. vii., ṣl. 90 *et seq.* :

'Gataddhino visokassa vip̄pamuttassa sabbadhi
Sabbaganthappahinassa pariḷāho na vijjati.'

ward things. Only by reaching this can a man, or any other sentient being, attain to release from suffering.

As we shall see later, Buddha seems to have tacitly accepted as true many of the philosophical ideas prevalent in the India of his day, especially those which, as Professor Max Müller has proved,¹ were common to all Indian systems of philosophy. One of the most noted of these was that of the existence of the *Ātmā*,² or Self, which is identical with what in Western philosophy was called the 'Animus Mundi.' This, Hindū philosophy taught, is real; all else is unreal, delusion (*māyā*). Buddha, however, taught that existence and suffering are real enough, but only transitory. He does not teach anything clearly about the *Self*, that of man or that higher Self (*Paramātmā*) of which we have spoken. Yet some have fancied that they can detect a faint conception of the latter underlying his teaching about the transitoriness of things.³ He shows that transitory things are not the

¹ 'Six Systems of Indian Philosophy,' p. 137 *et seq.* He mentions, among other ideas common to all the systems alike, belief in metempsychosis, in Karma, and a tendency to pessimism.

² Rhys Davids points out that though, in speaking to the unconverted, Buddha allows of the *possibility* that a good man should after death be united with Brahmā (Dialogue with Vāseṭṭha, 'Buddhist Suttas from the Pāli,' p. 203), yet 'such a union with Brahmā, as is here referred to, is not supposed, in early Buddhism, to be the highest thing which men should seek after. . . . There can be no finality in such a union; it must end, like every other life save that of the *Arahat*, in rebirth. And far better than that, an aim far worthier of the truly intelligent man, is to reach here on earth the 'Nirvāṇa of a perfect life in Arahatship' (Hibbert Lectures, pp. 69, 70). Brahmā, in Buddhist theology, is only a sort of angel, perishable like all other beings (see the note on 'Absorption' in Copleston's 'Buddhism,' pp. 216-218).

³ Such is Professor Oldenberg's opinion ('Buddha,' English translation, pp. 214-216). Cf. the verses:

'Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā-ti, yadā paññāya passati,
Atha nibbindatī dukkhe; esa maggo visuddhiyā.

Self, though he does not state definitely whether the Self exists at all¹ or not. A story is told of an inquirer² who came and asked him this very question, but Buddha preserved a complete silence, and would neither assert nor deny the existence of the Self.

He seems, however, to teach that, if his disciples grasp the idea that there is no *Ego*, they will find it easier to break the chain that binds them to existence.³ Therefore, shortly after attaining Buddhahood, he addressed his first five disciples thus: 'The form,⁴ O mendicants,

Sabbe sañkhārā dukkhā-ti, yadā paññāya passati,
 Atha nibbindati dukkhe; esa maggo visuddhiyā.
 Sabbe dhammā anattā-ti, yadā paññāya passati,
 Atha nibbindati dukkhe; esa maggo visuddhiyā.'

Dham., §ll. 277-279.

¹ But the idea that the *Ego* does not exist seems to lie at the root of much of Buddha's teaching. Hence it is that not 'personality,' but merely the term 'name and form' (*nāmarūpaṃ*), is used for 'individuality' in the explanation of the chain of causation already quoted. Moreover, in complete accordance with all this, and supporting his teaching by references to the Pāli canonical books, Nāgaseno disproves the existence of the *Ego*, showing that what is supposed to be a person is merely a collection of the five *Khandhos* (*Milindapañho*, pp. 25-28), and quoting in support of this *Bhikkhunī-Samyutta* (*Samyutta-Nikāyo*, book v.), § 10: 6. See Rhys Davids, *Hibbert Lectures for 1881*, pp. 208, 212-214. In the *Fo-sho-hing-tsan-king* (iv., § 1449) the same idea is expressed in these words: 'All is empty! neither 'self' nor place for "self," but all the world is like a phantasy: this is the way to regard ourselves, as but a heap of composite qualities (*saṃskāra*)' (Beal's translation in 'Sacred Books of the East').

² *Samyutta-Nikāyo*, vol. ii., quoted by Oldenberg, 'Buddha,' English translation, pp. 272, 273.

³ Hence the doctrine of *self* (*attavāda* or *sakkayaditṭhi*) has to be renounced at the very beginning of the way to Arahatship; it is the first 'fetter' — *saṃyojanam* (Rhys Davids, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 208).

⁴ *Mahāvaggo*, i., § 6: 38-46.

is not the Self. If the form were the Self, O mendicants, the form would not be liable to sickness, and we might say, Let my form be so and so, let my form not be so and so. But since the form, O mendicants, is not the Self, therefore the form is liable to sickness.' Having argued in the same way about the other Elements of Existence (*Khandhos*), he thus concludes: 'Having considered this, O mendicants, a learned and noble hearer of the word becomes weary of Form, weary of Sensation, weary of Perception, weary of the Components (or Aggregations), weary of Consciousness. Becoming weary of all that, he divests himself of passion. By freedom from passion he is set free. When he is free, he becomes aware that he is free. He realizes that rebirth is exhausted, that purity is completed, that duty is fulfilled, and that there is no further return to this world.'

The only way in which this weariness of all transitory things can be produced in a man's heart is by his attaching himself to Buddha's Order, for the latter's doctrine alone can, in the present age, teach men the knowledge which will set them free from worldly bonds. There were twenty-four Buddhas¹ before Gotamo Buddha, one succeeding another through vast ages. But each of them attained in turn to Nirvāṇa, and his teaching was forgotten. Buddha will ultimately be succeeded, after a long period of time, by another Buddha called² Metteya ('the kind, the friendly'). Meanwhile the wise man should take refuge in Buddha, in his Law, in his Order or Community, and everyone who is admitted to the Order has thrice to

¹ See the whole list and all that is known about them in the chapters of the *Buddhavaṃso* that bear their names.

² Regarding whom Gotamo says :

'Aham etarahi saṃbuddho, Metteyo-cāpi hessati.'

Buddhavaṃso, xxvii. 19.

assert that he does so.¹ In accordance with this it is said in the following verses of the Dhammapadam :²

‘ Truly to many a refuge go they, to mountains and groves,
 To gardens and tree-shrines, men terror-stricken.
 This refuge indeed is not safe,
 This refuge indeed is not the highest,
 Not to this refuge having come
 Is one freed from all suffering.
 But he, who to both Buddha and the Law
 And the Community has gone for refuge,
 The four Noble Truths
 By perfect understanding doth he see,—
 Suffering, suffering’s origination,
 And suffering’s termination,
 And the Noble Eightfold Path
 Leading to the cessation of suffering.
 This indeed is the safe refuge, this is the highest refuge :
 To this refuge having come is one freed from all suffering.’

In considering the question of the *summum bonum* of Buddhism and the desire to escape from existence, it

¹ *Vide* the Saraṇagamanam previously quoted, p. 38.

² ‘ Bahuṃ ve saraṇaṃ yanti pabbatāni vanāni-ca
 Ārāmarukkha-cetyāni manussā bhayatajjitā.
 N’ etaṃ kho saraṇaṃ khemaṃ,
 N’ etaṃ kho saraṇaṃ uttamaṃ,
 N’ etaṃ saraṇaṃ āgama
 Sabba-dukkhā pamuccati.
 Yo-ca Buddhañ-ca Dhammañ-ca
 Saṃghañ-ca saraṇaṃ gato,
 Cattāri aṛyasaccāni
 Sammapaññāya passati,—
 Dukkhaṃ, dukkhasamuppādaṃ,
 Dukkhasa-ca atikkamaṃ,
 Aṛyañ-c’atthaṅgikaṃ maggaṃ
 Dukkhūpasamaḡāmiṇaṃ.
 Etaṃ kho saraṇaṃ khemaṃ, etaṃ saraṇaṃ uttamaṃ,
 Etaṃ saraṇaṃ āgama sabba-dukkhā pamuccati.’

Dham., śl. 188-192.

must be borne in mind that Buddha adopted from the popular belief of his day the doctrine of transmigration. As he did not teach the existence of a spirit in man, it is evident that the doctrine of metempsychosis as inculcated by Buddha was in some respects different from that already in vogue. His doctrine was that, while the name-and-form which, with the other four *Khandhos*, make up a man (or it may be a *deva* or other sentient being) are separated and perish at death, yet the result of the man's conduct, his¹ *character*, his *Karma*, passes on to another being which comes into existence at his death, unless in the case of an *arahat* or perfect man. To explain this the illustration of a flame is used. If a number of pieces of tinder are placed close together in a line, and the first of them is set on fire and then blown upon, the flame on it may be extinguished, yet being blown over to the next piece a new flame is produced, the same, and yet not the same, as the first flame. So the life of one being is extinguished, but at the same²

¹ Rhys Davids, Hibbert Lectures for 1881, p. 92.

² *Vide* Rhys Davids, Hibbert Lectures, p. 101. Another and somewhat different illustration is given by the sage Nāgaseno to King Milindo (Milinda-pañho, p. 77) when the latter asks what transmigration is. The sage says: 'Idha, mahârāja, jāto, idh' eva marati, idha mato aññatra uppajjati, taññim jāto taññim yeva marati, taññim mato aññatra uppajjati: evam kho, mahârāja, saṃsāro hotthi.—Opammaṃ karohiti.—Yathā, mahârāja, kocid-eva puriso pakkam ambaṃ khāditvā aṭṭhiṃ ropeyya, tato mahanto ambarukkho nibbattivā phalāni dadeyya, atha so puriso tato pi pakkam ambaṃ khāditvā aṭṭhiṃ ropeyya, tato pi mahanto ambarukkho nibbattivā phalāni dadeyya, evam etesaṃ rukkhānaṃ koṭi na paññāyati; evam-eva kho, mahârāja, idha jāto idh' eva marati, idha mato aññatra uppajjati; evam kho, mahârāja, saṃsāro hotthi.'—'One born here, great king, dies just here; having died here he comes into existence elsewhere: born there he dies just there; having died there he comes into existence elsewhere: thus indeed, great king, does transmigration come to pass.—Give an illus-

moment another being starts into life, to which the *Karma* of the former is transferred. This process goes on through countless ages. It has gone on in the past with Buddha himself, for in the *Cariyā-Piṭakam*¹ he relates many tales regarding his previous states of existence as a man, a monkey, an elephant, and so on, relating how in each stage he exhibited certain perfections, gradually progressing in excellence, until in his last birth he became Siddhārtha. An ordinary being does not remember anything of his own previous births, but when Gotamo attained Buddhahood he remembered everything that had befallen him in the past.

All existence is suffering, and all pain or joy that befalls a man in this life (except in certain instances²) is the result of previous good or bad actions. Hence the striking words in which Buddha describes the amount of suffering which men endure.

'The transmigration (*saṃsāro*) of beings, O mendicants,' he says,³ 'has its beginning in eternity. The opening cannot be found from which, having come forth,

tration.—As, great king, were any man whatever, having eaten a ripe mango, to plant the kernel, a great mango-tree having sprung up thence would give its fruits : and were that man, having eaten a ripe mango therefrom also, to plant the kernel, a great mango-tree, having sprung up thence also, would give its fruits : thus no end is found of these trees. Even thus indeed, great king, one born here dies just here ; having died here he comes into existence elsewhere,' etc.

¹ *Cariyā-Piṭakam*, book iii., story vii. (as a Monkey-king) ; book ii., story i. (as a Virtuous Elephant).

² *Vide* *Milinda-Paṭiḥo*, Trenckner's edition, p. 134.

³ *Saṃyutta-Nikāyo*, vol. i., quoted by Oldenberg, 'Buddha,' pp. 216, 217. Professor Rhys Davids (*Hibbert Lectures for 1881*, p. 73) well says, in reference especially to the doctrine of transmigration : 'Buddhism was, in a great degree, the pouring of new wine into old bottles.'

beings, led astray through ignorance, bound by the thirst for existence, stray and wander. What do ye think, O mendicants, which of the two is the more,—the water which is in the four Great Oceans, or the tears which have poured from you and have been shed for you, while ye wandered and went astray in this long transmigration, and sorrowed and wept, because that which ye hated was your portion, and that which ye loved was not your portion? A mother's death, a father's death, a brother's death, a sister's death, a son's death, a daughter's death, the loss of relations, the loss of property, all this have ye experienced through long ages. And while ye experienced this through long ages, more tears have poured from you and have been shed by you, while ye strayed and wandered on this long pilgrimage, and sorrowed and wept because that which ye hated was your portion and that which ye loved was not your portion, than all the water which is in the four Great Oceans.'

We have seen that Buddha taught that good deeds would bring their own reward and bear fruit in a happy state after death, just as surely as evil deeds would bear evil fruit to the doer. Adopting popular language, he spoke of a great variety of gods, nymphs, *yakkhos* or demons (Sanskrit *yakshas*), and other superhuman beings, among whom one, Māro (the god of death¹ and all that involves death, change, and decay) is very frequently mentioned. This Māro is represented as again and again endeavouring under various forms to deceive Buddha and to lead him to give up his passive indifference to pleasure and pain, joy and grief, thus striving to produce in him some desire for the things of the world, or at least

¹ *Vide* 'Māro' in Childers' Pāli Dictionary.

to terrify him.¹ On each occasion Buddha recognises 'evil Māro' and discomfits him. But Māro's efforts are not directed against Buddha alone. In the *Bhikkhuni-Samyuttam*, one of the books contained in the *Samyutta-Nikāyo*, we find him endeavouring to disturb the calm of the female Buddhist mendicants by the same arts, but always failing. We quote one of these episodes to show, not the constancy of the tempted woman, or even the nature of the temptation, but rather the Buddhist view of the universality of suffering.

The story runs thus. One day Māro found a certain female mendicant or Buddhist nun, called *Upacālā*, seated at the foot of a tree to take the usual mid-day rest. Approaching her, he tried to disturb her equanimity by leading her to think of and long for the joys promised to the virtuous in the after-life. The desire for such things, being 'otherworldliness,' would injure her as much as any other desire, because it would bring her again into bondage to that Thirst for Existence which is the cause of so much suffering. Māro thus addresses her :

'Where² dost thou then desire to be reborn, O nun ?'

¹ The whole of the 'Māra-Samyutta' (book iv. of the *Samyutta-Nikāyo*) is taken up with the account of Māro's attempts to lead Buddha astray. See also *Mahāparinibbāna-Suttam*, pp. 24-26 and 30-32. Māro is also called 'Antako,' 'the Ender,'=the Sanskrit *Antaka* with the same meaning, which in the *Atharva Veda* is used as equivalent to *Yama*, the god of death.

² 'Kattha nu tvam, bhikkhuni, uppajjitu-kāmā ?-ti.'

'Na khvāham, āvuso, katthaci uppajjitu-kāmā-ti.'

'Tāvatiṃsā-ca Yāmā-ca Tusitā-cāpi devatā,
Nimmānaratino devā, ye devā Vasavattino ;
Tattha cittaṃ paṇidhehi, ratim paccañubhossasi-ti.'

'Tāvatiṃsā-ca Yāmā-ca Tusitā-cāpi devatā,
Nimmānaratino devā, ye devā Vasavattino :
Kāmabandhana-baddhā te, enti Māra-vasam puna.

In reply she says to him :

‘Friend, indeed I do not desire to be reborn anywhere.’

But Māro proceeds to remind her of the delights of the various heavens.

‘Both the Tāvatiṃsa and the Yāma and also the Tusita deities, the Nimmānarati gods and those gods who are styled Vasavatti (conquering); on them fix thy mind; thou shalt again enjoy pleasure.’

Unmoved, however, by the suggestion, the nun replies :

‘Both the Tāvatiṃsa and the Yāma and also the Tusita deities, the Nimmānarati gods, and those gods who are styled Vasavatti, they are bound with the bond of desire, they come again into Māro’s power. All the world is on fire, all the world is pouring forth smoke, all the world is ablaze, all the world is shaken through and through. Unshaken, untrembling is the abode of the converted: where Māro cannot come, there does my mind rejoice.’

If the heavenly¹ beings are so very far from happiness,

Sabbo ādipito loko, sabbo loko padhūpito,
 Sabbo pajjalito loko, sabbo loko pakampito :
 Akampitam acalitaṃ aputthujjana-sevitaṃ,
 Agati yattha Mārassa : tattha me nirato mano-ti.’

Samy.-Nikāyo, V., v., § 7: 2-5.

¹ With reference to the unsatisfactory nature of heavenly joys, Buddha is represented in the Fo-sho-hing-tsan-king (iv., §§ 1440-1444) as saying: ‘My rules are full of grace, able to rescue from destruction (evil ways of birth), and cause a man to ascend to heaven and share in all its pleasures. But yet to seek for these (pleasures) is a great evil, for lustful longing in its increase brings much sorrow. Practise, then, the art of “giving up” all search, for “giving up” desire is the joy of perfect-rest (Nirvāṇa). Know thou that age, disease, and death, these

we can hardly wonder that Buddhism takes a pessimistic view of all earthly joy. This gloomy view is well expressed in the following verses:¹

‘Never associate with loved or with unloved objects ;
 Not to see the loved and to see the unloved is pain.
 Therefore hold nothing dear, for loss of the loved is evil :
 No bonds have they to whom nothing is loved or unloved.
 From what is loved is born grief, from the loved is born fear ;
 To the man freed from loving anything there is no grief, much less
 fear.
 From affection is born grief, from affection is born fear :
 To the man freed from affection there is no grief, much less fear.
 From pleasure is born grief, from pleasure is born fear :
 To the man freed from pleasure there is no grief, much less fear.
 From desire is born grief, from desire is born fear :
 To the man freed from desire there is no grief, much less fear.’

are the great sorrows of the world. Rightly considering the world, we put away birth and old age, disease and death ; (but now) because we see that men at large inherit sorrow caused by age, disease, and death, (we gather that,) when born in heaven, the case is also thus : for there is no continuance there for any, and where there is no continuance there is sorrow, and having sorrow there is no “true self.”’

¹ Dhammapadam, §ll. 210-215 :

‘Mā piyehi samāgañchi appiyehi kudācanam ;
 Piyān’ adassanam dukkham, appiyānañ-ca dassanam.
 Tasmā piyam na kayirātha, piyāpāyo hi pāpako :
 Ganthā tesam na vijjanti, yesam n’atthi piyāpiyam.
 Piyatō jāyatī soko, piyatō jāyatī bhayam ;
 Piyatō vippamuttassa n’atthi soko kuto bhayam.
 Pemato jāyatī soko, pemato jāyatī bhayam :
 Pemato vippamuttasso n’atthi soko kuto bhayam,
 Ratiyā jāyatī soko, ratiyā jāyatī bhayam :
 Ratiyā vippamuttassa n’atthi soko kuto bhayam.
 Kāmato jāyatī soko, kāmato jāyatī bhayam :
 Kāmato vippamuttassa n’atthi soko kuto bhayam.’

'What¹ laughter, what joy is there, since there is always the burning?

Enveloped in darkness, seek ye not a lamp?

Behold the varicoloured figure, the accumulated mass of wounds,
Afflicted, full of wishes, to which there is no firmness, no stability.
This form (body) is decrepit, a nest of diseases, decaying ;
The putrid body is breaking up, for life ends in death.

These greyish bones, which are cast away like gourds in autumn,—
Having seen them, what pleasure remains ?

'The² preoccupied man while in the act of gathering flowers
Does Death seize and carry off, as a great flood the sleeping
village.

The preoccupied man while in the act of gathering flowers
Does the God of Death get into his power, when unsated with
lusts.'

From the misery of life there is no escape even in death, for death will certainly usher in a new life, possibly under worse and more unfavourable conditions, unless the man has raised himself beyond rebirth by his merits. Man's only hope is to strive to attain the calm and rest of Nirvāṇa ; and that is to be attained, as a general rule, only by becoming one of Buddha's mendicant monks, and thus weaning oneself from all things earthly.

¹ Dhammapadam, ṣll. 146-149 :

'Ko nu hāso, kim ānando, nīccam pajjalite sati ?
Andhakārena onaddhā padīpaṃ na gavessatha.
Passaṃ cittakataṃ bimbaṃ, arukāyaṃ samussitaṃ,
Āturaṃ, bahusaṅkappaṃ, yassa n'atthi dhavaṃ, ̥ṭhiti.
Parijñāṃ idaṃ rūpaṃ, rogaṇidḍaṃ, pabhañḅuṇaṃ ;
Bhijjati pūṭisandeho, maraṇantaṃ hi jivitaṃ.
Yān' imānī apatthānī alāpūn' eva sārāde,
Kāpotakānī atthini ; tānī disvāna kā rati ?'

² Dhammapadam, ṣll. 46, 47 :

'Puppān' eva pacinantaṃ vyāsattamanasaṃ naraṃ,
Suttaṃ gāmaṃ mahogho va, Maccu ādāya gacchati.
Puppān' eva pacinantaṃ vyāsattamanasaṃ naraṃ,
Atittaṃ yeva kāmesu, Antako kurute vasaṃ.'

Yet certain passages in the Buddhist Scriptures represent this inert and useless life, when the man believes that he has overcome all desires, innocent and sinful alike, as at once calm, peaceful, and even full of joy :

‘Very¹ happily indeed we live free from hate among the hating ;
 Among men who hate we dwell free from hate.
 Very happily indeed we live free from sickness among the sick ;
 Among sick men we dwell free from sickness.
 Very happily indeed we live inactive among the active ;
 Among active men we dwell free from activity.
 Very happily indeed we live to whom there is nothing ;
 Feeding on enjoyment we shall be like the Radiant gods.’

But it can hardly be said that such a life as this is in any way a noble or a useful one, a life worthy to be lived by any man who has the light which Buddha lacked, and for want of which life for him was so dark that for him the future held naught good but the hope of extinction. For that Buddha is now extinct has never been doubted by his followers. That was what he asserted would happen at his death, for he told men very shortly after attaining Buddhahood that he would not enter on a fresh existence after that life.² And the account of his last moments in the Mahāparinibbāna-Suttam, after detailing

¹ ‘Susukhaṃ vata jīvāma verinesu averino ;
 Verinesu manussesu viharāma averino.
 Susukhaṃ vata jīvāma āturesu anāturā ;
 Āturesu manussesu viharāma anāturā.
 Susukhaṃ vata jīvāma ussukesu anussukā ;
 Ussukesu manussesu viharāma anussukā.
 Susukhaṃ vata jīvāma, yesan no n’atthi kiñcanaṃ ;
 Pitibhakkhā bhavissāma devā ābhassarā yathā.’

Dham., §ll. 197-200.

The 200th śloka is found also in the Māra-Saṃyutto (Saṃy.-Nik., IV., ii., § 8 : 8). The *kiñcanaṃ* may refer to earthly bonds.

² Mahāvaggo, i. 6 : 29 (quoted in Lecture I.).

how he attained to each in turn of the four stages of ecstasy (jhānam), ends with the words : ' The Worshipful One became extinct.'¹

Yet before Buddha's death the question arose whether he would or would not cease to exist after death. On one occasion, we are told, Pasenadi, King of Kosala, came to Khemā, a famous female disciple of Buddha, and inquired of her² :

" How now, lady, does the Tathāgato exist beyond death ?"

" This, indeed, Great King, has not been clearly stated by the Worshipful One, that the Tathāgato exists beyond death."

" What again, lady ? does the Tathāgato not exist beyond death ?"

" This indeed too, Great King, has not been clearly stated by the Worshipful One, that the Tathāgato does not exist beyond death."

" How now, lady ? does the Tathāgato both exist and not exist beyond death ?"

" Indeed, Great King, this has not been clearly stated by the Worshipful One," etc.

¹ ' Bhagavā parinibbāyi ' (Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ, p. 62, Childers' edition).

² Saṃyutta-Nikāyo, vol. ii., quoted by Oldenberg (p. 440) :

' Kim nu kho, ayye, hoti Tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā ?-ti.'

' Abyākatam kho etaṃ, mahārāja, Bhagavatā, hoti Tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā-ti.'

' Kim pan', ayye, na hoti Tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā ?-ti.'

' Etaṃ pi kho, mahārāja, abyākatam Bhagavatā, na hoti Tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā-ti.'

' Kim nu kho, ayye, hoti-ca na-ca hoti Tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā ?-ti.'

' Abyākatam kho etaṃ, mahārāja, Bhagavatā. . . .'

' Kim pan', ayye, n'eva hoti na na hoti Tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā ?-ti.'

' Etaṃ pi kho, mahārāja, abyākatam Bhagavatā.'

“What again, lady? is the Tathâgato neither existent nor non-existent beyond death?”

“This indeed too, Great King, has not been clearly stated by the Worshipful One.”

We see then that, though his disciples naturally clung to the hope that somehow or other their teacher would continue to exist after death, yet this hope could find absolutely nothing¹ in his teaching upon which to build. And yet, not only is the desire for a life after death a part of man's very nature, but anthropological investigations² have shown that all nations have instinctively believed, as all nations still do, in the After-life. Even Hindū philosophy, with its denial of the true existence of anything but the Supreme Soul, the *Paramātmā*, into which a man becomes reabsorbed as soon as he can realize the *illusion (māyā)* of personal being, still in a measure taught that man existed after death, at least in the same way as a raindrop exists when it has fallen into and been absorbed in the ocean. And even although, as we have seen, Buddha had himself declared that one man cannot bear another man's sins, that each man must eat the fruit of his own doings and can never escape the punishment of his evil deeds, yet the hope that Buddha might continue to exist after death was so natural that (in spite of all that was so clearly implied in his teaching) his disciples

¹ That Buddha does not live after death is taught in the Fo-sho-hing-tsan-king (v., §§ 2036-2038) in these words: ‘The pains of birth, old age, disease and death, the endless sorrows of the world, the countless miseries of “hereafter,” dreaded by all the *devas*, he has removed all these accumulated sorrows: say, who would not revere him?—to escape the joys of after-life, this is the world's chief joy! To add the pains of other births, this is the world's worst sorrow. Buddha, escaped from the pain of birth, shall have no joy of the “hereafter”!’

² See De Quatrefages, ‘The Human Species.’

could not without a struggle reconcile themselves to its total resignation.¹ It can hardly be said that the passage above quoted gives any reason for hope, though it refrains from giving such a definite answer as absolutely to dash to the ground any hope that might still linger in the disciple's breast. But in reality there was no room in the Buddhist philosophy for any existence for the *arahat* or perfect man after death. The very desire for such an existence is wrong, as we have seen, since all existence in heaven or on earth is misery, and the desire for existence produces existence. One cannot be an *arahat*, much less a Buddha, if one still cherishes that or any other desire. And as Buddha again and again boasts² of his freedom from all bonds which might bind him to existence, there is only one possible conclusion to be drawn, unless, indeed, we indulge in the subtilty of Hindū speculation, and assume the possibility of Buddha's having at death entered into the state of existence which is in Sanskrit described as *sadasat* (Seiend-Nicht-Seiend), 'being and not being.' But to the Western mind, at any rate, the distinction between that and extinction is too subtle to be of any practical importance. For, although the word *Nirvāṇa*,

¹ Perhaps the title 'Bhāvitatto' (=Sanskrit *bhāvit-ātmā*; literally, 'one whose soul is purified by meditating on the universal soul,' or 'whose thoughts are fixed on the Supreme Spirit,' then 'a sage': Mon. Williams, Sanskrit Dictionary, s.v., new edition, p. 755) may indicate such a lingering desire to believe in his absorption into the Paramātmā, but it is more probably used only as denoting 'a sage,' like *mahesi* (= *mahārshī*), in the same verses (Mahāparinibbāna-Suttam, p. 47).

² E.g.:

'Mutto 'ham Māra-pāseṇa, ye dibbā ye-ca māṇusā :
Māra-bandhana-mutto 'mhi : nihato tvam asi, Antakā-ti.'

Samy.-Nik., IV., i., § 4 : 4, and § 5 : 4; cf. ii., § 1 :
4; § 4 : 4; § 5 : 3; Mahāvaggo, i. 6 : 29.

or 'Extinction,' is applied primarily¹ to the state of indifference to all things to which the Buddhist attains when he has 'extinguished' the fires of passion and burst the bonds which bind him to existence (so that in this way a man may be said to enter Nirvāṇa during his lifetime), yet, as his physical form (*rūpaṃ*), while it lingers a few more days or years upon earth, is even now decaying, and is of no more account than if it had already perished, his death also is still more frequently spoken of as the attainment of Nirvāṇa. Some texts, indeed, distinguish the two states by using *Nirvāṇa* only as the state into which the *arahat* enters at death, and speaking of him when alive as walking 'near to Nirvāṇa.' In accordance with this, we find Buddha tempted to 'enter Nirvāṇa' immediately after his attaining Buddhahood; and shortly before his death he is said to have spoken in the same way to his disciples, using the expression to imply his own decease. 'Soon,'² he says, 'will occur the Tathāgato's attainment of Nirvāṇa (*parinibbānaṃ*); after the lapse of three months hence the Tathāgato will attain Nirvāṇa' (or 'become extinct'). It is clear, therefore, that in whichever sense the word 'Nirvāṇa' is used, Buddha cannot now be said, in the opinion of his disciples, any longer to exist. And this attainment to Nirvāṇa, in this sense as well as in the other, is the goal at which every true Buddhist aims. Few can hope to attain it imme-

¹ Rhys Davids points out that 'Nibbānaṃ' (Nirvāṇa) is properly used of *arahat*-ship, and 'Parinibbānaṃ' of extinction at death (Hibbert Lectures for 1881, p. 161). But Oldenberg ('Buddha,' English translation, p. 445) shows that this distinction, though generally correct, is not always observed.

² 'Naciraṃ Tathāgatassa parinibbānaṃ bhavissati, ito tiṇṇaṃ māsānaṃ accayena Tathāgato parinibbāyissatīti' (Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ, Childers' edition, p. 37). The very title of this Buddhist work proves the same fact.

diately after this life ; that is reserved only for the most pious members of the Order (Saṅgho)—generally speaking, for the mendicants alone—and only for the very earnest ones even among them. A lay adherent¹ must generally content himself with the lower hope of entering at death into a state of existence somewhat less miserable than that in which he has been living here on earth, a state in which he will be some degrees nearer to Nirvāṇa than he now is. But his ultimate goal and reward, if he toil along the Noble Eightfold Path through this, and perhaps many other lives, whether on earth or in one of the many heavens or hells, is Extinction.

Reserving until our next lecture the explanation of the meaning of the various steps in the Noble Eightfold Path, which sums up the whole of the moral Principles of Buddha's philosophy, we now proceed to inquire what consolation Buddhism offers to the afflicted and sorrowing in a world so full of sorrow and suffering as it represents this world as being.

Generally speaking, Buddhism regards all suffering, disease, and misfortune as the result of ill-doing either in this or in some previous state of existence. This is the popular idea, and innumerable passages confirm it. It is an easy way of explaining, or trying to explain, the patent fact that it is not only those who are wicked that suffer, that often good men are called upon to endure pain, grief, and even apparently undeserved punishment—punishment for sins that they are falsely accused of committing. We know how impossible it is for us to understand these things, and how this problem is dealt with in the Book of Job. Unable to find any satisfactory solution of the problem, men in different lands have been

¹ Yet we are told in the Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ (pp. 16, 17) that in Buddha's own time not a few lay adherents entered Nirvāṇa.

tempted to imagine one or more previous states of existence in which deeds were done and sins committed for which men have to suffer now. Something of the same idea has been supposed by some to have existed in the mind of the Jews in our Lord's time, and to be referred to in St. John's Gospel, where we find the disciples inquiring of Christ,¹ 'Rabbi, who did sin, this man or his parents, that he should be born blind?' The Buddhist solution may seem to many to be an easier and more satisfactory one than most others, for the simple reason that it is difficult to refute, owing to our ignorance. But it tends to produce despair in the sufferer, and to hinder those who accept the doctrine from feeling any pity for such a man, and from endeavouring to relieve or console him. The universality of this explanation among Buddhists in his day is shown by the language of King Milinda (Menander) in the famous Buddhist religious treatise entitled 'Milindapañho,' or 'Menander's Inquiry.'² There the King, stating what he believes to be a truth which cannot be disputed, says: 'There is no sensation³ without *Karma*'—by which he here evidently means sensation of pain and evil-doing in the past; 'all that sensation has *Karma* as its root, just because of *Karma* is it experienced.'

But there is one great difficulty about this doctrine, and this the King states. Buddha himself suffered pain, once when his foot was pierced by a splinter of rock from

¹ 'Ραββει, τις ημαρτεν, ουτος η οι γονεις αυτου, ινα τυφλος γεννηθη; (John ix. 2; Nestle, second edition, 1899).

² Milindapañho, edited by Trenckner, London, 1880. An English version will be found in vols. xxxv. and xxxvi. of the 'Sacred Books of the East.'

³ 'N'atthi, bhante, vinā kammaṇa vedayitaṃ; sabban-taṃ vedayitaṃ kammamūlakam, kammaṇ' eva vediyati' (Milindapañho, p. 134).

a huge mass hurled at him by Devadatto,¹ on another occasion when he suffered from dysentery, and a few more times from slight illness. The problem is to reconcile these facts with the belief that the Tathāgato had burnt up all evil out of himself ere attaining Buddhahood. If, as King Menander says, there remained no evil in Buddha, why did he suffer pain?² Does not the fact of his suffering prove that there was still some portion of his *Karma* to be worked out?

To remove this difficulty and escape from the dilemma, the sage Nāgaseno, the other interlocutor in the dialogue, disputes the correctness of the belief that *all* suffering is the result of *Karma*. 'No,³ Great King,' he rejoins, 'for it is not every sensation (of pain) that has *Karma* as its root. Sensations (of pain), Great King, arise from eight causes, from which causes many beings experience feelings of pain.' In proof of this, Nāgaseno⁴ quotes the following passage from the Saṃyutta-Nikāyo, as spoken by Buddha himself to a disciple named Sīvako: 'Here indeed, Sīvako, certain (painful) sensations originating in the bile arise; this too, indeed, Sīvako, one should know spontaneously also, that here certain (painful) sensations

¹ Cullavaggo, VII., iii., § 9.

² Milindapañho, IV., i., § 62; Trenckner's edition, p. 134.

³ 'Na hi, mahārāja, sabban-taṃ vedayitaṃ kammamūlakam. Atthahi, mahārāja, kāraṇehi vedayitāni uppajjanti, yehi kāraṇehi puthusattā vedanā vediyanti.'

⁴ Milindapañho, IV., i., § 66; Trenckner's edition, pp. 137, 138: 'Pittasamuṭṭhānāni pi kho, Sīvaka, idh' ekaccāni vedayitāni uppajjanti; sāmaṃ pi kho etaṃ, Sīvaka, veditabbaṃ, yathā pittasamuṭṭhānāni pi idh' ekaccāni vedayitāni uppajjanti. . . . Tatra, Sīvaka, ye te samaṇa-brāhmaṇā evaṃ-vādino, evaṃ-ditthino: yaṃ kiñcāyaṃ purisa-puggalo paṭisamvedeti sukhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhamasukhaṃ vā, sabban-taṃ pubbe kata-hetū-ti, yañ-ca sāmañ-ñātaṃ tañ-ca atidhāvanti, yañ-ca loke sacca-sammatam tañ-ca atidhāvanti. Tasmā tesam samaṇa-brāhmaṇānaṃ micchā ti vadāmi,' etc.

originating in the bile arise Hence, Sīvako, those monks and Brāhmaṇs who thus say and thus think that whatever thing, whether pleasure or pain or neither pleasure nor pain, a person experiences, all of that has as its cause something done previously (in a previous state of existence), both go far beyond what is known spontaneously, and also go far beyond that which is in the world accepted as true. Therefore I say that those monks and Brāhmaṇs are in error.' Buddha then proceeds to point out the eight causes of painful sensations—the bile, the phlegmatic humour, wind, the union of all three, variation of temperature, avoidance of dissimilarity, external action, and, lastly, *Karma*. The result, as stated by Nāgaseno, is that 'it is not all sensations that are produced as the result of *Karma*,¹ and hence Buddha's sufferings are not to be considered as the natural consequences of any evil remaining in him.'²

In spite, however, both of Buddha's words on the subject, as recorded in their canonical books, and this argument of Nāgaseno, which probably dates from between the years 100 and 200 of our era,³ there is no doubt that the general theory of affliction still prevalent among Buddhists is that it is the result of evil conduct in a former state of existence.

It may be asked, What consolation did Buddha give to persons who came to him grieving for the death of those whom they held dear? This will be evident from the following narratives.

On one occasion, we are informed,⁴ Pasenadi, King of Kosala, came to Buddha grieving for his grandmother

¹ 'Na sabbā vedanā kamma-vipāka-jā' (*ibid.*, p. 138).

² *Ibid.*

³ Trenckner, introduction to *Milindapañho*, p. vii.

⁴ *Samyutta-Nikāyo*, III., iii., § 2, Ayyakā.

who had just died, having attained the great age of 120 years. 'Sir,' says Pasenadi, 'my¹ grandmother was, moreover, dear and delightful to me.' In language full of earnestness and sorrow, however quaint it may sound to us, the King assures Buddha that if, at the cost of the loss of his choicest elephant, his best horse, his finest village, or even a whole province, he could have prolonged his grandmother's life, he would gladly have paid such a price. What was the consolation that Buddha gave him in his sorrow?

'All² beings, Great King,' he says, 'that have not overcome death are liable to death, and have death as their goal.'

Not being able to obtain much consolation from this statement, and perhaps hoping to hear something more to the purpose, Pasenadi replied:

'Wonderful, Sir! marvellous, Sir! how well, Sir, this has been uttered by the Worshipful One! "All beings that have not overcome death are liable to death, and have death as their goal."'

¹ 'Ayyakā kho pana me, bhante, piyā ahoṣi, manāpā.'

² 'Sabbe sattā, mahārāja, maraṇa-dhammā maraṇa-pariyosānā maraṇam anatītā-ti.'

'Acchariyaṃ, bhante, abbhutaṃ, bhante; yāva subhāsitaṃ idaṃ, bhante, Bhagavatā: sabbe sattā maraṇa-dhammā maraṇa-pariyosānā maraṇam anatītā-ti.'

'Evam etaṃ, mahārāja, evam etaṃ, mahārāja: sabbe sattā maraṇa-dhammā maraṇa-pariyosānā maraṇam anatītā-ti. Seyyathāpi, mahārāja, yāni kānici kumbhakārika-bhājanāni āmakāni-c'eva pakkāni-ca, sabbāni tāni bhedana-dhammāni bhedana-pariyosānāni bhedanam anatītāni: evam eva kho, mahārāja, sabbe sattā maraṇa-dhammā maraṇa-pariyosānā maraṇam anatītā-ti.'

"Sabbe sattā marissanti; maraṇantam hi jīvitam:
Yathā kammaṃ gamissanti, puñña-pāpa-phalūpagā;
Nirayaṃ pāpa-kammantā, puñña-kammā-ca suggaṭṭam.
Tasmā kareyya kalyāṇam nicayam samparāyikam:
Puññāni paralokasmim patitthā honti paṇinan-ti."

‘Even so, Great King—even so, Great King ; all beings that have not overcome death are liable to death, and have death as their goal. For example, Great King, whatever potter’s vessels there may be, both cooked and uncooked, too, all of them, not having overcome breakage, are liable to breakage, and have breakage as their goal ; exactly thus, indeed, Great King, all beings that have not overcome death are liable to death, and have death as their goal.

“ All beings will die, for life ends in death.

According to their deeds shall they go, receiving the fruit of good and evil,

Hell the evil-doers, and the well-doers felicity.

Therefore should one prepare a good store for the future.

In the next world their good deeds are the stay of living beings.”

In ‘Buddhaghosha’s Parables,’ a work translated from the Burmese, there is a most striking and pathetic story which, though it does not occur in any of the canonical or other early Buddhist works, so clearly reveals Buddha’s way of offering consolation to the sorrowing that I cannot refrain from quoting it here, well known as it has become through Sir Edwin Arnold’s poetical version of it in ‘The Light of Asia.’

Kisā-gotamī was a young girl married to a rich man’s only son. ‘She had one child;¹ but when the beautiful boy could run alone he died. The young girl in her love for it carried the dead child clasped to her bosom, and went from house to house of her pitying friends, asking them to give her medicine for it. But a Buddhist mendicant, thinking, “She does not understand,” said to her,

¹ ‘Buddhaghosha’s Parables,’ chapter x., quoted by Professor Rhys Davids in his ‘Buddhism’ (‘Non-Christian Religious Systems’) pp. 133, 134. The story is also given in the commentary upon the Dhammapadam.

“ My good girl, I myself have no such medicine as you ask for, but I think I know of one who has.” “ Oh, tell me who that is,” said Kisā-gotamī. “ The Buddha can give you medicine ; go to him,” was the answer. She went to Gotamo, and, doing homage to him, said, “ Lord and master, do you know any medicine that will be good for my child ?” “ Yes, I know of some,” said the Teacher. Now, it was the custom for patients or their friends to provide the herbs which the doctors required, so she asked what herbs he would want. “ I want some mustard-seed,” he said ; and, when the poor girl eagerly promised to bring some of so common a drug, he added, “ You must get it from some house where no son, or husband, or parent, or slave has died.” “ Very good,” she said, and went to ask for it, still carrying her dead child with her. The people said, “ Here is mustard-seed, take it ;” but when she asked, “ In my friend’s house has any son died, or a husband, or a parent, or slave ?” they answered, “ Lady, what is this that you say ? The living are few, but the dead are many.” Then she went to other houses ; but one said, “ I have lost a son ;” another, “ We have lost our parents ;” another, “ I have lost my slave.” At last, not being able to find a single house where no one had died, her mind began to clear, and, summoning up resolution, she left the dead body of her child in a forest, and, returning to the Buddha, paid him homage. He said to her, “ Have you the mustard-seed ?” “ My lord,” she replied, “ I have not ; the people tell me that the living are few, but the dead are many.” Then he talked to her on that essential part of his system—the impermanency of all things—till her doubts were cleared away, and, accepting her lot, she became a disciple and entered the first Path.’

That is all the consolation that Buddha could give to

the sorrowing. Those who from bitter experience know what sorrow is know best how little comfort such words can give. Do they not remind us of the mournful inscriptions on Greek and Roman tombs in the times of dying heathenism in the West, 'Be¹ of good cheer, O Midôn: no one is immortal; even Hercules died.' 'To² my dearest, sweetest, most saintly mother: Be of good cheer, mother; no one is immortal?'

We have now dealt very briefly with the leading philosophical doctrines of Buddhism, as taught by Buddha himself and accepted by his earliest disciples. Every man is said to be the creature of his environment, at least to a very great extent, and Buddha was no exception to the rule. Although every one of the doctrines already stated may be found in one or other of the Hindū systems of philosophy so widely current in Buddha's day, yet he cannot be said to have slavishly borrowed from any of them. Every doctrine which he taught has been very considerably modified by him in passing through his mind, so much so that his claim to be a most deep and original thinker cannot be disputed. But while traces of Hindū philosophical speculations are very evident in what we have already learnt of his teaching, yet in the mythology and cosmogony of early Buddhism we shall find the same phenomenon even more clearly evident. That is to say, the mythology and cosmogony of Buddhism are far more plainly derived from those of the Hindūs than is its philosophy. The reason of this is clear. Buddha held and taught that men ought not to

¹ ΕΥΨΥΧΕΙ · ΜΙΔΩΝ · ΟΤΑΕΙΣ · ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ · ΚΑΙ · Ο · ΗΡΑΚΛΗΣ · ΑΠΕΘΑΝΕ (Maffei, 'Mus. Veron.,' p. 268, 11).

² MATRI · PIENISS · DVLCISS · SANCTISSIMÆ · ΟΤΧΙ (lege ΕΥΨΥΧΕΙ?) · ΤΕΚΟΤΣΑ · ΟΤΑΕΙΣ · ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ (Fleetwood, 'Inscriptt. Antiqu.: Sylloge,' p. 275).

waste their time, as he thought, in speculations¹ about the gods, heaven, hell, the after-life; the only thing worth thinking about was the way to escape from the suffering caused by existence. Hence, he did not go out of his way to teach anything to his disciples regarding their relation to the various superhuman beings that everyone in the India of his day believed to exist in the air, in natural objects, the planets, and so forth. These deities and other good and evil spirits could not save a man from the consequence of his own deeds; they were, like man himself (he held), subject to birth and death. Believing that the universe was not created, and knowing nothing of a Creator,² deeming himself and the *arāhats* far superior to all the gods, no matter of theology seemed to him worthy of much consideration. But not seeing any reason to disbelieve in the existence of superhuman though perishable intelligences, his mind naturally led him to remodel, consciously or unconsciously, what was believed about the *devatās*, in such a way as to fit into his *Weltanschauung*, his manner of looking at things in general, his theory of existence. Hence in the earliest form of Buddhism we find that the Hindū *devas*, while acknow-

¹ Majjhima-Nikāyo, Sabbāsava-Suttam, quoted by Rhys Davids, 'Buddhist Suttas from the Pāli,' pp. 298-300, and also in Hibbert Lectures, pp. 88, 89.

² With regard to the existence of a Creator, there is a long disquisition in the Fo-sho-hing-tsan-king (iv., §§ 1455-1468), though it is doubtful whether this is to be attributed to Buddha himself or to Aṣvaghosha (the author of the Buddha-carita, of which this Chinese work is a translation, though only seventeen chapters out of the twenty-eight are found in Sanskrit). The first and last of these paragraphs run thus: 'He argued not that Īṣvara was cause, nor did he advocate some cause heretical, nor yet, again, did he affirm there was no cause for the beginning of the world. . . . Thus, you see, the thought of Īṣvara is overthrown in this discussion (*śāstra*), and all such contradictory assertions should be exposed; if not, the blame is ours.'

ledged to exist, have undergone very considerable modification. Instead of being immortal they are mortal. Not being free from the domination¹ of the passions, as even their worshippers acknowledged, they must work out their own deliverance from existence much in the same way as men ought to do. In a word, Buddha represented these invisible beings as very much akin to men, instead of being immeasurably superior to them. His doctrine was preached 'for the sake of, because of, out of pity for both gods and men.' In fact, this part of Buddha's teaching reminds us very strongly of Pindar's view,²

Ἐν ἀνδρῶν, ἐν θεῶν γένος· ἐκ μᾶς δὲ πνέομεν
ματρὸς ἀμφότεροι· διέρχεται δὲ πᾶσα κεκριμένα
δύναμις,

though Buddha could not have said—to continue the quotation,

ὡς τὸ μὲν οὐδὲν, ὁ δὲ χάλκεος ἀσφαλὲς αἰὲν ἔδος
μένει οὐρανός,

nor could he have spoken of the gods as *ἀθάνατοι*, as the Greek poet does immediately after. While endeavouring to exalt men to the condition of at least Epicurean³ gods,

¹ See, for example, the language used in the Dhajagga-Parittam (Samyutta-Nikāyo, XI., i., § 3: 10) about Sakko: 'Sakko hi, bhikkhave, devānaṃ indo, *avītarāgo*, *avītadoso*, *avītamoho*, bhīru, chambhī, utrāsī palāyī-ti.' But in the same passage it is said of Buddha himself: 'Tathāgato hi, bhikkhave, araham, sammā - sambuddho, *vītarāgo*, *vītadoso*, *vītamoho*, abhīru, acchambhī, anutrāsī apalāyī-ti' (§ 3: 17).

² Pindar, Nem., vi. 1-4. How different from Buddha's view, on the other hand, was that of Xenophanes (*circa* 560 B.C.):

Ἔἰς θεός, ἐν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,
οὐ τι δέμας θνητοῖσι ὁμοίος οὐδὲ νόημα.

³ As depicted in the following passage from Lucretius, if, at least we omit the word 'immortal':

'Omnis enim per se divom natura necesse'st
Immortali ævo summa cum pace fruatur
Semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe :

he degrades the gods they believed in to the condition of superhuman mortals.

We have seen how numerous these superhuman being are said by Buddha to be in the discourse he delivered when lying on his death-bed under the *śāl*-trees in the grove at Kusinārā.¹ The chief of the inferior gods, as in Hindū mythology, is said to be Indra, also called Sakko or Maghavān, but he reached that height and dignity by his 'diligence'² in walking in the Noble Eightfold Path. He is most respectful and humble in his dealings with Buddha, as is also the chief and highest of all the gods, Mahābrahmā, 'the Great Brahmā' himself, who, instead of commanding, kneels to entreat Buddha, at the beginning of the latter's work as a teacher, to preach his doctrine in the world.³ Buddha himself is sometimes called Devadevo,⁴ 'god of gods,' to show his superiority to the whole of these deities. We can form a better idea of them if we think of them as angels of different ranks, many of them being even more similar to the nymphs of classical mythology or the fairies of our childish days. These are called the terrestrial deities.⁵

Nam, privata dolore omni, privata periclis,
Ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri,
Nec bene promeritis capitur nec tangitur ira.'

Lib. i., vv. 44-49.

¹ Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ, p. 50, translated in Lecture I., p. 63.

² 'Appamādena Maghavā devānaṃ seṭṭhatam gato.'

Dhammapadaṃ, śl. 30.

³ Mahāvaggo, I., v. 4 to end ; cf. especially 6.

⁴ Rasavāhinī, Uruga-Suttaṃ ('Anecdota Palica,' p. 27).

⁵ *Bhummā devā*. They and all the other classes of deities are enumerated in the Dhammacakkappavātana-Suttaṃ (Mahāvaggo, I., vi., § 30). Moreover, there are other genii or spirits called *Yakkhos* (Sanskrit *Yaksha*), *Rakkhasos* (Sanskrit *Rākshasa*), etc., and others named *Nāgos* (Sanskrit *Nāga*), or snakes, which could occasionally assume human form (cf. Mahāvaggo, i., § 63).

Some of the latter class are the guardians of particular families or towns; some reside in the air, in trees, in rocks, in clouds. But above all these are the inhabitants of the heavens, or 'divine worlds.' The heavens are divided into two classes, the lower six being called *devalokos*, and the twenty higher celestial regions the *Brahmalokos*. The lowest of these, the 'Heaven of the Four Great Kings,'¹ is situated at a vast height above the four great islands which are supposed to form this lower world. It is ruled over by four spirits, called the Four Mahārājas or Great Kings, who are the guardians of our world (*lokapālos*). They are the gods of the four cardinal points. The second heaven is called that of the Thirty-Three Gods,² of whom Sakko or Indra is the chief. It is situated on the top of Mount Meru. The third heaven is that of the *Yāmo* gods; the fourth is known as the *Tusita* heaven; the fifth is that of the *Nimmānarati* deities; and the sixth is styled the *Paranimmita-vasa-vatti* heaven. Its ruler is Māro, whose name signifies Death, and who shares with Sakko the government of the whole of these six heavens, which are collectively styled the 'Heaven of Sensual Pleasures,'³ because such pleasures are indulged in throughout these six heavens as well as in this 'World of Men,'⁴ in the World of *Asuras* or evil spirits, the Ghost-World,⁵ the 'Animal-World,'⁶ and Nirayo or Hell. Māro is a thoroughly evil being, and delights to lead men astray. He has three daughters, Taṇhā, Rati, and Arati, or Thirst, Sensuality, and Abstinence, and is assisted by a host of *devas*, inhabitants of the sixth heaven. The realm over which Māro rules (*Māradheyyam*) includes 'the whole sphere of sentient exis-

¹ Catum-mahārājako Devaloko.

³ Kāmā-vacara-devaloko.

⁵ Peta-loko.

² Tāvatiṃsa-devaloko.

⁴ Manussa-loko.

⁶ Tīracchāna-yoni.

tence,¹ since wherever there is existence there is change, birth, and death.

The twenty *Brahmalokos* are subdivided into sixteen 'corporeal' and four 'incorporeal'² heavens, situated one above another, and each inhabited by a particular class of superhuman beings styled *Brahmās*. These are superior to the dwellers in the *devalokos* or lower heavens, inasmuch as they are free from the dominion of *Kāmo*, or sensual desire, and do not feel either heat or cold. Those who belong to the 'corporeal' *Brahmā*-worlds have forms or bodies, but the rest are devoid of form, and consist of effulgence only. The ruler of the whole of the *Brahmā*-worlds is *Brahmā*, or *Mahābrahmā* (the Great *Brahmā*). We thus see something like one of the *Hindū* triads ruling the superhuman or divine region of the Buddhist faith, *Sakko*, *Māro*, and *Brahmā*, of whom two are identical with two of the *Hindū* gods (*Sakko* being *Pāli* for *Śakra*, one of *Indra*'s names in *Sanskṛit*) in name. But in nature they have changed greatly from the *Hindū* conception of them. Being liable to transmigration, change, decay and death, they can lay claim to no permanence. The being who in *Buddha*'s day was *Mahābrahmā* had, we are told,³ at one time been a monk called *Sahako*, who, in the time of a previous *Buddha* named *Kassapo*, had by his merits raised himself to that position. *Gotamo Buddha* himself had in previous births attained to that dignity no fewer than four times.⁴ The *Sakko* of *Buddha*'s time had once been a young *Brāhmaṇ* named *Magho*,⁵ and it is to this that reference is made in

¹ Childers' *Pāli Dictionary*, s.v. *Māro*.

² *Rūpa-brahma-lokos* and *A-rūpa-brahma-lokos*.

³ A Buddhist commentary to this effect is quoted by Childers s.v. *Mahābrahmā*.

⁴ Hardy, 'Manual of Buddhism,' p. 100.

⁵ Childers' *Dictionary*, p. 419.

the thirtieth *śloka* of the Dhammapadam, quoted above.¹ Gotamo Buddha himself had in twenty previous existences occupied that position.²

The Buddhist hells are very numerous, numbering in all 136,³ of which eight principal ones are frequently mentioned. Each of these 'is a place of torment in which former sins are expiated, but it is but a temporary state, and may be immediately followed by rebirth in a blissful existence — e.g., in one of the higher *devalokos*.'⁴

The cosmogony and geography of the Buddhist are very marvellous. The universe consists of a vast, and perhaps infinite, number of enormous circular planes,⁵ so arranged that they form groups of three, touching each other, the space between being a hell. A sun and a moon are attached to each. A mountain called Meru rises in the centre of each of these planes to the height of 84,000 *yojanas*⁶ or stages above the ocean. There are four great islands (*mahādīpos*) in each of these planes. One such plane is our earth. Of the marvellous rivers, lakes, trees, and animals found even in the Himālaya mountains full accounts are given in various commentaries, and the student will find them described by Hardy in his 'Manual of Buddhism,'⁷ and in his smaller work entitled 'Legends of the Buddhists.'⁸

As a specimen of the absurdities concerning such matters contained even in the older Pāli books, we select

¹ *Supra*, p. 109.

² Hardy, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

³ Hardy, quoted in Childers, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

⁴ Childers, p. 260.

⁵ Each called a *Cakkavālam* (Sanskrit *Cakravāḍam*).

⁶ The value of the *yojana* is not yet accurately known, but Dr. Hoey sees good reason to estimate it at between 4½ and 4¾ miles. The latter calculation would make it equal to two Nepalese *kōs*.

⁷ Chapter i.

⁸ Chapter ii., pp. 80-141.

what is said of the cause of eclipses of the sun and moon. This phenomenon is produced by an *asuro* called Rāhu, who seizes them in his mouth. The story of one such event and of the deliverance of both sun and moon by Buddha from the demon's power is given in the Saṃyutta-Nikāyo twice over,¹ almost identical language being used in each case. In that of the sun, the tale runs thus :

‘ Thus has it been heard by me. Once upon a time the Worshipful One dwells at Sāvatti in the Jeta-grove, in Anāthapiṇḍiko's park. Moreover, at that time the Sun-god had been seized by the demon Rāhu. Then, indeed, the Sun-god, recollecting the Worshipful One, at that season recited this verse :

“ Honour be to thee, O hero ! freed thou art on every side.
I have fallen into distress ; be thou my refuge !”

‘ Then, indeed, the Worshipful One addressed Rāhu the demon-chief in reference to the Sun-god in the verse :

“ To the Tathāgato, the *arahat*, has the sun betaken himself for
refuge ;
Release the sun, Rāhu : the Buddhas are full of pity for the
world.
Him who in the darkness, in the gloom, is the illuminator, shining,
disk-formed, terribly hot,
Swallow thou not, Rāhu, walking in the atmosphere ; release my
child the sun, Rāhu !”

‘ Then the demon-chief Rāhu, having released the Sun-god, with a terrified expression approached the spot where the demon-chief Vepacitti was. Having approached, he stood to one side, excited, and with his hair standing on end. Vepacitti the demon-chief indeed

¹ Saṃyutta-Nikāyo, book ii., i., §§ 9 and 10.

addressed the demon-chief Rāhu as he stood to one side with the verse :

“ Why now, as if utterly terrified, Rāhu, hast thou released the sun ?
Having come with excited aspect, why dost thou stand frightened ?”

(Rāhu replied :)

“ My head would have split into seven pieces, alive I should have obtained no pleasure,
(I have been addressed in verse by Buddha), had I not released the sun.”

It is not necessary to mention such absurdities more in detail, but it is well to remember them for two reasons. The first is because it is from such mythology as that which we have briefly considered that many of the later corruptions of Buddhism have sprung. The second reason is because a false but specious ‘liberality’ of thought leads many persons to exalt Buddhism far above its deserts, and even to speak of it as ‘in accord with Nature and her laws.’¹ While giving all due credit to Buddha for devoting his life to teaching what he believed to be most necessary for his fellow-creatures to know, ‘out of pity for the world,’ and while acknowledging all that is original in his philosophical speculations, it is hardly honest to conceal all the many and great defects and errors in his teaching. Surely, in dealing with Buddhism, as with everything else, we should ‘Nothing extenuate and naught set down in malice.’ Perfect fairness is best, in this as in all things ; and this is especially

¹ Cf. Subhadra Bhikschi, ‘Buddhistischer Katechismus,’ p. vi, where that writer speaks of Buddhism as ‘Eine Lehre, welche frei von Dogmen und Formenwesen, *im Einklang mit der Natur und ihren Gesetzen*, die höchsten, Geist und Herz gleichermassen befriedigenden Wahrheiten in so einfachem Gewande enthält, dass sie selbst dem bescheidenen Verstande fassbar sind,’ etc.

befitting for us Christians, remembering whose followers we are. Augustine's wise words of advice are as worthy of being remembered to-day as they were in his own time:

'Whosoever¹ is a good and true Christian, let him understand that Truth, wheresoever he may have found it, belongs to his Lord.'

¹ 'Quisquis bonus verusque Christianus est, Domini sui esse intellegat, ubicumque invenerit, Veritatem' (Aug., 'De Doct. Christiana,' lib. ii., 18).

LECTURE III

BUDDHA'S MORAL TEACHING

'Na antalikkhe, na samudda-majjhe,
Na pabbatānaṃ vivaraṃ pavissa
Na vijjati so jagatippadeso
Yatthaṭṭhito muñceyya pāpakammā.'¹

Dhammapadam, śl. 127.

IN order to form a just estimate of the Moral System of Buddhism, and to understand how virtues and vices are distinguished from one another, and their relative degrees of merit or demerit fixed, it is necessary to remember from what point of view the Buddhist looks at all matters of conduct. If for the moment we take our stand on the same level, we may, perhaps, be able to see how it is that he classes as evil deeds certain actions which in themselves are indifferent, or even good, and how it is that he seems to fail in any adequate degree to realize what Sin is.

All things, moral conduct included, are necessarily regarded by a Buddhist from a very low, an essentially selfish standpoint. Acknowledging no Divine Creator or Judge, not even a 'Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness,' he has no perception of anything

¹ These verses, as twice quoted in the Milindapañho (Trenckner's edition, pp. 150, 151), have, instead of *pāpakammā*, the word *Maccu-pāsā* 'from the snare of death.'

approaching the Kantian conception of the Moral Law¹ within, or of such a thing as a Categorical Imperative. Duty he cannot feel he owes to a God whom he does not believe in; it is only to his neighbour (to his fellow-men, that is, and to other animate beings) that he owes any duty at all. And as the only thing about which he has to concern himself is how to free himself from the fetters of Existence, all his moral ideas are conditioned by the desire to attain this goal as speedily as possible. Good and Evil, good and evil desert, have no strictly moral significance—in fact, have no real existence;² there can therefore be no essential difference between them, but only one of degree. Like all other men, a Buddhist has, of course, a conscience,³ but his judgment is so warped

¹ 'Zwei Dinge erfüllen das Gemuth mit immer neuer und zunehmender Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht, je öfter und anhaltender sich das Nachdenken damit beschäftigt,—das bestirnte Himmel über mir, und das moralische Gesetz in mir' (Kant).

² 'Lohn und Strafe, Verdienst und Schuld, gut und böse sind eigentlich bildliche Ausdrücke, unserer beschränkten, menschlichen Auffassung angepasst. Die Weltordnung kennt im Grunde weder Lohn noch Strafe, Verdienst noch Schuld, Gerechtigkeit noch Ungerechtigkeit. Alles ist nothwendige und natürliche Folge des eigenen rechten oder verkehrten Erkennens, Wollens und Thuns. Rechte Erkenntniss der Gesetze unserer eigenen Natur und des Weltalls, und Gehorsam gegen diese physischen, moralischen und geistigen Gesetze ist daher der einzige Weg zur Befreiung von Leiden und zur Erreichung des ewigen Friedens, des Nirwāna, jenes erhabenen Zieles, das jenseits von Gut und Böse, Schuld und Leiden liegt, jenseits alles Denkens und Vorstellens, und entrückt allen Gesetzen und Formen der Endlichkeit' ('Budd. Katechismus,' p. 53, note).

³ 'Est quidem vera lex, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna; quæ vocet ad officium, iubendo; vetando, a fraude deterreat: quæ tamen neque probos frustra iubet, aut vetat; nec improbos iubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec abrogari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest, nec vero aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus. Neque

by his defective outlook on the world that it prevents his conscience from guiding him aright. While, therefore, we find much that is noble in the Moral Precepts of Buddha, much, on the other hand, at once strikes us as defective, and even wrong. Those duties which are incumbent upon the Buddhist are so because, and only because, their performance assists him in attaining Nirvāṇa ultimately. Things which are forbidden are so, not because they are wrong in themselves, but simply because they tend to produce evil consequences to himself primarily. They should also be avoided because they tend to hinder other beings from attaining Nirvāṇa. The foundation, therefore, of the whole moral system of Buddhism is found in the Four Noble Truths¹ of Suffering, the Cause of Suffering, the Cessation of Suffering, and the Path which leads to the Cessation of Suffering, and we have already dealt with these 'Truths' in our first lecture.

The moral system of early and genuine Buddhism consisted of three great divisions. 'There² was a system of lower morality intended for those who still wished to remain in the world. There was a second system, including the lower but going beyond it, for those who had entered the Order. And there was a third and highest, including both the others, but going again beyond them,

est quærendus explanator aut interpres eius alius. Nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium Deus, ille legis huius inventor, disceptator, lator; cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis aspernatus hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiam si cætera supplicia, quæ putantur, effugerit' (Cicero, 'De Republica,' lib. iii.; quoted by Lactantius, 'De div. Instt.,' lib. vi.,

¹ Lecture I., pp. 30-32.

² Rhys Davids' Hibbert Lectures, pp. 205, 206.

for those who had entered what is called the '*Ariyo Atthaṅgiko Maggo*,' the 'Noble Eightfold Path'—that is to say, the system of intellectual and moral self-culture and self-control which culminated in *Arahat*-ship. What we understand by morality is almost confined to the lowest of the three. The desirability of abandoning the world, the consequences of having done so, the pursuits with which the recluse should or should not occupy himself, are considered in the second. Even this second system, much stricter than the first, is called 'a mere trifle, only a lower thing,'¹ as compared with the insight and freedom of the *Arahat*; and the disciple is not to be satisfied with having attained to the lesser aim. The third consists, on the *positive* side, of the Seven Jewels of the Law, enumerated in the 'Book of the Great Decease';² and, on the *negative*, of the veils and hindrances which the earnest Buddhist has to break, to remove, and to overcome.'

Dealing in the first place with the first of these three divisions, the duties of the lay adherent of either sex, it may be well to quote what have been called the 'Buddhist Beatitudes.'³ They are contained in a chapter of

¹ Brahmajāla-Suttam, i., § 10.

² Mahāparinibbāna-Suttam, i., § 7, pp. 6 and 7. The 'Seven Jewels of the Law' are the seven 'Constituents of Perfect Knowledge,' or 'Perfect Buddhahood' (*sambojjhaṅgo*), which are the following, as given in this passage: 'Recollection, investigation, energy, joy, calm, contemplation, and equanimity'—'Sati-sambojjhaṅgo, dhammavīcāya-s., viriya-s., pīti-s., passaddhi-s., samādhi-s., upekkhā-s.

³ A very good specimen of the loose way of using words which has deceived Seydel and others into fancying that a great resemblance between Buddhism and the Gospels could be traced. The word *mangalam* means 'a boon,' as is clear from the context in the nymph's question; but it is a boon not bestowed by anyone, the best thing to be desired.

the 'Khuddaka-pātho,' or 'Little Path,' entitled 'Chapter of the Great Boon,'¹ which runs in the following way :

'Thus has it been heard by me. Once upon a time the Worshipful One is dwelling at Sāvatti in the Jeta-grove, in Anāthapiṇḍiko's park. Then indeed a certain nymph of beautiful form on a lovely night, illuminating the whole Jeta-grove, approached the spot where the Worshipful One was. Having approached and respectfully saluted the Worshipful One, she stood to one side. Standing indeed to one side that nymph addressed the Worshipful One with the verse :

" Many gods and men have thought about boons,
Desiring prosperity : mention the best boon."

The text then gives Buddha's reply in eleven stanzas :

'Both not to serve fools and to serve the wise (learned),
And reverence for the venerable : this is the best boon.

'Both to dwell in a favoured land and meritorious conduct in a
former state,
And a perfect aspiration for one's self : this is the best boon.

'Both much learning² and skill and discipline well mastered,
And the word which is well-spoken : this is the best boon.

'Attendance on mother and father, cherishing of child and wife,
And an untroubled calling :³ this is the best boon.

'Both almsgiving and a religious walk and the cherishing of
relatives,
And blameless deeds : this is the best boon.

¹ Mahāmaṅgala-Suttaṃ. Our translation is from this chapter as it is given in the 'Parittap.'

² This, according to Buddhaghosa's commentary, means learning the Three Piṭakas by heart.

³ This explanation of the words 'an untroubled occupation' (*anākulā kammantā*) is taken from Childers' Dictionary (*s.v.* Kammanto).

- 'Ceasing, abstaining, and refraining from drinking harmful strong drink,
And diligence in matters : this is the best boon.
- 'Both respectfulness and lowliness and contentment and gratitude,
Hearing the Law in due season : this is the best boon.
- 'Both patience, meekness, and intercourse with monks,
Converse about the Law in due season : this is the best boon.
- 'Both penance and a religious walk, acquaintance with the Noble Truths,
And the realization of Nirvāṇa : this is the best boon.
- 'The mind of one touched by worldly matters, of whom does not shake
The sorrowless, passionless well-being : this is the best boon.
Having done such things, everywhere unconquered,
Everywhere prosperously they go : theirs is the best boon.'

These verses indicate what Buddha thought was proper conduct on the part, not of a member of his Order, but of a *lay adherent*.¹ He should live a life of humility and lowliness, reverencing the Buddhist monks, waiting on them, providing for their wants, showing them gratitude for their kindness in permitting him to gain merit by giving them alms. He should work at some peaceful avocation, preferably at agriculture, and should at proper times listen gratefully to their teaching, learning the Four Noble Truths, looking forward to Nirvāṇa in the distant future, and doing his duty to father, mother, wife, child, and relations. He should not suffer his peace of mind to be troubled by worldly cares, by sorrow or misfortune, but strive to remain calm and self-restrained amid the vicissitudes of life. There is something not without its charm in this picture, *but it does not apply to a regular disciple of Buddha*, for all members of his Com-

¹ 'Laity, not members of the Order' (Questions of Milinda, vi. 4 ; English translation, 'Sacred Books of the East,' vol. xxxvi., p. 247).

munity were bound to be monks, cut off from all family ties and worldly duties.

The Dhammapadam contains a large number of verses collected from various other books of the Pāli Canon, and some of these, too, depict the virtues which should be practised by pious laymen. We proceed to quote a few of the most striking of them :

‘ If one either speaks or acts with a corrupt mind,
Thereafter suffering follows him as the wheel does the foot of the
(ox) that draws it. . . .

If one either speaks or acts with a serene mind,
Thereafter pleasure follows him like a shadow that departs not.

“ He abused me, he smote me, he overcame me, he robbed me,”
Those who harbour that (thought), their wrath is not appeased.

“ He abused me, he smote me, he overcame me, he robbed me,”
Those who harbour not that (thought), their wrath is thoroughly
appeased.

For never is wrath here appeased with wrath,
And by freedom from wrath it is appeased : this is a permanent law.¹

‘ The man who continues to view pleasant things, not restraining
his senses,
And being immoderate in food, indolent, weak,
Him verily Māro vanquishes as the wind a feeble tree.

The man who continues to view unpleasant things, well restraining
his senses,
And moderate in food, faithful, exerting his strength,
Him verily Māro vanquishes not, as the wind a rocky mountain.²

‘ Not other men’s faults, not other men’s doings and omissions,
Should one observe, but his own doings and omissions.³

‘ Like a bright, fair-coloured flower without scent,
So the well-spoken word of one who acts not is fruitless.

Like a bright, fair-coloured flower with scent,
So the well-spoken word of one who acts is fruitful.⁴

¹ Dham., şll. 1-5.

³ *Op. cit.*, şl. 50.

² *Op. cit.*, şll. 7, 8.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, şll. 51, 52.

'Long is the night to the watcher, long is the stage to the weary,
Long is the transmigration of fools, not understanding the true Law.'¹

'The drinker in of the Law lies down happily with serene mind ;
The wise man always rejoices in the Law proclaimed by the noble.
For conduit-makers guide the water,
Fletchers bend the arrow,
Carpenters bend the tree,
Wise men tame themselves.'²

'If a man has done evil, let him not do it again and again,
Let him not find pleasure therein : painful is the accumulating of
evil.

If a man has done good, let him do it again and again,
Let him find pleasure therein : joyful is the accumulating of good.'³

'Whoever injures an uncorrupt man,
A person pure, undefiled,
The ill comes back to that very fool
Like fine dust thrown against the wind.'⁴

'Wicked deeds are easy, and harmful to one's self ;
What verily is both harmless and good, verily that is extremely
difficult.'⁵

'He who being formerly indifferent, afterwards is not indifferent,
He illumines this world like the moon freed from a cloud.

He whose evil deed done is covered by a good one,
He illumines this world like the moon freed from a cloud.'⁶

'Let one conquer anger by mildness, let one conquer wickedness
with goodness,
Let him conquer the miser with a gift, the false speaker with the
truth.'⁷

'Afar off shine the good like the Himālaya mountain ;
The wicked are not perceived here, as arrows shot by night.'⁸

¹ Dham., śl. 60.

² *Op. cit.*, śll. 79, 80.

³ *Op. cit.*, śll. 117, 118.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, śl. 125.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, śl. 163.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, śll. 172, 173.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, śl. 223. Cf. 'Be not overcome of evil,' etc. (Rom. xii. 21).

⁸ *Op. cit.*, śl. 304.

Besides such proverbial¹ philosophy and such precepts as these, which may be said to be profitable for all men alike, we find in the Dhammapadam others which state what the members of the Mendicant Community should do and what they should leave undone. With these we are not concerned for the present. But it may be well to notice the confusion between comparatively innocent and very wicked deeds, as evidenced by their being classed together, which exists in the Buddhist mind. For example, we read :

‘ All fear the rod, all dread death ;

Taking one’s self as an instance (of this), let one not kill nor cause to kill.

All fear the rod, to all is life dear ;

Taking one’s self as an instance (of this), let one not kill nor cause to kill.

Whoso harms with a rod beings desirous of pleasure,
Though longing for pleasure for himself, hereafter he does not obtain pleasure.

Whoso hurts not with a rod beings desirous of pleasure,
Though longing for pleasure for himself, he hereafter obtains pleasure.²

And again :

‘ Whoso destroys life and speaks falsehood,
Takes in the world what is not given, and approaches another’s wife,
And the man who addicts himself to drinking intoxicants,
This man even here in the world digs up his own root.’³

Here we find that the act of putting to death any living creature, for whatever reason, is coupled with very heinous sins. The reason of this is because, in accord-

¹ The resemblance between the general style of such maxims as these and the ‘ Proverbial Philosophy ’ of Martin Tupper will readily be perceived. Of course, the reader will also notice a great difference, inasmuch as Martin Tupper’s whole book is pervaded with a deep religious feeling, and this is altogether lacking in all Buddhist works.

² Dham., §ll. 129-132.

³ *Op. cit.*, §ll. 246, 247.

ance with Buddha's doctrine, all animate things are so bound together that a man may be one of the lower animals in a future state, or may have often been such in previous births, just as Buddha himself was, as we learn not only from the Jātakas but also from the Cariyā Piṭakam. In the same way an animal may be the form in which, if we may so speak, a human being is now living. But to speak thus is incorrect, though necessary to convey the thought we wish to express to European minds; for in reality, as man has no spirit and nothing of him but his *Karma* exists after death to be conveyed to the new *name-and-form* which then springs up, there is a difference merely of degree—of rank, so to speak—and not of kind, between man and the lower animals.

Some instances of the kind of conduct condemned by Buddha, even in lay disciples, and in fact in outsiders also, are afforded us in the *Vasala-Suttam*, or 'Outcast Chapter,' as it is called.¹ There we are told that a certain Brāhmaṇ, when making an offering to fire, saw Buddha approaching to beg at his house. On seeing him, the Brāhmaṇ called out to him not to come any nearer, applying to him the terms 'shaveling,' 'contemptible monk,' and 'outcast.'² Buddha calmly inquired whether he knew how to recognise an outcast, and, on his asking for information, replied :

'What man is wrathful, and full of hate, and cloaking his vices,
Devoid of belief, hypocritical, him know to be an outcast.

Whether once-born or twice-born, whoso here injures living
things,

With whom is no kindness towards a living thing, him know to be
an outcast.

¹ *Vasala-Suttam* in the *Parittam* (Frankfurter, pp. 122-125).

² 'Tatr' eva, muṇḍaka, tatr' eva, samaṇaka, tatr' eva, vasalaka, titthāhi-ti' (*ibid.*, § 3).

If in village or forest what is other people's property
 One by theft takes ungiven, him know to be an outcast.
 Whoso indeed, having received a loan, flees when addressed,
 Saying, "No, for I owe thee naught": him know to be an outcast.
 Verily whoso, through greediness for a trifle a person walking on the
 road
 Having slain, takes the trifle : him know to be an outcast.
 What man soever, for his own sake, for another's sake, and for
 wrath,
 Being questioned as a witness, lies : him know to be an outcast.
 Whoso has to do with the wives of relatives or friends,
 By force or by mutual consent : him know to be an outcast.
 Whoso mother or father or aged person whose youth has gone
 Well-content does not support : him know to be an outcast.
 Whoso mother or father or brother or sister
 Or mother-in-law strikes or annoys : him know to be an outcast.
 Whoso, being asked for good, teaches evil,
 Consults with a concealer : him know to be an outcast.
 Whoso, having done an evil deed, wishes not to be known,
 He is the doer of a hidden thing : him know to be an outcast.
 Whoso, having gone to another man's house, having eaten good food,
 Does not in return honour him when he comes : him know to be
 an outcast.
 Whoso either a Brāhmaṇ or a monk or any other mendicant
 Deceives by false speaking : him know to be an outcast.
 Whoso either a Brāhmaṇ or a monk, when meal-time is at hand,
 Annoys by voice and does not give anything : him know to be an
 outcast.
 Whoso here proclaims the unreal, being enveloped in infatuation,
 Coveting a trifle : him know to be an outcast.
 Whoso both exalts himself and despises another,
 Being vile through his arrogance : him know to be an outcast.
 Whoso is wrathful and ignoble, ill-wishing, envious, evil,
 Shameless, sinning without fear : him know to be an outcast.
 Whoso reviles a Buddha or even his disciple,
 A mendicant or a householder : him know to be an outcast.
 Verily whoso being imperfect pretends to be a perfect man (*arahat*),
 This thief indeed, though in the Brahmā-world, is the vilest outcast.
 These indeed who have been mentioned to you are by me called
 outcasts.

Not by birth does one become a Brāhmaṇ, not by birth does one become an outcast :

By conduct one becomes a Brāhmaṇ, by conduct one becomes an outcast.¹

Buddha then related the tale of a *Caṇḍālo* named Sopāko Mātaṅgo, who, he said, it is well known attained to the Brahmā-world² through subduing his passions. Convinced by Buddha's wise words, the Brāhmaṇ apologized for his rudeness, and desired to be admitted to the rank of a lay adherent.³

Very much the same teaching, sometimes in the same words, is given by Buddha in the Parābhava-Suttaṃ, or 'Chapter about Loss,' to a company of *devas* who came one day to ask him for instruction as to what evil things to avoid, lest they should suffer loss. There he condemns fraudulent dealing, drunkenness, unchastity, gambling, jealousy, pride, idleness, want of energy, undutiful conduct to parents, and many other forms of misconduct.

The 'Ten Moral Precepts' of the Buddhist faith are divided into three sections. The first five of these precepts are binding upon lay adherents, who are not obliged to obey the remainder; but they are recommended to practise the first eight. The last two are intended to apply only to full members of the Order, though every catechumen or novice who desires to obtain admission to the Order of Mendicants takes a vow to obey the whole ten. They are the following :

1. Abstinence from slaying any living being.
2. Abstinence from taking what is not given.
3. Abstinence from conduct unbecoming a religious student.
4. Abstinence from speaking falsely.

¹ Vasala-Suttaṃ, śll. 1-21.

² *Loc. cit.*, śll. 22-27.

³ *Loc. cit.*, § 7.

5. Abstinence from intoxicants, which cause slothfulness.

6. Abstinence from eating out of due season.

7. Abstinence from dancing, songs, music, and seeing spectacles.

8. Abstinence from using as adornments garlands, scents, unguents, ornaments, and finery.

9. Abstinence from (sleeping in) a high bed, a big bed.

10. Abstinence from receiving gold and silver.¹

The third of these precepts is held to forbid unchaste conduct of any sort, while a member of the Order has to live as a celibate. But the Mahāvaggo speaks of bestiality² as far less sinful than the conduct of a mendicant who returns to his family, thus showing how terribly perverted the moral sense becomes in a system of philosophy or religion which does not recognise a God. The fifth precept mentions three particular kinds of intoxicants which it is rather difficult to identify at present; their use is prohibited on the ground that they make a man slothful and careless in the observance of the rules of the Order. By the sixth rule the eating of food after the mid-day meal is prohibited.³ The tenth rule compels the Buddhist monk to renounce the pos-

¹ Dasa-sikkhā-padāni; Mahāvaggo, i., cap. lvi.; Vin., i. 83, 84: 'Pāṇātipātā veramaṇī, adinnādānā veramaṇī, abrahmacariyā veramaṇī, musāvādā veramaṇī, surāmerayamajjapamādaṭṭhānā veramaṇī, vikālabhojanā veramaṇī, naccagītavāditavisūkadassanā veramaṇī, mālā-gandhavilepanadhāraṇamaṇḍanavibhūsanatṭhānā veramaṇī, uccāsayanamahāsayanā veramaṇī, jātarūparajatapaṭṭiggaṇā veramaṇī.'

² Mahāvaggo, i., cap. lxxviii., § 2: 'Antamaso tiracchānagātāya.'

³ But the mendicants are permitted to eat four kinds of sweet food after mid-day. These are called *navanītaṃ*, *madhu*, *phāṇītaṃ*, *telam* (butter, honey, raw sugar, and oil made from the seeds of the *Sesamum Indicum*). See commentary in Fausböll's *Dhammapadam*, edition of 1855.

session of wealth, but it does not condemn the members of the Order if they hold property in common. Even in Buddha's own time, as we have seen, large estates were frequently presented to the community and enjoyed by them. But if any mendicant received gold or silver even for the Order, he was held to have transgressed the law. The gold was either to be thrown¹ away where it was not likely to be found, or it might be given to a lay adherent to purchase butter, oil, or honey, for the Order. But in such a case the culprit was not permitted to share in these good things.

Buddha enjoins upon his disciples, when admitting any new member to the Order, to recite to him the Four Prohibitions. These enjoin absolute chastity, forbid theft, killing any living thing, and laying claim to any superhuman condition.² Transgression of these four prohibitions is regarded as 'bringing³ about defeat'—that is to say, hindering the purpose for which a monk enters the Order. The transgressor is expelled from the community. We notice here again the guilt supposed to be incurred by taking the life of even the humblest insect, though in the Pātimokkham this third prohibition is explained as referring to murder only, or to the act of inciting to murder or suicide.

The members of the Order have to observe in all 227 rules, of which the four Prohibitions are the most important. The Pātimokkham gives these in full, and they have to be read out every *Uposatho* day. The *Uposatho*,⁴

¹ Oldenberg, 'Buddha,' English translation, pp. 357, 358; Pātimokkham, vi. 18, p. 20.

² Mahāvaggo, i., cap. lxxviii., §§ 2-5; Pātimokkham, Sect. 3, 'Pārājikādhammaṃ' (ed. Dickson, pp. 12, 13).

³ This is Rhys Davids' and Oldenberg's translation of the word 'Pārājikā' ('Sacred Books of the East,' vol. xiii., p. 3).

⁴ Sanskrit *upavasatha*.

or fasting-day, is one which occurs four times a month, and the observance of it is acknowledged to have been devised by Buddha from certain Hindū monks of the Titthiya¹ school. Buddha himself seems to have wished the recitation of the Pātimokkham to take place only on the fourteenth or fifteenth day of the half-month,² but it is now read in the monasteries on the eighth day of each half-month as well.³

It will be noticed that, as the strict Buddhist does not acknowledge any Creator and knows no God whom he is bound to worship, there is no precept in the slightest degree resembling the first four commandments of the Mosaic Code. The fifth commandment of the Mosaic Code is also absent from the ten Moral Precepts of the Buddhists, but we have seen that it is practically acknowledged in the Vasala-Suttam and elsewhere as binding upon all men. Yet transgression of any of these precepts, great or small, is not in any way regarded as a moral offence. It is evil, in the first place, because it injures the committer of the deed by entailing evil consequences in this or in some other existence, and still more because it tends to prevent him from reaching the goal at which he aims—Nirvāṇa. In the second place, it is evil because it violates one's duty to one's fellow-beings. Even an offence against a woman's honour is condemned principally on the ground that she is the property of someone else. We see, therefore, that Buddhist morality is defective in many ways. The idea of sin is practically absent, as has been pointed out in a previous lecture, its place being taken by that of *defilement* (*āsavo*), or *passion* (*kilāso*). To speak, as some do,⁴ of the 'four

¹ Mahāvaggo, ii., cap. i. ² *Loc. cit.*, ii., cap. iv., § 2.

³ Childers' Dictionary, *s.v.* Uposatho.

⁴ *E.g.* Dickson in his translation of the Pātimokkham.

deadly sins¹ prohibited by Buddha is to apply to Buddhistic conceptions words altogether inappropriate, and calculated to convey entirely false ideas. In fact, in writing on the subject of Buddhism, one of the greatest difficulties is to avoid giving altogether wrong ideas about that system of philosophy through the use of terms which in English, and in most other European languages, have, as it were, been *baptized*, and have become so thoroughly associated with Christian ideas that they are certain to mislead the student if used at all. We are therefore compelled to abstain as much as possible from the use of such terms as 'sin,' 'guilt,' 'punishment,' 'reward,' 'duty,' 'holiness,' 'righteousness,' 'creation,' 'creature,' and many others; and the fact that many writers have freely used these terms has entirely misled many sciolists of our own age.

The *defilements* or *āsavos* are sometimes spoken of as three—*kāmāsavo*,² the defilement of lust; *bhavāsavo*, the defilement of the love of existence; and *avijjāsavo*, the defilement of ignorance. The latter denotes only the 'ignorance' which consists in not knowing the 'Four Noble Truths,' no other kind of knowledge being considered by the Buddhist as of any real value. A fourth *defilement* is often mentioned, *diṭṭhāsavo*, or the defilement of heresy. There are ten evil *passions* (*kilesos*)—to wit, greed, hatred, infatuation, pride, heresy, doubt, sloth, vanity, shamelessness, absence of fear of doing wrong.³ These should be avoided by the true disciple of Buddha.

It will be observed that all the precepts which we

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 39.

² Childers, *s.v.* *Āsavo*. Buddha mentions the *four āsavos* in *Mahā-parinibbāna-Suttaṃ*, p. 8.

³ *Loc. cit.*, *s.v.* *Kilesos*. These are, in Pāli, *lobho*, *doso*, *moho*, *māno*, *diṭṭhi*, *vicikicchā*, *thīnaṃ*, *uddhaccaṃ*, *ahirikā*, and *anottappaṃ*.

have hitherto noticed are *negative* in their character. Doubtless the more earnest members of the Order would at times feel that the prohibition of one particular action, or line of conduct, indirectly enjoined its opposite; yet the command to do good is hardly ever expressed. An exception to this, in some measure, is found in the *Metta-Suttam*, or 'Chapter on Benevolence,' in which Buddha tells his disciples what eleven advantages a man may expect from entertaining a feeling of friendship or universal benevolence. A man who does this, he says, 'sleeps¹ happily, awakens happily, sees not an evil dream, is dear to men, is dear to superhuman beings, the deities protect him, neither fire nor poison nor weapon approaches him, his mind speedily becomes tranquillized, the look on his face becomes calm, unperplexed he dies, without acquiring anything further he attains to the Brahmā-world.' Here, too, as we have already seen, one is recommended to entertain benevolent feelings (not to *practise beneficence*) from no higher motive than self-interest.

In the *Karaniya-Metta-Suttam*,² or 'Chapter on the Propriety of showing Benevolence,' we find some noble sentiments. That Suttam urges the man who seeks his own true good to be 'able, upright, really upright and compliant, gentle, not vainglorious, both contented and frugal and free from care, living on simple food, keeping his senses in subjection, prudent, modest, not greedy in the families' (from which he begs). It then proceeds thus :

'Nor let him practise aught base
With which the wise yonder might reproach him ;
Happy or secure let them be,
Let all beings become happy-souled.

¹ Metta-Suttam.

² Part of the Khuddaka-Nikāyo.

- ' What living beings soever there be,
Whether movable or immovable, all alike,
Whether the long ones or those which are large,
Medium-sized, short, minute, big.
- ' Whether the visible or those which are invisible,
And those which dwell afar, not far,
Whether having existed or seeking birth,
Let all beings become happy-souled.
- ' Defraud not one another,
Despise him not in anything anywhere ;
Through hatred and feeling of anger
Let not one wish for pain to another.
- ' As a mother her own son,
Her only son, through life, would protect,
So, too, towards all beings
One should render one's affection (mind) unbounded.
- ' And (in) friendship towards the whole world
One should render one's affection (mind) unbounded,
Upwards and downwards and across,
Unobstructed, unhostile kindliness.
- ' Standing, walking, or sitting,
Or lying, as long as he may be awake,
Let him dwell upon this thought,—
This they call the angelic (*brahmā*) state here.
- ' And, avoiding heresy,
Let the virtuous man, equipped with insight,
Put away longing for carnal pleasures,
For certainly he does not again enter the womb.'

This is intended to represent the highest stage which it is possible for a man to attain to in this world. Those who have reached it are called *Arahats*, or perfect men. But it is not attained, as a general rule, without a long-continued struggle. We have already seen that Buddha describes the road upon which the true disciple must travel as the Noble Eightfold Path, and have noticed the eight qualities that distinguish the traveller who has

reached the end of his journey, and is never to be reborn in this or in any other world. The Buddhist mendicant reaches four different stages as he journeys along this road, and during the journey he has to burst the Ten Fetters (*samyojanos*) that bind him to existence. These Ten Fetters are—the Heresy of Individuality, Doubt, Contact with Rites, Sensual Pleasure, Hatred, Attachment to Form, Attachment to Formlessness, Arrogance, Vanity, Ignorance.¹ These need some elucidation.

The first Fetter, the 'Heresy of Individuality,' is belief in the existence of the Ego. A human being is said to be a compound, made up of the five elements of existence (*Khandho*), or Form,² Sensation, Perception, the Functions (or Aggregations), and Consciousness. As all compounds perish, he at death ceases to exist, though his *Karma* (as already explained)³ passes on to a new being produced by his longing for existence. As these five elements of existence do not include a spirit, man has no real personality, and he has at the very threshold of his religious life as a Buddhist to strive to overcome his belief in his own individuality. Thus we see that it is impossible for a Buddhist, while he continues such, to believe in the immortality of the spirit, for he has to learn, as the very first step in the Noble Eightfold Path, that he has no spirit, no personality. One is sometimes inclined to wonder how Buddha himself would have taken

¹ *Sakkāya-dit̥ṭhi*, *vicikicchā*, *silabbata-pārāmāso*, *kāmarāgo*, *paṭigho*, *rūpa-rāgo*, *arūpa-rāgo*, *māno*, *uddhaccaṃ*, *avijjā* (Childers, *s.v.* *Samyojanam*).

² See this argued out in the *Milindapañho* (Trenckner's edition of Pāli Text, pp. 25-28, book ii., cap. i.). There, too (p. 26), the thirty-two constituent parts of the body, as in the *Parittam* (*Dvattimsakāram*), are mentioned. Man is compared to a chariot, made up of a certain number of parts, yet the chariot has no personality.

³ Lecture II., pp. 87, 88.

the Cartesian proof of the reality of the Self—'Cogito, ergo sum.'

The second Fetter, or 'Doubt,' means doubt about the truth of the Buddhistic philosophy. It was certainly wise to forbid doubt on this point, for it is evident that the only way in which it is possible to accept that teaching at all is by receiving it, in opposition to reason, on the authority of the 'Teacher.'¹

The third Fetter, or 'Contact with Rites,' is said properly to signify devotion to 'certain² ascetic austerities, in which the anchorite imitates the manners and habits of a dog, ox, or other animal.' But in the so-called 'Jewel Chapter' (Ratana-Suttaṃ) of the Khuddaka-Nikāyo we find that 'rites'³ in general are condemned. This, no doubt, means sacrifices and religious ceremonies, including worship. The Buddhist faith leaves no ground for worship, for the true God is not recognised, while the *devas* and other superhuman beings, whether evil like Māro or good, are bound with the chain of suffering as men are, and it is expressly stated that each man must work out his own deliverance, 'being his own Lamp, his own Refuge, having no other Refuge.'⁴

The fourth and fifth Fetters need no explanation, but their mention here shows how immoral desires and evil passions are regarded by the Buddhist, as to be avoided solely because they hinder a man from progressing towards the attainment of Nirvāṇa.

The sixth and seventh Fetters condemn desire for continued existence in this world, and the longing for exist-

¹ Sattā, one of the titles frequently given to Buddha in the Pāli canonical books.

² Childers, *s.v.* Silabbataṃ, and the Buddhist explanation there given.

³ Quoted below, p. 143.

⁴ Lecture I., p. 57.

ence, whether in the *devalokas* or in the higher heavens, where there is no form. Death, Buddha declares,¹ is feared by all beings alike; yet he forbids us to love life, even in a higher world. This shows how hopelessly his philosophy is opposed to the very nature of things.²

The only other Fetter that calls for notice is the tenth. 'Ignorance,' as we have already said, implies only ignorance of the 'Four Noble Truths.' 'It would be an utter mistake,' says Bishop Copleston,³ 'to think of Buddhism as addressed chiefly to the intellect, or as concerned with the promotion of learning. Its adherents are not required to furnish themselves with even the rudiments of ordinary culture, or to learn by heart any confession of faith. . . . Learning is not highly esteemed. The ignorance which has to be abolished is ignorance of a small body of practical "truths," as they are called. That all which exists is perishable and inevitably subject to sorrow; that sorrow can be destroyed only by destroying desire and all that is attached to existence, and that Buddhism furnishes the way to the destruction of these—this conviction is what constitutes *knowledge*. All beings are by nature plunged in ignorance of these principles (and no wonder, since they are all false), and an effective conviction of their truth is knowledge. All other learning is disparaged. Questions of science, geography, astronomy, or even of metaphysics, are set aside as useless subtleties. Ignorance of these is not the ignorance that ruins. . . . The whole religion is said, as a matter

¹ Dhammapadam, §ll. 129, 130.

² De Quatrefages ('The Human Species') points out, from the point of view of an anthropologist, that (1) the belief in a being or beings superior to man, and (2) the belief in an after-life, are *universal* among men of every age and every clime, and constitute the greatest distinction between man and the lower animals.

³ 'Buddhism,' pp. 104, 105.

of history, to have started, as far as the present age is concerned, with the discovery of these "truths" by Gotamo. The whole system aims at producing in the disciple a similar conviction. The insight by which the chain of causation is broken, and rebirth rendered impossible, is attained by the disciple only when all the work is done. He who sees clearly, no longer believing it on the assurance of others, nor arriving at it merely as a conclusion of reasoning, that the cause of sorrow is desire, etc., he has no more duties to perform, no more virtues to acquire, no more reason to remain in life; his course is ended. This conviction is reached by different disciples at very different rates. By hearing the preaching of a Buddha, many, we read, grasp it all at once, and are at once perfect. Others only enter on the course, and have still to run through long ages and many births before they arrive at insight.'

In order that a man may be able to burst the fetters of existence, Buddha held it very desirable that he should be impressed with a feeling of disgust¹ for it. Hence his followers are again and again recommended to consider² how much there is repulsive, for example, in the human body, how it is a 'nest³ of diseases,' how it decays and

¹ Nibbidā.

² There are four 'meditations' (*satipaṭṭhānaṃ*) recommended: Kāyānupassanā-satip., vedanānupassanā-satip., cittānupassanā-satip., and dhammānupassanā-satip.—meditation on the (impurity of the) body, on the (evils of the) sensations, on (the evanescence of) thought, and on the conditions (of existence). Buddha refers to them in the Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ, p. 10 (quoted below, p. 139). The five 'Hindrances' (*nīvaraṇaṃ*) are: Kāmacchanda-n., vyāpāda-n., thīna-middha-n., uddhaccakukkucca-n., and vicikicchā-n.—the hindrance caused by the desire of sensual pleasure, that caused by the wish to injure, that produced by sloth and torpor, that springing from vanity and remorse, and that which originates in doubt.

³ 'Rogaṇḍaṃ' (Dham., xi., ṣl. 148).

putrefies when dead. The description of these things in Buddhist writings is very graphic, and there is no reticence in it; in fact, the perusal of such passages produces a feeling of loathing in the mind of the reader, not for the 'body of our humiliation,'¹ but for the perversion of view that deliberately shuts the eyes to all that is lovely, and gazes without reserve on—nay, rather prides itself in gloating over—whatever is repulsive.

The man who has become a member of the Order, and is at the first of the four stages on the Path to Nirvāṇa, is technically called a *sotāpanno*, 'one who has entered the stream.' He bursts in his onward progress the first three fetters, and when he dies he has only seven more births to undergo. When he has done this, he reaches the second stage, that of the *Sakadāgāmi*, which means 'he who returns but once' to this world. While in this stage he advances by diminishing Greed, Anger, and Infatuation in himself. After his death the believer who has attained to this second stage is reborn in one of the higher worlds. Returning to this world and again undergoing birth, he still presses onward, being known as an *anāgāmi*—one who is not liable to be reborn in this world. While living his last life on earth he bursts the fourth and fifth fetters, and entirely gets rid of all that still clings to him of Greed, Anger, and Infatuation. After his death he is reborn only in one of the Brahmā-worlds, from which he may attain to Nirvāṇa. Some, however, instead of passing through all these three stages in regular order in successive births, reach the fourth and final stage here, and are then known as *arahats*,² or perfect men. They have burst the five remaining fetters, and

¹ Τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν (Phil. iii. 21).

² Childers, *s.v.* *Sakadāgāmi*; *cf.* also his articles on *Sotāpanno*, *Arahā*, etc.

are free from all clinging to existence. Even while living they enter Nirvāṇa, and at death cease to exist. Each of these four Paths or Stages is divided into two, in the former of which the devotee strives till he reaches the position proper for him, and then in the latter subdivision 'eats the fruit' of his exertion. The ten fetters are divided into two groups of five each, the *orambhāgiya-sāmyojanāni*¹ and the *uddhambhāgiya-samyojanāni*. The first five 'belong to the lower lot,' because they cause rebirth in the world of sensuality—the hells, this world, and the *devalokos*. The last five are said to 'belong to the upper lot,' because they produce rebirth only in one of the divisions of the Brahmā-heavens. All this is explained by Buddha in the Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ, where he says to his disciples: 'Those,² too, who shall at a future time be omniscient arahats, all those worshipful ones, having left behind them the five Hindrances, having discerned the defilements of the mind . . . with minds firmly fixed on the four Meditations, having brought into being the seven³ constituents of knowledge as they really are, shall perfectly know the higher, perfect knowledge.' In relating the fate of certain deceased disciples, some of whom were only lay adherents, he speaks thus: 'The female⁴ mendicant Nandā, . . . through loss of the five fetters which belong to the lower lot,

¹ Childers, *s.v.* Orambhāgiyo and Uddhambhāgiyo. See also the passages from the Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ, quoted below.

² Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ, p. 10: 'Ye pi te, bhante, bhavissanti anāgatam addhānaṃ arahanto sammāsambuddhā, sabbe te bhagavanto, pañca nīvarane pahāya, cetaso upakkilese paññāya, dubbalkaraṇe catusu satipaṭṭhānesu supatitṭhitacittā satta bojjaṅge yathābhūtaṃ bhāvetvā, anuttaraṃ sammāsambodhiṃ abhisambujjhissanti.'

³ The 'seven elements of knowledge' (*sambojjhango*) are mentioned in note 2 to p. 119.

⁴ Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ, p. 16.

being *apparitional* ' (that is to say, being born in a Brahmā-heaven without parents), ' and there becoming extinct, is not liable to return from that world. . . . More¹ than fifty lay adherents . . . having died, having become *apparitional* through loss of the five fetters of the lower lot, having there become extinct, are not liable to return from that world. Ninety efficient lay adherents . . . through loss of three fetters, from the diminution of greed, anger and infatuation, being *sakadāgāmīs*, having come to this world only once more, shall make an end of suffering. Five hundred efficient lay devotees . . . having died, becoming *sotāpannos* through the loss of three fetters, not being liable to a state of destruction (*apāyo*), are self-controlled, being sustained by perfect knowledge ' (of the Four Noble Truths).

All this shows the object and aim of Buddhist morality to be, not the attainment of holiness, but that of Nirvāṇa. We see also how thoroughly Buddha had incorporated into his system, though with modifications, the belief in transmigration which was prevalent among the Hindūs of his day, although this doctrine has been rightly supposed² to have formed no part of the original creed of the Āryans in any part of the world, but to have been borrowed by them in India from the earlier inhabitants³ whom they had conquered.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

² *Vide* Rhys Davids' Hibbert Lectures for 1881, pp. 74; 75.

³ Some similar explanation accounts for the belief in transmigration among the Gauls (Cæsar, 'De Bello Gallico,' vi. 14) and other Kelts.

Pythagoras probably learnt it in the East. Its occurrence in Pindar ('Ol.,' ii. 57 *et seq.*) is similarly explained. We find it held also by Empedocles, of whom Diogenes Laertius writes: *καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν παντοῦα εἶδη ζῶων καὶ φυτῶν ἐνδύεσθαι· φησὶ γοῦν,*

*"Ἦδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμεν κοῦρός τε, κορὴ τε,
Θάμνος τ', οἰωνός τε, καὶ ἐξ ἄλλος ἔμπυρος ἰχθύς.*

'De Vit. Phil.,' lib. viii., cap. ii., § 12.

In order to give a fairly complete view of Buddhist ethics, we proceed to quote two passages, the former of which shows what course should, in Buddha's opinion, be pursued by one who is not a full member of the Order and does not wish to become such, while the latter explains the benefits to be obtained by one who advances from one stage to another along the Noble Eightfold Path.

On a certain occasion, we are informed, Buddha was living at the city of Āḷavi in the abode of the demon (*yakkho*) Āḷavako. This demon, being desirous of instruction, inquired of Buddha:

- ‘What is a man's best possession here (below)?
 What deed well done brings happiness?
 What is indeed the sweetest of tastes?
 What kind of living do they call the best life?’

(Belief in the unity and personality of God is the distinguishing doctrine of the Semite, belief in or a tendency to pantheism that of the Japhethite, and the doctrine of the transmigration of souls distinguishes the (Hamite or) races of the Old World which belong to neither of these stocks.)

Herodotus also mentions an instance of a similar belief among the Metapontines regarding a certain Aristean of Proconnesus (lib. iv., 13). The author has noticed the belief in transmigration as often occurring in the minds of European children of a tender age. Sometimes this is shown by their speaking of the time when their parents will become their children.

In the ‘Meno’ (14, 15) Socrates expresses his belief that what Pindar says regarding metempsychosis is true, and on it he founds his theory that *learning is recollecting*: Φασί γάρ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾶν, ὃ δὴ ἀποθνήσκειν καλοῦσι, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι· ἀπόλλυσθαι δ’ οὐδέποτε . . . ἅτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὖσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγονυῖα, καὶ ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν ἄλλου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ τι οὐ μεμάθηκεν· ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἷόν τε εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι ἃ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο.

Buddha replied :

‘ Faith is man’s best possession here. (below),
The Law well performed brings happiness,
Truth is indeed the sweetest of tastes,
Living wisely they call the best life.’

The dialogue then proceeds as follows :

‘ How, then, does one cross the flood (of passion) ?
How, then, does one cross the ocean (of existence) ?
How, then, does one overcome suffering ?
How, then, does one become purified ?’

‘ By faith one crosses the flood,
By diligence the ocean ;
By effort he overcomes suffering,
By understanding he is purified.’

‘ How, then, does one obtain understanding ?
How, then, does he find the treasure ?
How, then, does he gain fame ?
How does he weave friendships ?
(Having gone to) the world beyond this world,
How does he not grieve hereafter ?’

‘ Believing the arahats,
(Obeying) the Law for the obtaining of Nirvāṇa,
By obedience he obtains understanding,
He the diligent, the discerning.
The burden-bearer who does what is becoming
By exertion finds the treasure ;
By truth he gains fame,
Giving alms he weaves friendships,
(Having gone to) the world beyond this world
Thus he does not grieve hereafter.
He to whom belong these four qualities
Of the believer seeking a home,—
Truth, self-restraint, energy, generosity,—
He indeed does not grieve hereafter :
(Having gone to) the world beyond this world,
Thus he does not grieve hereafter.’¹

¹ Saṃyutta-Nikāyo, x. (Yakkha-Saṃyuttam), § 12, 9-14.

The demon was so charmed with this discourse that he vowed that he would henceforth wander about from village to village and from town to town praising the Perfect Buddha.

The following passage from the Jewel Chapter (Ratana-Suttaṃ) depicts the progress of the monk, and shows how he at length attains Nirvāṇa :

‘The end, the absence of desire, the deathless, transcendent (state)
Which the steadfast Śākya-ascetic attained,—
With that condition there is nothing equal. . . .
The purity which the chief Buddha praised,
That they have styled uninterrupted calm (self-concentration),
With that calm there is nothing equal. . . .
Those who with firm purpose are closely attached
To the precept of Gotamo the devoid-of-desire,
They have attained *Arahat*-ship, having entered deathlessness.
Having freely obtained they are enjoying Nirvāṇa. . . .
Those who clearly understand the Noble Truths
Well expounded by the deeply-wise One,
Although they be very careless
These do not obtain an eighth birth. . . .
Immediately upon the attainment of this discernment
Three conditions become rejected,—
The heresy of Individuality, and Doubt,
Like the Rite also, whatever it be ;
And one is released from the Four Destructions
And is not liable to commit the Six Crimes. . . .
Although he commit an evil deed,
Whether by body (act), word or thought,
That man is not liable to the concealment of it.
Declared is the non-liability of him who has seen Nirvāṇa.’¹

The ‘eighth birth’ is spoken of because a novice (*samaṇero*), before he becomes a *sotāpanno*, has eight births into this world to dread. We have seen how the number of these births may be diminished. There are, however,

¹ Khuddaka-Nikāyo, Ratana-Suttaṃ, śll. 4, 5, 7, 9-11.

several expressions used in these verses which might easily be misunderstood, because a Buddhist uses them in a peculiar sense, very different from that which they have to a Christian's mind. The first of these is 'Purity' (*suci*). The passage we have quoted explains this word as meaning the Stoical calm of self-concentration, or purely abstract meditation. That is to say, this purity is not *moral* purity of deed or thought, but merely *abstraction* from all mundane affairs, the state of one no longer affected by pleasure or pain, by grief or passion, by longing for life or dread of death. Another word which is often translated by 'purity' is *visuddhi*, or *undefilement*, and of this we are told there are three kinds (though others are also mentioned)—to wit, 'purity of conduct' (*sīla-visuddhi*), 'purity of belief' (*ditṭhi-visuddhi*), and 'purity of mind' (*citta-visuddhi*). The former denotes merely the perfect keeping of the precepts of Buddhism,¹ and so also the other technical terms have a technical and philosophical rather than the moral meaning which we should be naturally inclined to attach to them. The 'Four Destructions' (*cattāro apāyā*) are four states of suffering, and denote the condition² of a man born again either in hell (*narako*), as an animal (*tiracchāno*), as a ghost (*peto*), and as an evil spirit (*asuro*). The 'Six Crimes' (*cha abhihānāni*) are: matricide, parricide, murder of an *arahat*, murder of a Buddha, causing schism in the Community, and following another teacher.³ 'Deathlessness' does not denote the immortality of the spirit, as we have already seen, but the state of Nirvāṇa; and the latter is so called because after it there is neither death nor life, since there is no further birth. In fact, to

¹ Hardy, 'Manual of Buddhism,' p. 193.

² Childers, *s.v.* Apāyo.

³ Hardy, 'Eastern Monasticism,' p. 37.

our minds, this condition would seem more worthy of the title 'eternal death' than of that of 'deathlessness' or 'immortality.'

It is evident from this how thoroughly negative in its essence Buddhist morality is, as far, at least, as the members of the Order are concerned. The lay adherent is expected to give alms to the monk, but the monk owes no duty to the layman, except to teach him when he needs teaching. We find, indeed, 'universal benevolence' enjoined, and the duty of not putting any living creature to death, because we know how much they all dread it. But we do not find that this benevolence is to be exhibited, except in a *negative* way, by abstaining from doing harm. Buddhism does not enjoin the duty of comforting the sorrowful, helping the poor (unless they be monks), healing or tending the sick, or even performing ordinary duties towards parents or children, except, again, in the case of those lay adherents who are not regarded as in any real sense Buddhists. In fact, the man who has entered on the 'Noble Eightfold Path' has abandoned his relations, as Buddha himself did, and burst asunder all the ties which bind him to humanity. Were he to devote himself to the discharge of social duties, to 'go about doing good,' to 'visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction,' or really to love any of his fellow-beings, he would be breaking loose from the rules of the Order, and binding himself once more with the bonds which he has devoted all his attention to breaking. A monk may at any time leave the Order and return home, but to do so is to abandon the path that leads to Nirvāṇa. His one positive duty is, when travelling about for the purpose of collecting alms, to teach men the Law, so that all who are capable of understanding it may do so; and, unless they belong to one of the classes who may

not be admitted to the monastic community, may, if they please, become members of the Order, and so completely useless in their day and generation, privileged idlers in this busy world. Certainly, to whatever other advantages it may lay claim, Buddhism cannot be said to point out the dignity of labour, to teach us that every man has his own work to do in the world, or to encourage self-denial for the good of others, unless, again, the self-denial be on the part of the lay adherent, and the 'others' are understood to be Buddhist mendicants.

The 'benevolence' inculcated in some of the extracts which we have given above has been very much belauded by various European writers. Inasmuch as it taught consideration for the lives of the lower animals, it was very much required in the India of ancient times, no doubt, as it certainly needs to be inculcated in that country to-day. But let us hear Professor Oldenberg's opinion on this subject.

'Some,' he says,¹ 'who have endeavoured to bring Buddhism up to Christianity, have given compassionate love of all creatures as the kernel of the Buddhist's pure morality. In this there is something of truth. But the inherent difference of the two moral powers is still apparent. The language of Buddhism has no word for the poesy of Christian love, of which that hymn² of Paul's is full, the love which is greater than faith and hope, without which one, though he spoke with the tongue of men or of angels, would be a sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal; nor have the realities, in which that poetry assumed flesh and blood within the Christian world, had their parallel in the history of Buddhism. We may say

¹ 'Buddha' English translation, p. 292.

² 1 Cor. xiii.

that love, such as it displays itself in Buddhist morality, oscillating between negative and positive, approaches Christian love, without actually touching it, in a way similar to that in which the beatitude of the Nirvāṇa, though fundamentally wholly different from the Christian idea of happiness, does to a certain extent . . . swing towards it. Buddhism does not so much enjoin on one to love his enemy as not to hate his enemy. It evokes and cherishes the emotion of friendly goodness and tender-heartedness towards all beings, a feeling in which the motive power is not the groundless, enigmatic self-surrender of love, but rather intelligent reflection, the conviction that it is thus best for all, and not least the expectation that the natural law of retribution will allot to such conduct the richest reward.'

It is one of the greatest and most remarkable defects of the Buddhist system of ethics that much less is expected of the *arahat* or perfect man than of one who has not yet attained that stage. One who is slowly advancing along the Noble Eightfold Path must refrain from self-indulgence, and to some extent practise self-denial and endeavour to assist others. Thus, a lay adherent must not only give alms to the Buddhist monks and nuns, but he must also support his father and mother, his wife and children, and assist his relations if they require his aid. But a monk is under no obligation to help anyone but himself in any way, except, perhaps, by teaching them the Law. The novice is required to perform certain duties towards one more advanced in the Law than he is himself, but the converse of this rule does not hold good. So it is that it is said in the *Dhammapadam*, in describing the class of persons whom Buddha judges worthy to be called by the lofty title of *Brāhmaṇ*, which

there practically denotes the highest rank of Buddhist mendicants :

' He who has here overcome both good and evil, both bonds,
The sorrowless, undefiled, purified man, him I call a Brāhmaṇ.¹

Such a man has escaped, as we see, not only from committing evil deeds, but from doing good ones. To do the latter would be a bond to existence, and therefore the perfect man must avoid such conduct. He must be indifferent to both alike, just as we have seen that he is bidden² to love no one, as well as to hate no one. Strange as this may appear to us, it follows naturally from the foundation principles of Buddhist morality and their essential selfishness.

We see this illustrated in the case of Buddha himself. Certain books of the Pāli canon inform us that, when he existed in previous births, he practised the 'ten perfections' (*dasa pāramiyo*)—that is to say, those ten virtues which a (Bodhisattva) Bodhisatto, or one who is in some future birth to become a Buddha, is bound to manifest in his conduct, as a necessary preparation for his ultimately attaining Buddhahood. These 'ten perfections' are: The³ perfections of almsgiving, moral conduct, self-abnegation, understanding, energy, patience, truth, determination, benevolence, and equanimity. Each of these is again subdivided into the ordinary virtue of that name, and the same virtue in a lower and a higher degree. Thus, the

¹ Dham., śl. 412 :

'Yo' dha puññañ-ca pāpañ-ca, ubho saṅgaṃ upaccagā,
Asokaṃ, virajaṃ, suddhaṃ, tam ahaṃ brūmi brāhmaṇaṃ.'

² Above, Lecture II., p. 92 ; Dham., śl. 210-215.

³ 'Dānapāramitā, silapāramitā, nekkhamma-pāramitā, pañña-pāramitā, viriya-pāramitā, khanti-pāramitā, sacca-pāramitā, adhiṭṭhāna-pāramitā, metti-(or mettā-)pāramitā, upekhā-pāramitā' (Childers' Pāli Dictionary, s.v. Pārami).

'perfection of almsgiving' denotes the ordinary exercise of that virtue, but the¹ inferior degree signifies the bestowal of gifts of an inferior kind, such as gold, silver, robes, and treasures; while the superior degree of the same perfection is attained by the Bodhisatto who bestows on a petitioner gifts of the highest order, things which he himself prizes most, and the loss of which he will feel most keenly, such as his wife, children, his own body, flesh, limbs, bones, blood, sinews, or even life itself. The Bodhisatto has to practise each of the thirty varieties of virtue thus distinguished from one another. Buddha tells us in the *Jātakaṃ*, the tenth book of the Khuddaka-nikāyo, no less than 550 tales of his former births, and these are intended to show how he exercised these virtues himself during untold ages before his last birth into this world as Suddhodano's son. Another of the sacred books of the same collection (the Khuddaka-nikāyo), called the *Cariyā-Piṭakaṃ*, contains in poetical form some of the same tales, and others similar. Many of these are most absurd, and they show a great confusion of the moral sense, often representing the Bodhisatto as sacrificing his nearest and dearest to his desire to acquire merit for himself by attaining to one of the Ten Perfections. This is particularly the case in the story of Prince Vessantaro, which we shall give below. 'We cannot refrain from thinking,' says Professor Oldenberg,² 'that the treatment of beneficence in Buddhist morals would have been more sound and less prolix if it were not that here a virtue was being handled,

¹ Clough, Sinhalese Dictionary, quoted by Childers (*loc. cit.*). The names of the varieties of the Perfections are formed on the model of the three varieties of almsgiving: *Dāna-pāramitā*, *dān-ūpa-pāramitā*, and *dāna-paramattha-pāramitā*—the ordinary or general virtue, the lower degree, and the highest degree.

² 'Buddha,' English translation, pp. 301, 302, note.

in a position to practise which the pauper monk could scarcely ever be.' It is quite in accordance with what we have said above regarding the defective principles of the Buddhist ethical system to find that Siddhattho (Siddhârtha) Gotamo, when he had once attained the position of a Buddha, did not even attempt to show forth any of these virtues. These perfections are not intended to be sought for their own sakes, in order to reach a perfect moral standard and to form a high and noble character; they are to be practised for a time only, and from a purely selfish desire to attain Buddhahood. The contrast between this and the motive for practising virtue set before the Jews as early as Moses' time, when we find Jehovah saying to His people, 'Ye shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy,'¹ and before us Christians, when our Lord says to His disciples, 'Ye therefore shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect,'² is as great as it is possible to imagine.

In order to give some idea of the way in which the canonical books of the Buddhists tell us that Buddha practised these virtues in previous existences, we proceed to quote a few of the many tales to that effect contained in the *Cariyā-Piṭakam*. Here, for example, we are informed that once upon a time Buddha was a³

¹ Levit. xix. 2: קְדָשִׁים תִּהְיוּ כִּי יְרוּשׁ אֲנִי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם

² Matt. v. 48.

³ *Cariyā-Piṭakam*, book iii., story vii.

' KAPIRĀJA-CARIYAM SATTAMAM.

- ' 1. Yadā ahaṃ kapi āsiṃ nadī-kūle dari-saye,
Piliṭo suṃsumārena gamaṇaṃ na labhāmi 'haṃ.
- ' 2. Yamh' okāse ahaṃ thatvā orapāraṃ patāṃ' ahaṃ,
Tatth' acchi satthu vadhako kumbhilo ruddadassano.
- ' 3. So maṃ asaṃsi, Ehī-ti : ahaṃ Emī-ti taṃ vadi :
Tassa matthakam akkamma parakūle patitṭhahim.
- ' 4. Na tassa alikaṃ bhaṇitaṃ yathā vācaṃ akās' ahaṃ :
Saccena me samo n' atthi : esā me sacca-pāramī-ti.'

monkey on the bank of a river, dwelling in a cave. There a crocodile continually lay in wait for him, and gave him no peace, pursuing him from one bank of the river to the other. Failing to capture the unfortunate monkey by any other means, the crocodile commanded him to come and give himself up to be eaten. The monkey said, 'I am coming,' and then, stepping down on his head, reached the farther shore. Buddha boasts that he kept his word in this way, and concludes by saying, 'There exists not my like in regard to truth: such is my perfection of truth.' What the disappointed crocodile thought about the matter is not stated, if he *was* disappointed, for the expression 'I stood firm upon the farther bank' *may* be intended to signify that the monkey was devoured by his enemy, and thus crossed the river of death.¹

On another occasion Buddha is represented as stating that he was a man called Suvanno Sāmo, 'the comely black man,' being then, apparently, the god Sakko or Indra under that form. The story, which is put into Buddha's own mouth, runs as follows²:

'When I was Sāmo in the forest, caused by Sakko to assume that appearance,

I presented myself in friendship on the mountain-slope towards the lion and the tiger.

¹ But if the story thus briefly told in the *Cariyā-Piṭakam* is identical with either the *Sumsumāra-Jātaka* or the *Vānarinda-Jātaka* (*Jāt.*, ii. 158-160, 278-280), the monkey deceived the crocodile by telling him a lie, thereby saving his own life. It is hard, however, for the Western reader to understand how this proves that in previous births Buddha possessed the Perfection of *Truth*.

² *Cariyā-Piṭakam*, book iii., story xiii.; found also in the *Asīti-Nipāto*.

'SUVANNA-SĀMA-CARIYAM.

'I. Sāmo yadā vane āsiṃ Sakkena abhinimmitto,
Pavane siha-vyagghe-ca mettāyam upanāmayiṃ.

With lions, tigers, panthers, bears and buffaloes,
 Spotted antelopes, deer, boars, having associated I dwelt in the wood.
 No one dreads me, nor do I fear anyone :
 Upheld by the power of friendship I then rejoice on the mountain-
 slope.'

This 'power of friendship' or benevolence is, as it were, a kind of magical influence which subdues hostility in the breasts of men and beasts alike. The Cullavaggo¹ tells us that Devadatto on one occasion let loose upon Buddha a furious elephant named Nālāgiri, or 'Elephant Mountain,' on account of his enormous size. But the monster was completely subdued by this power of benevolence which resided in Buddha, and was unable to do him any harm.

Buddha himself, he informs us, on one occasion existed in the form of an elephant, and he tells the story to show how he possessed and manifested in that state the 'Perfection of Moral Conduct' (*śīla-pāramitā*). The tale is thus related in the Cariyā-Piṭakam² :

- ' 1. When I was an elephant, nourishing my mother on the mountain-
 slope,
 Then there is not on earth my like in virtue.
- ' 2. A forester, having seen me on the mountain-slope, informed the
 King,
 "An elephant worthy of thee, great King, dwells in the grove."
- ' 3. He has no need of ditch nor of stake-pit :
 Having grasped me by the trunk, (he says,) "Come hither even
 of thyself."

' 2. Sīha-vyagghehi dīpehi acchehi mahisehi-ca
 Pasadamiga-varāhehi parivāretvā vane vasim.

' 3. Na maṃ koci uttassati na pi bhāyāmi kassaci
 Mettābalen' upatthaddho ramāmi pavane tadā-ti.'

¹ Cullavaggo, VII., iii. 12.

² Cariyā-Piṭakam, book ii., story i. : 'Silava-nāga-cariyam.'

- '4. Having heard that speech of his, the King, too, being glad of heart,
Sent a well-taught elephant-tamer, clever at teaching.
- '5. That elephant-tamer, having gone, in a lotus-pond saw
Me plucking a water-lily-root as sustenance for my mother.
- '6. Having recognised me, he perceived my virtuous character.
"Come, son," thus having spoken he seized me by my trunk.
- '7. My natural bodily strength then
Was equal and similar to the strength of a thousand elephants
of to-day.
- '8. If I had been angry at their approaching to seize me,
I should have been a match for even their human race (kingdom).
- '9. But I, for the sake of keeping the precepts, for the sake of accom-
plishing the Perfection of Moral Conduct,
Do not in heart oppose one binding me to the stake.
- '10. If they had cut me to pieces there with hatchets and lances,
I would not have even been angry with them through my dread
of breaking the precepts.'

But all this is eclipsed by what Buddha tells us of his conduct at another time, when, in the birth previous to that in which he attained Buddhahood, he became incarnated as the Prince Vessantaro.¹ His mother, Phusatī, wife of a King named Sañjāyo, had in previous births been the Queen of Sakko, King of the gods of the lower heavens. Sakko had shown his approbation of her by granting her ten boons, and all these were summed up in her becoming Vessantaro's mother. Phusatī herself was celebrated for her almsgiving, and her son followed her example. Beginning at the age of eight years, he became so generous that he says of himself: 'I would² give away my heart, my eye, my flesh, too, and my blood also; I would give my body, if, requesting, anyone

¹ *Cariyā-Piṭakaṃ*, book i., story ix.

² *Op. cit.*, §l. 13 :

'Hadayaṃ dadeyyaṃ, cakkhūṃ, maṃsaṃ pi ruhiraṃ pi-ca
Daddeyyaṃ kāyaṃ yācetva yadi koci yācayeṃ mama.'

were to ask me.' One day the Brāhmaṇs came to him when he was going out to give alms, mounted on a beautiful and incomparable white elephant, the value of which was enhanced by the fact that he was supposed to be an emblem of good fortune. They told him that there were many people famine-stricken in the country, and begged him to give them his elephant as alms. The Prince gladly complied. But the people of the land were incensed at the loss of the elephant, and banished Vessantaro from the country, ordering him to depart to the Crooked Mountain. Asking as a final boon permission to give a great feast to the Brāhmaṇs, Vessantaro departed from his palace in a chariot drawn by four horses, accompanied only by his affectionate wife, Princess Maddi, and his two little children, a boy named Jāli, and a little daughter called Kaṇhājīnā. Very soon, however, the Prince gave away his chariot and horses. He then turned to his wife and said: 'Do¹ thou, Maddi, take Kaṇhā—this younger sister is light; I shall take Jāli, for that little brother is heavy.' As they went along they inquired of those whom they met the way to the mountain, but were distressed at hearing that it was very far away. 'If² the children see fruit-bearing trees on the mountain-slope, the children weep for those fruits. Those broad trees, planted in the ground, having seen the children weeping, bowing down of themselves, approach the little ones,' much to the astonishment of Maddi. The demons (*yakkhos*), out of compassion for

¹ *Loc. cit.*, §l. 29.

² *Loc. cit.*, §ll. 34, 35 :

'Yadi passanti pavane dārikā phalite dume,
tesaṃ phalānaṃ hetumhi uparodanti dārikā.
Rodante dārike disvā ubbidhā vipulā dumā,
Sayam ev' oṇamitvāna upagacchanti dārike.'

the children, shortened the road, and the royal party reached their destination at sunset. Sakko then caused a wonder-working sage called Vissukammo to prepare for them a dwelling-place hollowed out of the mountain-side. 'Having¹ pierced into the quiet, noiseless declivity, we four persons dwell there within the mountain. Both Maddi the Princess, both Jāli and Kaṇhājinā, then abide in the cell, soothing one another's sorrow. Guarding the children, I am not desolate in the hermitage. Maddi brings fruit; she feeds us three persons.' But this quiet life was soon to be put an end to, and that through what Vessantaro regarded as most virtuous conduct on his part. 'When² I dwelt in the hermitage,' says Buddha, 'a traveller came to me. He asked for my little children, for both Jāli and Kaṇhājinā. Having seen the beggar who had come, mirth arose within me. Having taken both children, I gave them then to the Brāhmaṇ. When I had abandoned my own children to the Brāhmaṇ

¹ *Op. cit.*, §ll. 43-45.

² *Op. cit.*, §ll. 46-53 :

'Pavane vasamānassa addhiko maṃ upāgami,
 âyâci puttake mayhaṃ Jālikaṇhājine c'ubho.
 Yâcakam upagataṃ disvâ, hâso me upapajjatha :
 ubho putte gahetvâna adâsi brâhmaṇe tadâ.
 Sake putte cajantassa yâcake brâhmaṇe yadâ,
 tadâpi paṭhavî kampi Sineruvanavaṭaṃsakâ.
 Punad eva Sakko oruyha hutvâ brâhmaṇasannibho
 âyâci maṃ Maddideviṃ sīlavatīṃ patibbatāṃ.
 Maddiṃ hatthe gahetvâna, udakañjalim pûraya,
 pasannamanasañkappo tassa Maddim adâs' ahaṃ.
 Maddiyâ dīyamânâya gagane devâ pamoditâ,
 tadâpi paṭhavî kampi Sineruvanavaṭaṃsakâ.
 Jālikaṇhājinaṃ dhītaṃ Maddideviṃ patibbatāṃ
 cajjamāno na cintesiṃ bodhiyâ yeva kâraṇâ.
 Na me dessâ ubho puttâ, Maddî devî na dessiyâ,
 sabbaññutaṃ piyaṃ mayhaṃ tasmâ piye adâs' ahaṃ.

beggar, then, too, the earth with Mount Meru and its banyan-woods trembled. Even once more Sakko, having descended in the likeness of a Brāhmaṇ, and having offered sacrifice, asked me for the Princess Maddī, the virtuous, the devoted. Taking Maddī by the hand, and filling with water the hollow of her joined hands, I gave Maddī to him with pleased resolution of mind. When Maddī was being given away, the gods in the sky were joyful; then, too, the earth with Mount Meru and its banyan-woods trembled. Abandoning Jāli and my daughter Kaṇhajinā and the devoted Princess Maddī, I regarded it not, just for the sake of (obtaining) Buddhahood. Not hateful to me were both the children, the Princess Maddī was not hateful; (but) omniscience was dear to me, therefore did I give away my dear ones.'

Nothing in the whole of the Three Piṭakas affords a better illustration of the system of ethics inculcated by Buddha. It is not to the purpose to urge that the events here mentioned never really occurred. Buddha seemed to believe that they had, and he related this story as a proof (not of his folly and inhumanity, but) of his having completely carried out all that was necessary to the attainment of the 'Perfection of Almsgiving.' Nor was all this done out of pity for those in distress. He tells us candidly that when he was Prince Vessantaro he gave up all things and sacrificed his virtuous and devoted wife and his little children merely for the sake of obtaining an advantage for himself. The perversion of the moral sense which this story demonstrates is one of the most marked and all-pervading characteristics of the whole of Buddha's moral code. Those who know modern Buddhism best declare that the immorality¹ and in-

¹ 'The Sinhalese are reported by a Commissioner who came to inquire into the criminal statistics of the island to stand first on the

humanity which now characterize the followers of that faith have caused it to be despised by many in China and Japan, as well as in other countries where it still prevails.

list of homicides "perhaps in the world" (Copleston, 'Buddhism,' p. 482, quoting Report on Administration of Police, etc., in Ceylon, by A. H. Giles, Officiating Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Bengal). See the whole subject of Buddhist morals in Ceylon dealt with by Bishop Copleston, *op. cit.*, p. 481 *et seq.*

In the 'Circular in Connection with the Chinese Emergency,' issued by the Buddhists of Japan, and dated October 11, 1900, the theory is tacitly accepted that the Buddhists in China have taken a leading part in the Boxer movement there. The Japanese Buddhists say that they have 'perceived, with no small regret, that Buddhism in China has so completely declined as to have lost all vestige of influence upon the morals of men' (*C.M.S. Intelligencer*, February, 1901, p. 118).

In his edition of the 'Lalita-Vistara' (Introduction, p. 11 *et seq.*), Rājendralāla Mitra, speaking of one of the books of the Nepalese Buddhist Canon, writes thus: 'The seventh is named "Tathāgata Guhyaka," otherwise called "Guhya-samagha," or "a collection of secrets." . . . As a Tāntric composition of the esoteric kind, it has all the characteristics of the worst specimens of *Śākta* works of that type. The professed object, in either case, is devotion of the highest kind—absolute and unconditional—at the sacrifice of all worldly attachments, wishes, and aspirations; but in working it out theories are indulged in and practices enjoined which are at once the most revolting and horrible that human depravity could think of, and compared to which the worst specimens of Holiwell Street literature of the last century would appear absolutely pure. A shroud of mystery alone serves to prevent their true characters being seen, but divested of it works of the description would deserve to be burnt by the common hangman. Looking at them philosophically, the great wonder is that even a system of religion so pure and so lofty in its aspirations as Buddhism could be made to ally itself with such pestilent dogmas and practices. . . . The first chapter opens with details about various kinds of *Samādhi*, or meditation appropriate for the higher order of the Buddhist clergy. . . . In the fifth are detailed the characteristics and qualifications necessary for a neophyte to undertake certain forms of secret worship, and among the practices enjoined which promote

Even the excellence of some of its precepts, therefore, could not save Buddhism from extinction¹ in India itself, the land of its birth. Buddha could appeal to no motive in men other than selfishness. Even the very virtues which he inculcated upon others were not in general, he taught, incumbent upon the highest classes of his followers, nor does he seem to have even practised them himself—at least in *this* life. Whatever is good in Buddhist ethics is due to the light of conscience and reason, which even a false philosophy could not entirely extinguish. And the existence of such teaching as to the value, for instance, of truth, chastity, benevolence, and self-denial, should encourage us disciples of Christ to toil for the evangelization of the Buddhist world, feeling assured that the ‘Light which lighteth every man

the attainment of perfection, debauchery of the most bestial character, not even excepting mothers, sisters, and daughters, is reckoned as most essential. . . . The sixth is devoted to secret mantras, like the *Vija* mantras of the Tāntras, to meditation of mystic diagrams, and to training necessary for such meditation. . . . The means of attaining perfection, described in the next chapter, are not to be austerity, privations, and painful, rigorous observances, but the enjoyment of all the pleasures of the world, and the way[s] in which some of the pleasures are described are simply revolting.’ The same writer goes on to give some further details which are too vile to be transcribed here, and proves what he says by quoting certain verses of this book in the original Sanskrit. This shows what the much-bepraised ‘Esoteric Buddhism’ of India really was, and makes it clear that it is not only in modern times that the *corruptions* of Buddhism have produced immorality; for there can be no doubt that these evil theories and practices were quite alien to the original teaching of Buddha.

¹ Cf. Mon. Williams, ‘Buddhism,’ p. 162 *et seq.*; Barth, ‘Religions of India,’ pp. 132-138. Barth says (p. 136): ‘Everything . . . tends to prove that Buddhism became extinct from sheer exhaustion, and that it is in its own inherent defects we must especially seek for the causes of its disappearance.’

coming into the world ¹ has not left Himself without a witness even in the hearts of men whose judgment an atheistic philosophy has perverted—and many of whom, we may well believe, unconsciously perhaps, but none the less really, thirst for the living God, of whom Buddha could teach them nothing—who claims all souls² as His own, and gave His Son to redeem them unto Himself.

¹ John i. 9: *Ἦν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὃ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον.

² Ezek. xviii. 4: הִן בְּלִיָּה־נְשׂוֹת לִי

LECTURE IV

BUDDHISM AND CHRISTIANITY

'O Father, touch the East, and light
The light that shone when Hope was born.'

TENNYSON: *In Memoriam*, xxx.

Πάντα δοκιμάζετε, τὸ καλὸν κατέχετε (1 Thess. v. 21).

HAVING now briefly considered the main philosophical dogmas and the ethics of Buddhism, it is our purpose in the present lecture to inquire what is the exact relation between Buddhism and Christianity, and in especial the Christianity of the New Testament. The subject naturally divides itself into three parts: First, a comparison between some of the distinguishing features of Buddhism and those of the Christian faith; second, a contrast between them in certain very important points; and, third, an investigation of the question whether Buddhism has had any influence upon Christianity either originally or in later times.

1. In comparing Buddhism with Christianity we perceive that Buddha's teaching contains much thought and not a little truth. We may learn much, too, from even the failures and the errors of this philosophy. Buddha thought that, without any Divine assistance, he could explain to men how they ought to live, and at what they

ought to aim. But besides this, talking, as he erroneously thought, his intuition as his guide, he made assertions regarding matters of physical science, as well as concerning mental and moral subjects. In reality, he was for the most part accepting—at least, in general—the commonly received opinions of his time regarding these secondary matters, as he held them to be. It is patent to all that what he taught was entirely erroneous in reference to such matters as geography and astronomy, and we can hardly wonder that he failed to solve the problems which concern man's ultimate goal and the reason of his existence, the cause and cure for suffering, the nature of sin, the existence of the Ego, the immortality of the spirit, and, deepest of all, man's relation to God. Knowing, and caring to know, nothing of God, Buddha failed to discover any adequate motive, except a selfish one, to which to appeal in endeavouring to prevail upon men to walk in the path which he laid down for them. He urges them to toil without ceasing, and to deny themselves the innocent as well as the guilty pleasures of the world, in order that they may ultimately gain deliverance from suffering. This is essentially a selfish motive. Yet Buddha perceived that selfishness, the desire to gain a coveted object for one's self, constitutes a bond to existence and consequent misery. Even desire to live long in one of the higher heavens of which he speaks is condemned on this ground. Moreover, in his philosophy, the Self, the Ego, the *ātmā* (Pāli *attā*), does not really exist. Hence his teaching is self-contradictory. Experience shows that any form of selfishness is a hindrance to one's spiritual progress. We need something higher than self-interest to appeal to in order to call into operation those higher and nobler feelings and impulses which are inborn in every man,

and which are rarely completely extinguished in this life, even in the most vicious and abandoned of our fellow-creatures. In a word, the only thing that can lift a man out of himself and make him capable of heroism, self-sacrifice, and true nobility of character, is Love.

‘Love took up the harp of Life and smote on all the chords
with might ;
Smote the chord of Self, that, trembling, passed in music out
of sight.’¹

But this love, to be perfect, should be directed to Him that is perfect ; and love to the parent can be awakened in the heart of the child only by the child’s experience of a father’s, a mother’s, love to it. Hence the Apostle tells us, ‘ Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us ;’² and he reminds us of the only way in which it was possible for us to learn to love God, by saying, ‘ We love because He first loved us.’³ This, and not selfishness, not the desire to escape from temporal or eternal misery, not even the longing for happiness here or hereafter, is the mainspring of all of the noblest and truest Christian efforts. We cannot wonder that Buddha knew nothing of this, but we can see how ignorance of this grand truth rendered his teaching a failure, and made his philosophy contradict itself. Not having the key to unlock the mystery of human existence, it is no marvel that the mass of human suffering not only appalled him, but proved to him a mystery incapable of solution. He could see nothing in existence, in any form of existence, but misery. Existence itself seemed to him therefore an evil, unmeaning, leading to no goal, requiring to be

¹ Tennyson, ‘ Locksley Hall.’

² 1 John iv. 10 : ‘*Εν τούτῳ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγάπη, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς ἠγαπήσαμεν τὸν Θεόν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἠγάπησεν ἡμᾶς.*

³ 1 John iv. 19 : ‘*Ἡμεῖς ἀγαπῶμεν, ὅτι αὐτὸς πρῶτος ἠγάπησεν ἡμᾶς.*

'extinguished' as soon as possible. Peace and rest could be attained only through the cessation of being. Holding that all things are bound together in the chain of causation, he was far from grasping the fact that there is a Divine, 'Eternal Purpose'¹ in all things, overruling all things for good, bringing good out of evil,² and bound ultimately to triumph and be accomplished. Buddha knew not

'That nothing walks with aimless feet,
That not one life shall be destroyed,
Or cast as rubbish to the void,
When God hath made the pile complete.'³

Nay, rather, to Buddha all things seemed aimless and purposeless, since Nature was self-originated, or, if not, had originated in such a way that it in no wise concerned mankind to know the secret of its origin. Hence he made no effort to investigate the origin of anything except that of the dread fact of Suffering. It is not, therefore, surprising that the solution of this problem which he enunciated was incorrect. He closed his eyes to all that was good and beautiful in the world, deliberately choosing rather to view and meditate upon all that was loathsome and disgusting. Buddha perceived the truth afterwards expressed in the first clause of the Apostle's dictum, 'The things which are seen are

¹ Eph. iii. 11 : . . . κατὰ πρόθεσιν τῶν αἰώνων ἦν ἐποίησεν ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ.
Hence Tennyson sings of the

'One far-off divine event,
To which the whole creation moves.'
'In Memoriam.'

² 'O yet we trust that somehow good
Will be the final goal of ill.'

Ibid.

³ *Ibid.*, liv.

temporal';¹ but he could never rise—even as far as his philosophical predecessors in India itself had done in their theories about the *âtma*, the *paramâtma*, and the *purusha*²—in the direction of the apprehension of what St. Paul says in the concluding clause of the verse, 'The things which are not seen are eternal.'³

This affords us one example out of many of the *half-truths* to be found in Buddha's teaching. We now proceed to mention a few more.

Buddha perceived and taught, as clearly and forcibly, perhaps, as anyone else has ever done, that man cannot find on earth and in earthly things alone the satisfaction of the spiritual needs of which he is dimly conscious, and that true and abiding peace and happiness for which he yearns. In his address to his followers quoted in our first lecture,⁴ he informs us that he himself left his home and all its pleasures because he had learnt how unsatisfactory and transitory are all earthly joys and sensual pleasures. In this he was wiser far than the old Assyrian epicure who, as the ancient story has it, caused to be engraved on his statue near Anchialê the words, 'Eat,

¹ 2 Cor. iv. 18: Τὰ γὰρ βλεπόμενα πρόσκαιρα. Cf. Dhammapadam, cap. xx., śl. 277 :

'Sabbe saṃkhârâ aniccâ ti, yadâ paññâya passati,
Atha nibbindatî dukkhe ; esa maggo visuddhiyâ.'

Cf. also Mahâparinibbâna-Suttam, cap. vi., p. 62 :

'Aniccâ vata sañkhârâ uppâdavayadhammino,
Uppajjitvâ nirujjhanti : tesam vûpasamo sukho ti.'

² Cf. Iṣvara-Kṛishṇa's 'Sâñkhya-Kârikâ,' *passim*. Though very different in every way, yet the Platonic theory of *ideas* is another instance of a philosophy rising to the conception of the eternal reality of the unseen.

³ 2 Cor. iv. 18 : τὰ δὲ μὴ βλεπόμενα αἰώνια.

⁴ Lecture I., pp. 20, 21.

drink, and indulge in sensual pleasure, for all the rest is not worth so much as *that*¹—the ‘that’ denoting a snap of the fingers. Buddha’s pessimism was as deep as, but more reasonable and nobler far than, that of some of the Hebrews of Isaiah’s day, and of many of the Greeks of later times, whose motto was, ‘Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die,’² or than that which lurks beneath the Horatian sentiment:³

‘Sapias, vina liques, et spatio brevi
Spem longam reseces. Dum loquimur, fugerit invida
Ætas; carpe diem, quam minimum credula postero.’

If we may believe the statements attributed to him in the ‘Buddhavaṃso’⁴ elsewhere, Buddha had tasted of luxury and pleasure, and had learnt therefrom (as another Eastern sage of still earlier date had learnt from his own experience) to say, ‘Vanity of vanities, all is vanity.’⁵

¹ This is related regarding a statue, supposed to be that of Sardanapalus (Assur-bani-pal), not far from Tarsus. A similar one at Nineveh was by some ascribed to Sardanapalus, by others to the fabled Ninus (‘Goal of the Human Race,’ p. 48). The Nāstikas of ancient India (denounced in Bhagavadgītā, xvi. 6 *et seq.*), and especially the Cārvāka and Lokāyata sects, had a saying: ‘So long as life lasts, delight thyself and live well: when once the body is reduced to ashes, it will revive no more’ (Barth, ‘Religions of India,’ pp. 85, 86; *cf.* Maitrī Upanishad, vii. 9, and the first chapter of Sāyaṇa’s ‘Sarva-daśana-saṅgraha’).

² Isa. xxii. 13, quoted in 1 Cor. xv. 32; *cf.* Ḥāfiz :

معنی آبِ زندگی وروضه ارم—جز طرفِ جو بیار و می خوشکوار چیست

³ Horace, ‘Odes,’ lib. i., Ode xi.

⁴ Buddhavaṃso, xxvi., śll. 14, 15; *cf.* Añg. Nik., quoted in notes to Lecture I., p. 15.

⁵ Eccles. i. 2; *cf.* Fo-sho-hing-tsan-king, III., xiv., 1146: ‘He saw that all was empty and vain alike, with no dependence, like the plantain or the bubble’ (S. Beal’s translation in ‘Sacred Books of the East,’ vol. xix., p. 160).

But Buddha was never able to counterbalance this half-truth, as Solomon was, by pointing to that which is *not* vanity, to that which renders earthly life precious and noble, to that which shows man for what end and aim he was created and preserved: 'This is the end of the matter; all has been heard: fear God and keep His commandments, for this is the whole duty of man. For God shall bring every work into judgment, with every hidden thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil.'¹

Nor was it of earthly joys alone that the vanity was patent to Buddha. He knew that even the fabled joys of the age-long existences in the numerous heavens of which he spoke could not of themselves satisfy the human heart.² They were all unstable, he taught, bound some day to come to an end,³ and their very transitoriness prevented them from rendering happy either man or gods. While, therefore, worldliness is vain, 'other-worldliness,' too, is useless and worse than useless. But he did not know what is the secret of true happiness; he could not gain or give any peace higher than that which the world offers, or that baseless equanimity which he told his disciples they might obtain by weaning themselves from all things earthly, and becoming with Stoic fortitude indifferent alike to pleasure and pain, to good and evil. How far does his teaching in this respect fall short of that of the Light of the World and of His gracious promise, which, as many of us doubtless know by experience, He fulfils to His people: 'Peace I leave with you; My peace I give unto you:

¹ Eccles. xii. 13, 14, Revised Version.

² 'Api dibbesu kâmesu ratim so nâdhigacchati ;
Taṇhakkhayarato hoti sammâsambuddhasâvako.'

Dham., śl. 187.

³ 'Sabbe saṅkhârâ aniccâ' (Dham., śl. 277).

not as the world giveth, give I unto you.'¹ 'These things have I spoken unto you, that in Me ye may have peace. In the world ye have tribulation : but be of good cheer ; I have overcome the world.'²

One of the most valuable of all Buddha's half-truths is to be found in what he so continually repeats regarding the deep importance of our conduct here. We have already seen that he teaches that a man *must*, either here or in some future state, 'eat the fruit of his deeds,'³ whether good or ill. He held that no power, human or Divine, could undo what had once been done, could prevent a man from receiving to the full the good or evil consequences of every single act. No repentance, no rites or ceremonies, no degree of asceticism, no number of good deeds, would suffice to obliterate a single evil act. Of course, there is a terrible truth underlying all this, and one which we Christians are sometimes in great danger of forgetting. Peter's repentance could not to all

¹ John xiv. 27 : *Ειρήνην ἀπέημι ὑμῖν, εἰρήνην τὴν ἐμὴν διδωμι ὑμῖν· οὐ καθὼς ὁ κόσμος δίδωσιν, ἐγὼ διδωμι ὑμῖν.*

² John xvi. 33.

³ Lecture II., pp. 75, 78 ; *cf.* the following verses of the Dhammapadam :

'Caranti bālâ dummedhâ amittenêva attanâ,
Karontâ pâpakam kammaṃ, yaṃ hoti kaṭukapphalaṃ.'

Śl. 66.

'Madhuvâ maññatî bālo, yāva pâpaṃ na paccati :
Yadâ-ca paccatî pâpaṃ, atha bālo dukkhaṃ nigacchati.'

Śl. 69.

Pāpo pi passatî bhadrāṃ, yāva pâpaṃ na paccati ;
Yadâ-ca paccatî pâpaṃ, atha pâpo pâpāni passati :
Bhadro pi passatî pâpaṃ,
Yāva bhadrāṃ na paccati ;
Yadâ-ca paccati bhadrāṃ,
Atha bhadro bhadrāni passati.'

Śll. 119, 120.

Cf. also śll. 15-17, 127, 137-140, 219, 220.

eternity undo his denial of his Master. David's confession of his sin, though we are told that God forgave him, did not secure him from the punishment—the loss of his child, and the other family troubles of after-years. Not all the piety of John Newton's later years could obliterate the dark record against him in reference to his early connexion with the slave-trade. Nor is it possible even to imagine the possibility of entirely undoing any deed, good or bad, that has ever been done since the world began. Holy Scripture teaches us this in the clearest and most decisive language. 'Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap. For he that soweth to his own flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption; but he that soweth unto the Spirit shall of the Spirit reap eternal life.'¹

But though our reason fails to find any remedy for this terrible state of things, yet we feel, as Buddha felt, that there *must* be a remedy of some kind, else not mere pessimism, but the blackest despair, would drive the thoughtful man to madness. Buddha, however, was unable to explain how there *can* be any remedy. He taught that, perhaps after innumerable ages and world-cycles spent in hell, perhaps in a briefer period, though one sufficiently long, the suffering which was the 'fruit' of evil-doing would work itself out. *How* this was possible, how each deed was to be prevented from perpetuating its consequences to all eternity, he failed to explain, and no wonder, for reason seems to give no encouragement to the hope that evil will ultimately come to an end of itself. Reason and Scripture, on the

¹ Gal. vi. 7, 8: Μὴ πλανᾶσθε, Θεὸς οὐ μωκτηρίζεται. ὁ γὰρ ἐὰν σπείρῃ ἀνθρώπος, τοῦτο καὶ θερίσει· ὅτι ὁ σπείρων εἰς τὴν σάρκα ἐαυτοῦ ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς θερίσει φθοράν, ὁ δὲ σπείρων εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος θερίσει ζωὴν αἰώνιον.

contrary, lead us rather to believe that character tends to final permanence in good or evil. 'He that is filthy, let him be made filthy still: and he that is righteous, let him do righteousness still: and he that is holy, let him be made holy still.'¹

But the Bible, though not fully explaining the whole of this mysterious subject, introduces two most important factors into the problem, which materially affect its solution, and lead us to look forward with trustful hope to the time when 'the first things'² shall have 'passed away,' when evil shall have been finally overcome, and God's will shall be done on earth as it is in heaven. These two factors are: (1) the existence of an All-Wise and All-Loving God and Father, and (2) the fact of an Atonement. The former fact Buddha ignored and tacitly denied; the latter he seems to have denied in so many words.³ He could not, therefore, see the possibility of evil being overruled for good, as we perceive took place when the most terrible crime ever committed in the world (the conduct of the Jews in handing over God's only Son, their promised Messiah, to death) was turned into the means of salvation for the whole human race. But when we recognise this, when we observe that Stephen's martyrdom won St. Paul for Christ, and was the means used by God for the conversion of the Gentiles not only in Europe but in all the world; when we notice that Augustine's very sins made him, when he repented,

¹ Rev. xxii. 11: 'Ὁ ἀδικῶν ἀδικησάτω ἔτι, καὶ ὁ ῥυπαρὸς ῥυπανθήτω ἔτι, καὶ ὁ δίκαιος δικαιοσύνην ποιησάτω ἔτι, καὶ ὁ ἅγιος ἁγιασθήτω ἔτι.'

² Rev. xxi. 4: Τὰ πρῶτα ἀπῆλθαν.

³ Dhammapadam, śl. 165:

'Attanā va kataṃ pāpaṃ attanā saṃkilissati,
Attanā akataṃ pāpaṃ attanā va visujjhati;
Suddhī asuddhī paccattaṃ nāñño aññaṃ visodhaye.'

more helpful to sinners than the holiest and most spotless angel¹ could ever be, then we at least are able to believe, even 'where we cannot prove,' that good will finally triumph, and that 'for evil' there will, when God's purpose is accomplished, be 'so much good more.'² Buddha felt, as did Æschylus,³ that an evil deed brings its own punishment to the evil-doer; he could say, as did Horace, 'Nemo malus felix,' and this he most clearly taught. But the other, the compensating half of the truth, which Reason demands, and yet cannot explain or prove, he knew not.

¹ 'I held it truth, with him who sings
To one clear harp in divers tones,
That men may rise on stepping-stones
Of their dead selves to higher things.'

'In Memoriam,' i.

² 'What was good shall be good, with, for evil, so much good more;
On the earth the broken arcs; in heaven a perfect round. . . .
And what is our failure here but a triumph's evidence
For the fulness of the days? Have we withered or agonized?
Why else was the pause prolonged but that singing might issue
thence?
Why rushed the discords in but that harmony should be prized?'
Browning, 'Abt Vogler.'

³ Æschylus, *passim*—e.g.:

Τὸ δυσσεβὲς γὰρ ἔργον
μετὰ μὲν πλεονα τίκτει, σφετέρᾳ δ' εἰκότα γεννᾷ.

'Agam.,' vv. 757-760.

Τὸ τοι κακὸν ποδώκες ἔρχεται βροτοῖς,
καὶ τ' ἀμπλάκημα τῷ περῶντι τὴν θέμν.
ὄρᾳς δίκην ἀναυδον, οὐχ ὀρωμένην,
εὐδοῦσι καὶ στεῖχοντι καὶ καθημένῳ
ἐξῆς ὀπάξει δόχμον, ἄλλοθ' ὕστερον·
οὐκ ἐγκαλύπτει νύξ κακῶς εἰργασμένον.
ὄ, τι δ' ἂν ποιῆς δεινόν, νόμιξ' ὄρᾳν τινά.

Æschylus, quoted by Dionysius
apud Theophilum 'ad Autolyicum,' ii. 37.

Buddha also proclaimed the fact that men should strive to burst the fetters¹ which tend to bind them to this transitory world. He held that 'Life is real, life is earnest,' but could not realize that 'the grave is not its goal.'² On the contrary, he taught that death is the end towards which all existence tends—in fact, that 'extinction' should be sought as the best thing of all for all beings, high and low. He had a conviction of the existence of the *expedient*, τὸ πρέπον, though the higher idea of the good, τὸ καλόν, was beyond him. He taught the propriety of entertaining a feeling of universal kindness even to the lower animals,³ though the confusion in his system between the beast⁴ and the human made him unable to distinguish properly between the guilt of murder and the act of, even unconsciously, putting to death the humblest form of animal life. To him there would have been no meaning in what even Greek philosophers⁵ held regarding a likeness between God and man; much less could he conceive of man as created in the image of God.⁶ He acknowledged—as did Socrates⁷

¹ E.g., Dhammapadam, śll. 397, 398:

'Sabba-samyojanaṃ chetvā yo ve na paritassati,
Saṅgātigaṃ viṣamyuttaṃ, taṃ ahaṃ brūmi brāhmaṇaṃ.
Chetvā nandhiṃ varattañ-ca,
Sandānaṃ sahanukkamaṃ,
Ukkhittapaḷighaṃ buddhaṃ,
Taṃ ahaṃ brūmi brāhmaṇaṃ.'

² Longfellow.

³ In the Metta-Suttaṃ, the Karaniyamettasuttaṃ, etc.

⁴ Lactantius well says: 'Hominum atque mutorum vel solum, vel certe maximum in religione discrimen est' ('Instt. Div.,' lib. II., cap. iii.).

⁵ Pindar, 'Nem.,' vi. 1, 2 (*vide* p. 108).

⁶ Gen. i. 27.

⁷ Plato, 'Apol. Soc.,'; Xenophon, 'Memorabilia Soc.,'; cf. Plato, 'De Legibus,' iv. : Τιμος μὲν δὴ καὶ ὁ μηδὲν ἀδικῶν ὁ δὲ μηδ' ἐπιτρέπων τοῖς ἀδικούσιν ἀδικεῖν, πλεον ἢ διπλάσιος τιμῆς ἀξιος ἐκείνου.

—that one should not cherish a feeling of revenge,¹ and return evil for evil, but he can hardly be said to have reached the height of the second part of the Apostolic precept, 'Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good.'² The precept, 'Render not evil for evil, or reviling for reviling,'³ may be paralleled in the Buddhist Scriptures,⁴ but the continuation, 'but contrariwise blessing,' cannot. Buddha held, as did Confucius, that 'Reciprocity'⁵ was a good thing as between man and man; but the Golden Rule of Christ, bidding us do unto others as we would that they should do unto us⁶—that rule which even in its negative form the Emperor Alexander Severus⁷ admired so much, when he learnt it from the Christians, that he had it inscribed in his palace and proclaimed aloud by the crier—was as far from dawning upon him as it was from being discovered by any other of the philosophers of antiquity.⁸ Self-sacrifice he inculcated as one of the ten principal virtues,

¹ Dhammapadam, §ll. 3-5.

² Rom. xii. 21; *cf.* verses 14, 17; Matt. v. 44 *et seq.* The nearest parallel to this in the Three Piṭakas is Dham., §l. 223, quoted above, p. 123.

³ 1 Pet. iii. 9.

⁴ Dham., §ll. 3-5, 133, 134.

⁵ Confucian 'Analects,' book XV., cap. xxiii.

⁶ Matt. vii. 12.

⁷ 'Clamabatque sæpius, quod a quibusdam sive Iudæis sive Christianis audierat, et tenebat; idque per præconem quum aliquem emendaret, dici iubebat, "Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris." Quam sententiam usque adeo dilexit, ut et in Palatio et in publicis operibus præscribi iuberet' (Ælii Lampridii 'Alexander Severus,' li.). The command in this negative form is apparently taken from Christian writers (*cf.* Augustine, 'De Doct. Christiana,' lib. iii.).

⁸ Perhaps the nearest to the Golden Rule are the words attributed to Aristotle, of whom it is said that, when asked, Πῶς ἂν τοῖς φίλοις προσφέροιμεθα, he replied, Ὡς ἂν ἐξέλμεθα αὐτοὺς ἡμῶν προσφέρεσθαι

relating many absurd stories¹ of how he practised it in former states of existence; but even in such tales as these we find that he and the other purely fictitious earlier Bodhisattos and Buddhas, whom he holds up to our admiration in this particular, thought nothing of sacrificing others—their wives and children,² for example—in order to practise this virtue and gain merit for themselves.

So we might go on almost indefinitely, showing how Buddha taught a considerable number of half-truths, but in a form so imperfect, and so mixed with serious error, that they were in many instances productive of harm rather than of good. But one other example of this must suffice.

Perceiving to some extent the evils arising from sensuality, Buddha not only discouraged licentiousness among his followers, but went so far as to denounce married life as a low and evil thing. His disciples had to dedicate themselves to a life of complete celibacy, not because Buddha held that such a life was *holier* than any other—for the idea of holiness can hardly be said to exist in Buddhism—but because a celibate³ was more free from all human ties, and therefore less bound to exist-

(Diogenes Laertius, lib. V., cap. i., § 11). Thales, when asked, Πῶς ἄν ἀριστα καὶ δικαιοτάτα βιώσαιμεν; replied, Ἐὰν ἂ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτιμῶμεν, αὐτοὶ μὴ δρῶμεν (*op. cit.*, lib. I., cap. i., § 9).

¹ Cf. the Cariyā-Piṭakam and the Jātakam, *passim*.

² Cf. the story of Vessantara, quoted in Lecture III.

³ Dham., §§. 287-289, 294, 295, 330, and especially Dham., 345, 346 (from Kosala-Samyuttam, cap. i., x., 3):

‘Na taṃ daḷhaṃ bandhanam āhu dhīrā,
Yad āyaṣaṃ, dārujaṃ, pabbajañ-ca :
Sārattarattā maṇikuṇḍalesu,
Puttesu, dāresu-ca, yā apc-khā.

ence, than the family man, the householder. It is not surprising to learn that this attempt to 'drive out nature with a pitchfork'¹ has failed, resulting among the Buddhist monks² of Japan and China to-day in very gross immorality, just as a similar attempt in the Greek and Roman Churches has done only too frequently in Europe.

2. We now proceed to contrast Buddhism with Christianity in some of the many particulars in which the difference is not, as it may seem to be in some of the previous examples, in degree, but in kind.

Buddhism is a doctrine of despair, Christianity of hope. Buddha saw clearly enough the sorrow, misery, pain, and ultimate death of which the world is so full. He did not discover that all this is the fruit of sin, for, not knowing God, he did not know of any Divine Law of which sin is the transgression.³ Nor did he perceive that good may come out of evil, that existence is an evil only when abused, but of itself is a good thing, a thing to be thankful for. He believed that certain deeds produced evil consequences, and tended to misery, while others produced certain kinds of happiness, or at least the appearance of it. But he really increased men's misery, instead of lessening it, by teaching them that they should always look at the gloomy side of life, and not at

Etaṃ dalhaṃ bandhanam āhu dhīrā,
 Ohāriṇaṃ sithilaṃ duppaṃuṭṭhaṃ :
 Etaṃ pi chetvāna paribbajanti
 Anapekhino kāmasukhaṃ pahāya.'

¹ 'Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret' (Horace, Ep. i., 10, 24).

² For the state of things in Ceylon, *vide* Copleston, 'Buddhism,' p. 483.

³ 'Ἡ ἀμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία (1 John iii. 4).

its bright one; that all joy was fleeting and transitory, and therefore unreal, and to be despised by the wise man. Only by becoming insensible and indifferent¹ to joy could a man become indifferent to sorrow. Hence, when Buddha had left his home, and cut himself off from father and family, wife and son, he boasted that he was delivered from the power of Māro:

‘ I am freed from all ties, those which are divine and those which are human ;

I am freed from the great bond : thou art smitten down, O deadly One.’²

Neither on earth nor in heaven, he taught, could happiness be found; the only true happiness lay in the extinction, firstly, of all the passions, good as well as evil, and then of existence itself.³ Thus, we find in Buddhism the most pronounced and utter pessimism. On one occasion, we are told, Māro came to try him by telling him something of the joys of life, and said :

‘ The possessor of sons rejoices in his sons,
So also does the owner of kine rejoice in his kine :
A man’s joy is in his impulses (*upadhi*),
He indeed who is devoid of impulses rejoices not.’⁴

But Buddha utterly refuses to look at any but the gloomy aspect of things. Possession of worldly things to him

¹ Dham., §ll. 93-99.

² Samyutta-Nikāyo (Māra-Samyuttam), book IV., cap. i., § 5 : 4.

³ With this compare the speech of Silēnus to Midas : *Δαίμονος επιπόνου και τύχης χαλεπῆς ἐφήμερον σπέρμα, τί με βιάζεσθε λέγειν ἃ ὑμῖν ἄρειον μὴ γινῶναι ; μετ’ ἀγνοίας γὰρ τῶν οικείων κακῶν ἀλυπτότατος ὁ βίος. ἀνθρώποις δὲ πάνπαν οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι τὸ πάντων ἄριστον, οὐδὲ μετασχεῖν τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου φύσεως. ἄριστον γὰρ πᾶσι και πάσαις τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι τὸ μὲν τοι μετὰ τοῦτο, και τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ἄλλων ἀνυστόν, δεύτερον δὲ, τὸ γενομένου ἀποθανεῖν ὡς τάχιστα (Arist., Frag. Eud.).*

⁴ Samyutta-Nikāyo (*ibid.*, book IV., cap. i., § 9 : 2, 3.

means misery, for they may be lost. He therefore replies :

‘The possessor of sons grieves for his sons,
So also does the owner of kine grieve for his kine :
A man’s grief is in his impulses,
He indeed who is devoid of impulses grieves not.’

In contrast to this despair and universal pessimism, Christianity is the religion of hope and of joy. Buddha, with all his self-inflicted privations and troubles, was not called upon to endure anything in any degree to be compared with the sufferings, physical and mental, to which the Apostles and so many of their converts were exposed. Yet we find Paul and Silas singing in their prison at midnight,¹ in spite of their bleeding wounds. Paul describes himself and his fellow-believers as ‘perplexed, yet not unto despair.’² And who that has once heard that triumph-song at the end of 1 Cor. xv. can ever forget the hopefulness—nay, rather, the joyful certainty—which sounds forth from its grandly-solemn tones? ‘O death, where is thy victory? O death, where is thy sting? . . . Thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.’³ Our Lord just before His Passion tells His disciples: ‘Ye shall be sorrowful, but your sorrow shall be turned into joy,’⁴ and bids them ‘Ask, and ye shall receive, that your joy may be fulfilled.’⁵ And, even amid all the fiery trial by which they were tried, St. Peter can write to and of his fellow-disciples a few years later, saying that, through faith in the unseen Saviour, they ‘rejoice greatly with joy unspeakable and full of glory.’⁶ Right through the ages from that time to this we find the joy and happiness of the Christian scattering the gloom of life, and bringing

¹ Acts xvi. 25.

² 2 Cor. iv. 8.

³ 1 Cor. xv. 55.

⁴ John xvi. 20.

⁵ John xvi. 24.

⁶ 1 Pet. i. 8.

even to the heathen the conviction that the religion which enables men and women, in the midst of trials and distresses, suffering and temptation—nay, even in the face of death itself—to rejoice and be calmly, but often ecstatically, happy, cannot be of mere earthly origin. In this respect Christianity and Buddhism are at opposite poles. Buddhism, it is true, is said in certain cases to produce a calmness which some have admired; but it is the calmness of one dead to all worldly things, good and bad alike, self-centred, unmoved amid the troubles of the world, because he has steeled himself to endure without murmuring all that may befall himself, and has no loved ones whose trials and afflictions, sorrows and sins, can vex him.

‘As a pillar, based on the earth, would be
Unshakeable¹ by the four winds,
Such like I declare the true man,
Who attentively beholds the Noble Truths. . . .

The old (*karma*) is exhausted, the new originates not;
Having their minds detached from future existence,
Those seed(=*karma*)-exhausted men whose desires grow not,
The resolute, become extinguished like this lamp.²

But how different is the calm thus described from the ‘peace which passeth all understanding,’³ that peace

¹ Cf. Horace, ‘Odes,’ book iii. ode iii. :

‘Iustum et tenacem propositi virum,
Non civium ardor prava iubentium,
Non vultus instantis tyranni
Mente quatit solida, neque Auster
Dux inquieti turbidus Adriæ,
Nec fulminantis magna Jovis manus;
Si fractus illabatur orbis,
Impavidum ferient ruinæ.’

² Khuddaka-Nikāyo, Ratana-Suttaṃ, §§ 8 and 14.
Phil. iv. 7.

which our Lord left with His disciples,¹ and in which we may all share—the peace and calm amid the storm² of trouble and suffering which animated those who are described as ‘giving³ no occasion of stumbling in anything, that our ministration be not blamed ; but in everything commending ourselves as ministers of God, in much patience, in afflictions, in necessities, in distresses, in stripes, in imprisonments, in tumults, in labours, in watchings, in fastings ; in pureness, in knowledge, in long-suffering, in kindness, in the Holy Ghost, in love unfeigned, in the word of truth, in the power of God ; by the armour of righteousness on the right hand and on the left, by glory and dishonour, by evil report and good report : as deceivers and yet true ; as unknown and yet well known ; as dying, and, behold, we live ; as chastened and not killed ; as sorrowful, yet alway rejoicing ; as poor, yet making many rich ; as having nothing, and yet possessing all things.’

This leads us to another matter, in which Christianity and Buddhism stand to one another in direct opposition, or, at least, in striking contrast. Buddha’s followers were compelled, if they wished to enter his Order, to come out of the world, to live a life openly different from that of laymen, to avoid identifying themselves with other men, or even associating with them, except for the sake of instructing them, or with the object of obtaining alms.

¹ John xiv. 27.

² Cf. Clement Marot’s hymn :

‘ Si qu’en paix, en seurité bonne
Resterai et reposerai,
Car, Seigneur, ta bonté tout ordonne,
Et elle seule me espoir donne
Que sauf et sain regnant serai.’

³ 2 Cor. vi. 3-10.

The industry, the trades, the ordinary toil and every-day avocations of men were thus tacitly condemned, though the lay disciple might still continue to practise most of them. Christianity is opposed to all this *toto calo*. Our Lord went about among men, sanctifying alike their innocent joys and their sorrows, though thereby incurring the reproach of being 'a friend of publicans and sinners.'¹ Even in His last great prayer for His disciples He says, 'I pray not that Thou wouldest take them out of the world, but that Thou wouldest keep them from the evil.'² He told His disciples that they were the light of the world, warning them therefore, 'Let your light so shine forth before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven.'³ Instead of withdrawing from the ordinary avocations of the world, they were to remember that they were 'the salt of the earth,'⁴ and were to strive to keep the world from utter corruption. Hence it is that we find the Apostles not only working with their own hands, but also pointing out to their disciples the dignity of labour, bidding them remember that 'If any man will not work, neither should he eat,'⁵ and exhorting them, whatsoever they did in word or in deed, to do heartily,⁶ as unto God, and not as unto men, doing even the most ordinary thing 'to the glory of God.'⁷ No greater difference could well be imagined, therefore, than is to be found in this respect between Buddha's teaching and that of Christ. To Buddha the joys, sorrows, suffering, and labours of men were 'Māro's realm,'⁸ and even their very senses rendered them subject to his sway.⁹ It is true that, looking at the *moral*

¹ Matt. xi. 19; Luke vii. 34.

² John xvii. 15.

³ Matt. v. 16.

⁴ Matt. v. 13.

⁵ 2 Thess. iii. 10.

⁶ Col. iii. 17.

⁷ 1 Cor. x. 31.

⁸ Māra-dheyyam (Māra-Samyuttam, II., vii.: 7).

⁹ Cf. Māra-Samyuttam, cap. ii., v. 3; vi. 7; vii. 7; ix. 6-14.

state of the world (at which Buddha did *not* look), an Apostle tells us that 'the whole world lieth in the wicked one¹'; but, nevertheless, He who created all things, and for whose² pleasure they are and were created, has said, 'All souls are Mine.'³ The Bible teaches us that this is *God's* world, however marred by human rebellion and consequent misery; it is not abandoned or rejected by Him, whom we are taught to call our Father, without whose permission not even a sparrow can fall to the ground,⁴ nor can a hair of our head perish.⁵ We are called to be 'workers together with' God,⁶ who has given 'to every man his work' to do⁷; and we are taught to look forward to the time of the regeneration⁸ and restoration⁹ of all things, when 'the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea.'¹⁰

Again, where can we find a greater contrast than between the practical Atheism of Buddhism and the teaching of our Lord on the subject of our heavenly Father's love and care for us? In Buddhism there is no room for God; in Christianity God is everywhere present. Buddha teaches that man must be his own light, his own refuge, trusting entirely to his own strength and his own efforts.¹¹ Christ tells us that apart from Him¹² we can do nothing; and His Apostle shows us the secret of strength when he says, 'I can do all things through Christ, who strengtheneth me.'¹³ We are warned of the

¹ 1 John v. 19.

² Rev. iv. 11.

³ Ezek. xviii. 4.

⁴ Matt. x. 29.

⁵ Luke xxi. 18.

⁶ 2 Cor. vi. 1.

⁷ Mark xiii. 34.

⁸ Matt. xix. 28.

⁹ Acts iii. 21 : ἀχρι χρόνων ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων.

¹⁰ Hab. ii. 14.

¹¹ 'Tasmā ti, Ānanda, attadīpā viharatha attasaraṇā, anaññasaraṇā dhammasaraṇā anaññasaraṇā' (Mahāparinibbāna-Suttam, p. 22).

¹² John xv. 5.

¹³ Phil. iv. 13.

danger of the light which is in us being darkness,¹ and He who is the Light of the world promises to lead us, so that we, if we follow Him, shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life.²

In Buddhism we find no proper distinction between good and evil. God not being recognised, there is no absolute standard by which to judge of actions and motives. The expressions 'good' and 'evil' are, it is true, constantly used in the Tipitakam; but any attempt to distinguish between them is in vain, because the student becomes conscious that in Buddha's own mind these contrary things were regarded as differing from one another in degree only, and not in kind. A modern Buddhist writer is therefore correct when, in answer to the question whether, in the Buddhist system, there is a radical or absolute Bad, he replies, 'No. Everything earthly is relative; everything, even the morally Good and Evil, is a matter of comparison. Both expressions denote only the stronger or more feeble degree of Egoism of a living being, the roots of which are the desire to live and ignorance'³—*tanhā* and *avijjā*. This being so, everything has to be judged in relation to its utility or inutility in reference to what we are taught is the one aim and end to which all man's thoughts and efforts should be directed, the cessation of being, extinction, Nirvāṇa. Whatever is conducive to the attainment of that goal is good; whatever is otherwise is evil. The Buddhist writer already quoted applies this principle

¹ Luke xi. 35; Matt. vi. 23.

² John viii. 12.

³ 'Giebt es ein radikales oder absolutes Böses?—Nein. Alles Irdisches ist relativ. Alles ist eine Vorhältnissgrösse, auch das moralisch Gute und Böse. Beide Ausdrücke bezeichnen nur den stärkeren oder geringeren Grad des Egoismus eines lebenden Wesens, dessen Wurzeln Lebenswille und Unwissenheit sind' (Subhadra Bhikshu, 'Buddhistischer Katechismus,' p. 53).

even to the case of suicide. In answer to the inquiry whether suicide is an evil deed or a sin, he says: 'Suicide, provided that duties undertaken towards other persons are in nowise thereby violated, is no evil deed, for each living being has an indisputable right over his own life. But suicide is a foolish act, for it endeavours to cut off forcibly a thread of life which will necessarily be joined again, and for the most part, moreover, under still more unfavourable circumstances than those are which the self-murderer attempted to elude.'¹ We see here that such a deed is condemned as being unwise and unsuitable, because it places the man under circumstances in the next existence which render it more difficult than it was here for him to attain to Nirvāṇa. It is hardly necessary to point out how opposed this is to Christian teaching, not only with regard to this particular deed, but with reference to the distinction between right and wrong. Even in Old Testament times, as we have already seen, we find God saying to the Israelites, 'Ye shall be holy, for I, the Lord your God, am holy.'² God's will is but the expression of His unchangeably perfect nature, which is wholly good. Good and evil, as far as principles and motives are concerned—for in accordance with them are our actions weighed—are eternally distinct and opposed to one another, since the former is in accord with the nature and will of an all-

¹ 'Ist der Selbstmord ein Unrecht oder eine Sünde?—Der Selbstmord ist, falls dadurch nicht etwa übernommene Pflichten gegen andere Menschen verletzt werden, kein Unrecht, denn jedes lebende Wesen hat ein unanfechtbares Recht auf sein eigenes Leben. Aber Selbstmord ist eine thörichte Handlung, da er einen Lebensfaden gewaltsam abzuschneiden sucht, der mit Nothwendigkeit wieder angeknüpft wird und zwar meist unter noch ungünstigeren Umständen als diejenigen sind, denen der Selbstmörder zu entfliehen trachtete' (*op. cit.*, p. 59).

² Lev. xix. 2.

holy God, the latter contrary thereto. As man is made in the image of God, that which is contrary to the Divine nature must be contrary to man's true nature, and therefore injurious to it. Hence, sin degrades and injures a man, while virtue ennobles him. But we are urged to seek to do right through the revelation of the love of the heavenly Father towards us, and are assured of His grace to enable us to obey His will. The lost harmony between God's will and ours is restored, not by force, but by the attractive power of the Divine Love, manifested in God's care for us, and revealed in our Lord Jesus Christ. But Buddhism, knowing nothing of God, knows nothing of the heinousness of sin or of the beauty of virtue. Man is self-dependent, and hence becomes selfish, lives for himself alone, and aims only at his deliverance from an existence which seems to him aimless, objectless, a curse, and not a blessing.

A great contrast will also be found between the Christian and the Buddhist cosmogony. The Buddhist deems the problem of the origin of the world an insoluble one;¹ the only thing about the matter of which he feels sure is that there is not a Divine Creator who made all things. But Buddha fancied that he knew much about

¹ "Hat der Buddha Nichts über den ersten Anfang und über das Ende des Weltalls gelehrt?"

"Nein."

"Warum nicht?"

"Weil dieses Wissen die Kräfte des menschlichen Verstandes übersteigt (transscendent ist), und, selbst wenn es erlangt und in Worten gelehrt werden könnte, die Menschen in ihrer geistigen und moralischen Entwicklung doch nicht fördern würde, weil es nicht zur Aufhebung des Leidens, nicht zum Heil, zur Befreiung, zum Nirwāna führt. Phantasie, Verstand und abstrakte Vernunft werden sich stets vergeblich abmühen, einen Beginn der Zeit, eine Grenze des Raumes, eine Entstehung des Seins, der Welt und der Individualität vorzustellen oder zu denken" ('Buddhistischer Katechismus,' pp. 40, 41).

the world as it is, this earth and the other worlds which together form the material universe. Hence, he tells us the wonderful tales about Mount Meru (also called Sineru), the enormous lakes and trees, the huge lions and other animals of the Himālayas (*Himavat*), oceans 840,000 miles deep, the Jambu-tree, from which India takes its name of Jambudīpo—which is *only* 1,000 miles high—fishes 10,000 miles in length, the chariot-like form of India, and other matters of that description, of which the English reader will find an account in Hardy's works¹ on Buddhism. We do not wonder at finding such errors in the Buddhist Sacred Canon, for all false religions contain such. The Muḥammadan Traditions (*Aḥādīth*) of both the Sunnis and the Shi'ahs abound in similar absurdities,² as do many of the Rabbinical³ writings. But the very fact that Buddha made such mistakes in matters in which men can now put his assertions to the test—if we attribute these statements to him, as his disciples do—renders it impossible for any educated man to believe that Buddha was in reality omniscient. Hence, the spread of education is fatal to Buddhism. Contrast all this with the Bible. We know that opponents have for many centuries endeavoured to convince us that the book abounds in historical, scientific, and other errors, and some of them have at least succeeded

¹ These examples are taken from his 'Legends and Theories of the Buddhists,' chapter ii., and authorities quoted in appendices; *cf.* also 'Manual of Buddhism.' He takes the *yojano* at ten miles.

² See some of them quoted, with authorities, in my 'Religion of the Crescent,' pp. 119, 120, and Appendix C, p. 16.

³ *Cf.* Rabbinical comments on many parts of the Old Testament—*e.g.*, Hāgīgāh xi. 1; see also A. Geiger's work, 'Was hat Mohammed aus dem Judenthume aufgenommen?' McColl's 'The Old Paths,' etc. The Targum of Jonathan on Gen. ii. 9 says that the Tree of Life was in height a journey of 500 years.

in persuading themselves of the correctness of their assertions. The proofs to the contrary are not far to seek. Where, in the Bible, do we find any such geographical statements¹ as those above quoted from the Buddhist books? Passing over the many points in which the historical accuracy of the Bible has been proved from recently discovered inscriptions, as in the case of Belshazzar, of Arioch,² of Pul, and the confident ignorance of hostile critics exposed, let us hear what a number of the most eminent scientists of our own day and generation have said with regard to the Bible and modern scientific discoveries. At a meeting of the British Association in 1865, a document, now in the Bodleian Museum at Oxford, was drawn up and signed by 617 scientists, including Dr. Balfour, Bentley, Bosworth, Sir David Brewster, Macleod, Sir John Richardson, and other eminent men, which begins with the following declaration :

‘ We, the undersigned students of the natural sciences, desire to express our sincere regret that researches into scientific truth are perverted by some in our own times into occasion for casting doubt upon the truth and authenticity of the Holy Scriptures. We conceive that it is impossible for the word of God, as written in the Book of Nature, and God’s written word, written in Holy

¹ The reticence of Holy Scripture with regard to those matters which were not of spiritual import is especially remarkable when we remember the false geography and astronomy of such apocryphal works as the Book of Enoch, the Visio Pauli, and many others.

² See Hommel’s ‘ Die Altisraelitische Überlieferung,’ *passim*, and also Sayce’s ‘ The Higher Criticism and the Verdict of the Monuments.’ Here, perhaps, I may be permitted to say that I am not depending on other men’s interpretations of Babylonian, Accadian, Assyrian, and even Egyptian, records, but have in very many instances consulted the originals for myself.

Scripture, to contradict one another, however much they may appear to differ. We are not forgetful that physical science is not complete, but is only in a condition of progress, and that at present our finite reason enables us only to see through a glass darkly; and we confidently believe that a time will come when the two records will be seen to agree in every particular.'

Of course, certain other equally eminent men have differed from these authorities in these matters. But could one even imagine such a difference of opinion among learned men with reference to the scientific statements of the Buddhist Scriptures? No defence of them is in the remotest degree possible. It is well to bear this in mind. The cosmogony, geography, and astronomy of Buddhism are manifestly false; those of the Bible are correct, as far as our present knowledge enables us to judge.

We have already seen that Buddhism did not address itself to the poor, the afflicted, the oppressed, the ignorant, the sinful, to all of which classes Christianity has appealed successfully. Experience has also shown that the Buddhist's renunciation of the world differs vastly from that of the Christian. Buddhism cannot consistently concern itself with family, religious, intellectual, or political life. Consider for a moment what that means. What would be the condition of Europe now if the Christian Faith had always adopted the attitude that true Buddhism is constrained by its very nature to maintain in these matters? The condition of so-called Christian nations is not what it should be, but it is at least far better in every possible way than that of Buddhist peoples. And just in proportion to the fidelity of the adherents of each of the two religions to the principles inculcated by its Founder will the influence

of Christianity on the community at large be better, and that of Buddhism worse. The more true and earnest Christians that exist in any nation, the more does that nation progress morally, intellectually, and in every other way, for the Christian has learnt that 'none of us liveth unto himself,'¹ that we are not our own,² that we are workers together with God,³ that God has given 'to every man his work.' But the earnest Buddhist deems it necessary to become a monk, to abstain from all work except that of teaching others to take as low a view of their fellow-men and of this fair world as he does himself. The further he advances along the road to Nirvāṇa, the more useless does he become, the less bound to show kindness to his fellow-creatures, the more injurious to them, since he is a living condemnation of honest labour, intellectual effort, and even of the most ordinary human duties and affections. A nation which honestly adopted Buddha's cheerless creed would die out within a generation.

In nothing can a greater contrast between Buddhism and Christianity be found than in their treatment of women. It is hardly necessary to state—for it follows from what has been already said—that Buddhism regards woman as a snare. In Buddha's original plan no place for woman was found in the Order. When he was persuaded to admit female mendicants, he prophesied, we are told, that as a result his Law would practically be forgotten in the short space of 500 years.⁴ The female mendicant all her life lives in a state of the most humble servitude, occupying a place far lower⁵ than that of the monk. Some of them are spoken of with respect in the

¹ Rom. xiv. 7.

² Οὐκ ἐστὲ ἐαυτῶν (1 Cor. vi. 19).

³ 2 Cor. vi. 1.

⁴ Cullavaggo, X. 1.

⁵ See the whole subject well dealt with by Bishop Copleston ('Buddhism,' cap. xix.).

Buddhist Scriptures for their generosity and devotion, and even one of the Canonical Books, the *Therigātho*, consists of religious poems composed by the nuns. But this only proves how great a fault it is in Buddhism not to make due provision for the piety, fidelity, and self-devotion of women. The position of woman in India was a fairly good one when Buddhism arose. She enjoyed¹ a considerable degree of liberty, and was respected, if not as much as by the early Teutons, at least far more than she is now. The Mahābhārata and other Sanskrit works show this as clearly with regard to ancient India as the Iliad and Odyssey do in reference to ancient Hellas. Although it may not be due to Buddhism alone that, even in Buddhist lands, the position of the fair sex is lower to-day than it was over 2,000 years ago in India, yet we can at least see that Buddhism has not asserted for woman her rightful position in the world as man's loved and honoured helpmeet. There is nothing in all Buddha's teaching which in the least degree tends in this direction.

As Buddhism offers no high ideal, no noble aim, no spiritual comfort in life, so in death also it offers no hope save the dreary one of extinction. It does indeed tell of other worlds higher than this, in some of which the pleasures of the senses are to be indulged in, while in others, again, they are not. But the Buddhist is forbidden to hope for these existences; for the very hope will bind him to an existence which is misery and suffering, as he believes all existence is and ever must be. Buddha himself does, indeed, in repelling Māro's temptations, boast that the 'Deadly One' is overthrown,² and

¹ Cf. Oldenberg's 'Buddha,' English translation, p. 164.

² Māra-Samyuttam, *passim*—*e.g.*, cap. ii., § 5 : 3 : 'Nihato tvam āsi, antakā-ti.' *Antako*, the 'Ender,' is a title of Māro; *cf.* the Atharva

this has been by some understood as proclaiming his triumph over death. But it is as much a victory over life as over death, for it is only through binding men to life that Māro slays them, since 'all life ends in death.' Māro tempts Buddha to care for existence, to take a cheerful view of life, and flees when Buddha recognises him and replies with some of his pessimistic sayings. How different all this is from the victory over sin and Satan, and over death itself, which Christ gives to His own! Especially is the difference felt by the mourner: for the Christian can derive comfort from the thought, 'I shall go to him, but he shall not return to me';¹ while the Buddhist has no hope of ever recognising his loved and lost again in any state of existence, and for his only consolation has Buddha's own words, 'All that have not passed through death are liable to death.'²

3. We must not conclude these lectures without referring briefly to the question which has been raised in certain quarters, whether Christianity has been at all affected by Buddhism or Buddhism by Christianity. The complete contradiction which, as we have seen, exists between the leading principles of the two religions ought of itself to prevent any perverse intellect from fancying it possible to derive Christ's and His Apostles' teaching from that of Buddha, or rather from Buddhist legends of later times. Yet such attempts have been made by men of the same order of mind as those who have tried to resolve Buddha himself into a sun-myth,³

Veda: 'The gods lived constantly in fear of death, the mighty Ender (*Antaka*).'

¹ 2 Sam. xii. 23.

² Kosala-Samyuttaṃ, cap. iii., 2 : 5 : 'Sabbe sattā, mahārāja, maraṇa-dhammā, maraṇa-pariyosānā, maraṇam anatīta-ti.'

³ By Senart, 'Essai sur la légende du Buddha.'

to prove the mythical theory of the Gospel portraiture of our Saviour, and to derive men's highest knowledge of God from a distorted animism or the worship of fetishes. The foundation on which such a theory of the connexion between Buddhism and the Christianity of the Gospels rests is ignorance, with a semblance of learning, even more than prejudice. Attempts to prove that certain stories, now found, for example, in later Northern Buddhist works like the *Lalita-Vistara*, existed before our Gospels were written may safely be said to have broken down,¹ the proved facts of the case being sufficient to refute the theory. Again, slight and casual resemblances in phrases and single words between the Bible and the *English versions* of parts of the Buddhist Canon have been pressed into the service. For example, the Buddhist 'Beatitudes,' as they have been called, have been supposed to have some connexion with the Beatitudes in the Gospel. Here the resemblance lies in the name which an *English translator* has given to these verses ascribed to Buddha, although in reality, as we have seen, Buddha is speaking of *boons*. The fact that both Christ and Buddha are supposed to have related a

¹ See Rhys Davids' discussion of the date of the *Lalita-Vistara*, on which work most of the attempted comparisons of the Gospel history with later Buddhist legends are based, in his *Hibbert Lectures*, pp. 198-204. R. Davids points out that the Tibetan version of that work was made (as Foucaux acknowledges) 'at some date which cannot be earlier, but may be much later, than the sixth century of our era, or 1,000 years after the birth of Gotama' (p. 192). 'All that we can at present say is that books of a similar character were in existence as early as six or seven hundred years after the birth of Gotama, and that one of these may turn out to be substantially the same as ours' (p. 200).

Dr. Kellogg, in his 'The Light of Asia and the Light of the World,' has answered Professor Seydel's theory as given in his work 'Das Evangelium von Jesu in seinen Verhältnissen zu Buddha-Sage und Buddha-Lehre.'

parable of the mustard-seed is another example of the danger arising from too little knowledge. What could be more unlike than the story of Kisā-Gotamī seeking mustard-seed¹ to bring to life again her dead infant, and our Saviour's parable² to which reference is made? Another example might be adduced from the words, 'I counted it not loss so that I might win the Buddhahood,'³ used in the English version of Professor Oldenberg's 'Buddha,' in the story of Vessantaro. The exact translation of the Pāli here is, 'I regarded it not, just for the sake of (obtaining) Buddhahood,' as given above.⁴ In this, as in many other cases, the English or other translator has inadvertently used as a free translation certain Biblical expressions; then some sciolist, ignorant of Pāli, triumphantly adduces the resemblance in words thus produced as a proof that the Bible has borrowed from the Buddhist books, though, as in this instance, the words in which the resemblance consists *do not occur in the Pāli*. Even casual resemblances between the Bible and certain Buddhist writings can be more than paralleled by a still greater likeness between Buddhist doctrines and those of certain Greek philosophers⁵—

¹ Quoted in Lecture II., pp. 104, 105.

² Matt. xiii. 31; Mark iv. 31; Luke xiii. 19.

³ Oldenberg's 'Buddha,' English translation, p. 303. The passage compared with this is Phil. iii. 7, 8.

⁴ Lecture III., p. 156.

⁵ When Christianity is compared with Buddhism, why not compare the following passages with one another, and draw similar conclusions from casual resemblances?

1. Epicureanism.

1. Lucretius, i. 44-49; cf. the Sammāsamādhi (fourth Jhānam).
2. *Ibid.*, ii. 7-14; cf. Dham., śl. 28, Milinda, p. 387.*
3. *Ibid.*, ii. 1-19; cf. Dham., śll. 197-202.*

* Compared by Rhys Davids, Hibbert Lectures, pp. 164-166.

Pythagoras, for example, or Buddha's contemporary, Heraclitus. Yet it has not been suggested that Buddha borrowed his precision regarding numbers or his doctrine

(The resemblance is quite as close as that which Fausböll notices between Dham., śl. 394, and Luke xi. 39, or between Dham., śll. 219, 220, and Rev. xiv. 13.)

2. Stoicism.

Horace's 'Impavidum ferient ruinæ' ('Carminum,' lib. iii., 3, vv. 1-8); cf. Māra-Samyuttaṃ, ii., § 1 : 4, and i., § 6 : 5.

3. Old Hebrew.

Ps. ciii. 13 : 'Like as a father pitieth his own children'; cf. Mahā-parinibbāna-Suttaṃ, p. 14 : 'Tato ṇam anukampati mātā puttaṃ va orasam.'

4. Gospel and Epistles.

Matt. vii. 12 (Golden Rule); cf. Dham., śll. 129, 130, and Confucius' 'Reciprocity.'

Rom. xii. 21 ; cf. Dham., śl. 223.

5. Modern.

1. Shakespeare : 'How far that little candle casts his beams ! So shines a good deed in a naughty world'; cf. Dham., śl. 304.

2. Persian : 'Ān kih na dānad va na dānad kih na dānad'; cf. Dham., śl. 63.

3. Spanish saying : 'Whatever good thou doest, do it again and again'; cf. Dham., śll. 117, 118.

Or Heraclitus, 'Everything flows on,' the universe is 'an ever-living fire,' with Buddha's similar ideas (Oldenberg, 'Buddha,' English translation, p. 259).

Or, again, the Greek Γνωθι σαυτόν, with Muṇḍaka Upanishad, ii. 2, 5 : 'Know the *ātman* only, and away with everything else ; it alone is the bridge to immortality'; cf. Bhagavadgītā, xviii. 66.

Or the *moderation* inculcated by Pythagoras, Καὶ κληρονομίην πᾶσαν ἀποδοκιμάζει, λέγων μὴ παραβαίνειν μήτε τῶν πόνων μήτε τῶν σιτίων μηδένα τῆν συμμετρίαν (Diog. Laert., lib. viii., cap. i., § 6), with Buddha's 'Middle Course' : 'Dve 'me, bhikkhave, antā pabbajitena na sevittabbā. . . Yo cāyaṃ kāmesu kāmasukhallīkânuyogo, hīno, gammo, pothujjaniko, anariyo, anattasamhito : yo cāyaṃ atta-kilamathânuyogo, dukkho, anariyo, anattasamhito. Ete kho . . . ubho

of transmigration¹ from Pythagoras, although it is remarkable that the latter Philosopher founded an Order or Community, as did Buddha, consisting of wealthy young men, and admitted women to hear lectures,² if they were not admitted (about which some doubt exists) to full membership in the Order.

A careful examination of the question and diligent study of the Buddhist Canon has led me to the same conclusion as that adopted by Professor Rhys Davids, who, speaking on this subject, says: 'There now arises a very natural question—whether all this is any proof that the Christian writers, who lived about 500 years after the Buddhist writers, borrowed their ideas from India. . . . I can find no evidence whatever of any actual and direct communication of any of these ideas from the East to the West. Where the Gospel narratives resemble the Buddhist ones, they seem to me to have been independently developed on the shores of the Mediterranean and in the valley of the Ganges; and, strikingly similar as they are at first sight, the

ante anupagamma majjhimâ paṭipadâ Tathâgatena abhisambuddhâ,' etc. (Mahāvaggo, i., 6: 17, translated in Lecture I., p. 28).

Many similar resemblances have already been referred to in previous notes. They do *not* prove that the West borrowed from the East or the East from the West, and they serve to confute the suggestion that, because of *much slighter* coincidences between the New Testament and (mostly) late and non-canonical Buddhist books, the New Testament writers may be fancied to have borrowed from the Buddhists: *quod absurdum est*.

¹ Τοῦτον γὰρ καὶ τὸ φονεύειν ἀπαγορεύειν, μὴ ὅτι γε ἀπρεσθαι τῶν ζώων, κοινὸν δίκαιον ἡμῶν ἐχόντων ψυχῆς (Diog. Laertius, lib. viii., cap. i., § 12; but see § 18, *fin.*). Note also that Pythagoras is said to have claimed to remember all that took place during all his own transmigrations (*op. cit.*, lib. viii., cap. i., § 4).

² Diogenes Laertius, lib. vii., cap. i., § 21.

slightest comparison is sufficient to show that they rested throughout on a basis of doctrine fundamentally opposed.¹

But though it is impossible to deduce any part of the teaching of the New Testament from Buddhist sources, yet it is an indisputable fact that Buddhism has not been without its very decided influence upon some corrupt forms of Christianity. One example of this is the story of Barlaam and Josaphat. This tale was at one time well known in many parts of Europe, and it has been shown² that Josaphat—though, through a mistaken belief that he was an early Christian saint, he has been canonized by the Roman and Greek Churches—is none other than Buddha himself! Again, the whole of the monastic system is non-Christian. Its more noted forms of self-denial, its prohibition of private property among members of the Order, while permitting the Order itself to accumulate landed and other property, its insistence upon celibacy, its prescribed fasts, its peculiar dress, and many other things of the same description, show that monasticism is directly due to Buddhism. This is particularly evident in the case of the mendicant friars of the Middle Ages. The Buddhist denunciation of the crime of following any other teacher than Buddha himself may have been the origin of the idea that arose in comparatively early Christian times, that separation from

¹ Hibbert Lectures, 1881, pp. 151, 152; see also Max Müller, 'Six Systems of Indian Philosophy,' pp. 82, 83.

² Johannes Damascenus, who lived at the Court of the Khalifeh Al Manşūr (A.D. 753-774), wrote the story of Barlaam and Josaphat as a manual of Christian Theology. Prince Josaphat is Buddha, the name being a corruption of the title 'Bodhisattva' (Pāli *Bodhisatto*) given to each Buddha before his incarnation. Josaphat is a saint in both the Greek and the Roman calendar; in the former his day is August 26, in the latter November 27.

what claimed to be the 'Catholic' Church was a deadly sin. The striking resemblance which exists between the Lamaism of Tibet and the Papacy is too close to be due to anything but a common origin.¹ Professor Rhys Davids on this subject well says :² 'When we remember how fundamentally opposed are the views of life set forth in the Pāli Piṭakas to those set forth in the New Testament, and how different are the characters, the ideas, the habits and customs, of some of the peoples among whom the two religions have been adopted, we can then perceive how instructive is the fact—one of the most curious facts in the whole history of the world—that Buddhism and Christianity have both developed, in the course of 1,500 years, into sacerdotal and sacramental systems, each with its bells and rosaries and images and holy water ; each with its services in dead languages, with choirs and processions and creeds and incense, in which the laity are spectators only ; each with its mystic rites and ceremonies performed by shaven priests in gorgeous robes ; each with its abbots and monks and nuns of many grades ; each with its worship of virgins, saints, and angels ; its reverence to the Virgin and the Child ; its confessions, fasts, and purgatory ; its idols, relics, symbols, and sacred pictures ; its shrines and pilgrimages ; each with its huge monasteries and gorgeous cathedrals ; its powerful hierarchy and its wealthy cardinals ; each, even, ruled over by a Pope, with a triple tiara on his head and the sceptre of temporal

¹ May not the origin of at least certain peculiarities in both systems be due to Persian (Magian or Zoroastrian) influences? (The mitre is certainly associated in derivation with the Persian Sun-god Mithra.) I owe this suggestion to Dr. Hoey, the English translator of Professor Oldenberg's 'Buddha.'

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 192-194. By 'Christianity,' as is evident from the context, Professor Rhys Davids means Roman Catholicism.

power in his hand, the representative on earth of an eternal Spirit in the heavens!

‘If all this be chance, it is a most stupendous miracle of coincidence—it is, in fact, ten thousand miracles. And it cannot be objected that the resemblance is in externals only. The principles which bind each of these two organizations together, which give them their recuperative power, are also similar. Each of the two churches claims to be guided by the Eternal Spirit, who it especially present in the infallible Head of the Church; each lays peculiar stress upon the mystic sacrament in which the priest reverently swallows a material thing, and by doing so believes himself to become partaker in some mysterious way of a part of the Divine Being, who during the ceremony has become incorporated therein.’

The Gnosticism of early Christian times may also be traced in at least some measure to a Buddhist source. The very word *γνώσις* is a translation of the *bodhi* at which Buddha aimed, and from the supposed attainment of which he derived the title.

Manichæism, again, is by the ecclesiastical historian Socrates (lib. i., cap. xxii.), traced to ‘Scythianus,’ whose disciple Terebinthus took the name of Buddha. (This title ‘Scythianus’ may preserve a recollection of Gotamo’s descent from the Śākas.) Its resemblance to Buddhism in some important respects is very striking.

Between the tales to be found in many of the Apocryphal Gospels and other such pseudo-Christian works and the fables contained in the various books¹ of

¹ Sir Monier Monier-Williams (‘Buddhism,’ pp. 69, 70) enumerates nine Nepalese canonical Scriptures (*Dharmas* or *Laws*): (1) Prajñā-pāramitā, (2) Gaṇḍa-vyūha, (3) Daṣa-bhūmiṣvara, (4) Samādhi-rāja, (5) Lañkāvatāra, (6) Saddharma-puṇḍarīka, (7) Tathāgata-guhyaka, (8) Lalita-vistara, (9) Suvarṇa-prabhāsa. Non-canonical are the Mahā-

the 'Greater Vehicle' (Mahāyāna) of what has been called the Northern School of Buddhism, there is a very great resemblance. Some fables contained in the Three Piṭakas are also similar in character. One of these we have already noticed in the tale of Prince Vessantaro.¹ The trees that there approach and bow down their branches that the children of Vessantaro and Princess Maddī may eat of their fruit represent the date-tree that bent its head to permit Mary and the infant Jesus to pluck its fruit when on their flight into Egypt, according to² the History of the Nativity of Mary.³ In the 'Romantic Legend of Buddha,' as translated by Beal from the Chinese Sanskrit, we find that Buddha's mother, Māyā, was delivered of her son while standing⁴ under a tree, just as occurred at Christ's birth, according to the Qu'rān,⁵ which here also follows the Apocryphal Gospels.

vastu and the Divyāvadāna. He says that the Lalita-Vistara is 'probably as old as the second century of our era.'

Beal (Fo-sho-hing-tsan-king, p. 365 *et seq.*) shows that the same name was given to different works, and as an example of expansion gives, from Dharmaraksha's translation of the Mahāparinibbāna-Suttaṃ, an expanded account of Chando's conversation with Buddha near Kusinārā. This largely invalidates the assertion that the Chinese records are said to contain regarding the early date of the first (no longer extant) translation of the Lalita-Vistara into Chinese.

¹ Lecture III., pp. 153-156.

² We have almost the same story in the Qur'ān (Sūrah xix., vv. 23, 25), evidently derived from the apocryphal History of the Nativity of Mary.

³ 'Hist. Nativ. Mariæ,' cap. xx.

⁴ Beal's 'Romantic History of Buddha,' p. 43. But the Fo-sho-hing-tsan-king (p. 2) says that Māyā was then resting on a couch. The 'tree' episode is, however, again found in Phū-yau-king (*ibid.*, p. 347).

⁵ Qur'ān (Sūrah xix., v. 23):

فَاجَاءَهَا الْمَخَاصِ الْيَ جِدْعَ النَّخْلَةِ

In the Arabic 'Gospel of the Infancy'¹ and in the Qu'rân² we find the statement that Jesus spoke when an infant in the cradle and asserted His Divine mission. So also of Buddha it is stated in these later legends that, when he was born, he 'forthwith³ walked seven steps towards each quarter of the horizon ; and, as he walked, at each step there sprang from the earth beneath his feet a lotus flower ; and, as he looked steadfastly in each direction, his mouth uttered these words : ". . . In all the world I am the very chief."'

We cannot now enter into the question whether the later Buddhists borrowed all these tales from stories current among credulous Christians of early Christian times, or whether in some cases, as in that of the bowing down of the fruit-tress, the Buddhist tale is not of decidedly earlier date than the apocryphal Christian one. The fact that in the Apocryphal Gospels we find absurd indeed—but *comparatively* sober—fables, while in the 'Romantic History' we discover these tales in such an extremely exaggerated form that they can best be described as the product of mythology gone mad, tends to convince us that the Buddhistic is the later form. Nor is the matter of much real importance, though it is of considerable interest. The difficulty of

¹ Arab. 'Evangelium Infantiae,' cap. i. :

ان يسوع تكلم وهو حين كان في المهد وقال لمريم امه اني انا هو
يسوع ابن الله

² Sûrah xix., v. 30 *et seq.* ; also Sûrah v., v. 109 ; Sûrah iii., vv. 40, 41, etc.

³ Beal, 'Rom. Beg.,' p. 44. In Beal's version of the Fo-sho-hing-tsan-king (pp. 3 and 4) much the same story is told, but there Buddha says : 'This birth is in the condition of a Buddha : after this I have done with renewed birth : now only am I born this once, for the purpose of saving all the world.'

coming to a definite conclusion is due to the uncertainty which exists regarding the date of all Buddhist literature. Writing had not become of extended¹ use in India, even if it had been introduced, in Buddha's time. The earliest Pāli works show that a considerable interval must have elapsed between Buddha's death and their composition. The Gāthas which many of them contain must be much the most ancient fragments which remain of the earliest Buddhist literature, unless an exception be made in favour of the Pātimokkham. But we have only probable conjecture, instead of sufficient proof, to justify² us in identifying any of the books of the Pāli Canon with those mentioned in the edicts of King Aṣoka Piyadassi³ (reigned 257-220 B.C.⁴). All attempts to prove that the Lalita-Vistara and other Sanskrit works of that description were in existence at or shortly after the beginning of the Christian era have failed, and we know only this much, that such books certainly existed in the sixth century after Christ.⁵

Contrast with this the certainty which we have now attained about the antiquity of far the greater part of the books of the New Testament. Professor Harnack's⁶ investigations have established the fact that they were in

¹ Mon. Williams, 'Buddhism,' p. 19, note.

² *Vide* notes to p. 70 above.

³ The Third Buddhist Council is said to have been held in the sixteenth or seventeenth year of Aṣoka's reign, about 244-242 B.C., at Patnā (Pāṭali-putra) (Mon. Williams, 'Buddhism,' p. 59).

⁴ This follows from the facts stated by Professor Bühler in 'Three New Edicts of Aṣoka,' pp. 9-20.

⁵ Rhys Davids, Hibbert Lectures, p. 199; see the whole subject discussed there (pp. 197-204).

Mon. Williams says it may, at earliest, have been written in the second century of our era ('Buddhism,' p. 70).

⁶ Harnack, 'Die Chronologie der Altchristlichen Litteratur bis Eusebius,' vol. i., preface.

existence for the most part long before the end of the first Christian century, so that the traditional account of their origin, antiquity, and genuineness is now proved to be correct in almost every respect. The difference between the Christian and the Buddhist Scriptures in this matter is as worthy of notice as is the contrast between the two religions in their principles. In the Gospels we have historical facts, the words of One who spoke as no mere man before or since ever yet spoke ; a character so human, and yet so Divine, that even Romance¹ has never equalled it ; a manifestation of God which not only satisfies our reason, but quenches the deep thirst of all human hearts and spirits ; a motive power in love to Him who first loved us which is a perennial spring of all that is noblest in thought, word, and deed ; a Life which has since proved not only the incentive to countless of the highest and holiest men and women whom the world has ever seen, but one to which even the enemies² of Christ's religion have vied with His disciples in paying their tribute of admiration. In the Buddhist books we see a man turning away with loathing from a surfeit of sensuality (if we may believe the accounts there attributed to Buddha himself), one whose greatness of soul could not content itself with merely earthly pleasures, but yet one who, knowing nothing better than earthly things, and seeing their vanity apart from the God whom he knew not, nor sought to know, strove after annihilation for himself ; who never sought in any way to benefit a single one of his fellow-creatures,

¹ John Stuart Mill tells us that the Gospel accounts of Christ's life must be historical, for no poet or dramatist ever lived who could have 'imagined the life and character revealed in the Gospels.' Cf. Row's 'Jesus of the Evangelists'; also 'Ecce Homo'; also 'The Fact of Christ,' P. C. Simpson (Hodder and Stoughton, 3s. 6d.).

² *E.g.*, Strauss and Renan.

much as he compassionated their sorrows, except by teaching them a false system of philosophy, though it was, indeed, what he mistakenly fancied to be the only truth which it concerned them to know. Buddha's character must provoke us to pity, not unmixed with admiration; but to compare his philosophy with the religion which our Master has taught us for our own salvation and that of all men (for whom He lived and died and rose again, and ever liveth), is to compare Cimmerian darkness with the Light of the World.

Hence it is that even Buddha's followers in many lands, turning from his teaching, pray¹ to and look for the coming of the future Metteyo² Buddha, of whose advent he gave them hope.³ And may we not in that prediction see another of the unconscious prophecies of heathenism, parallel, perhaps, to that embodied in the glorious Fourth Eclogue of Virgil, pointing to the great Hope of the human race, the coming of the Saviour of the world? It is due to the failure of Buddhism, not only in its ancient form as a philosophy, but in its modern development as more religions than one, that many in Buddhist lands are now turning to Christ, and, in spite of the contempt of the learned and the persecution of the ignorant multitude, finding in Him the Light of Life, the Hope⁴ which 'putteth not to shame, because the love of God hath been shed abroad in' their 'hearts,' as in ours, 'through the Holy Ghost.'

¹ Mon. Williams, 'Buddhism,' pp. 181-183.

² *Metteyo* is the Sanskrit *Maitriya*, 'Friendly' (cf. the Mithro of the Avestic books). But may it not be connected with the Hebrew *Māshīah* through the Aramaic, in which language the Hebrew *מָשִׁיחַ* (*sh*) becomes *ܡܫܝܚܐ* (*sh*)?

³ *Buddhavamsa*, xxvii. 19: 'Ahaṃ etarahi sambuddho, Metteyo cāpi hessati'; see also the uncanonical *Anāgata-Vamsa* (Warren, 'Buddhism in Translations,' p. 481 *et seq.*).

⁴ Rom. v. 5.

NOTE ON BUDDHA'S BIRTH

MANY modern writers on the subject have dwelt on the marvels which are said to have accompanied Buddha's conception and his birth. It may be as well to call attention to the following facts in this connexion :

1. The early Pāli works give no hint whatever to the effect that Māyā was a virgin at the time of Buddha's conception, and they are free from the marvels which in much later times crept into the narrative.

2. We first find *some* of these in the Introduction to the Jātakas, which are of much later date than the more authoritative Pāli works. Even there the wondrous conception of Buddha is related, not as a *fact*, but only as a *dream*. The passages referred to are appended below in the original.

3. Even in the Introduction to the Jātakas, however, nothing whatever is said as to Māyā's virginity. The first indication of any such belief is found in the Sanskrit poem of Aṣṭvaghosha, entitled *Buddha-Carita* (book i., śll. 17, 18, ed. Cowell). This work, in the opinion of Professor Cowell, *may* date from the first century of the Christian era, for the Professor, speaking of the author of the work, says: 'Whether¹ he could be the con-

¹ Introduction to the *Buddha-Carita*, p. v.

temporary and spiritual adviser of Kanishka in the first century A.D. is not yet proved, though it appears very probable; but at any rate his Buddha-Carita seems to have been translated into Chinese early in the fifth century. This must imply that it enjoyed a great reputation among the Buddhists of India, and justifies our fixing the date of its composition at least one or two centuries earlier.' Aṣvaghosha boldly accepts the things which Māyā saw in her dream as having in reality occurred, and adds many other marvels to them, using to the full the poet's license in such matters. Possibly this Buddhist writer may have adopted the idea of the virgin birth of Buddha from having heard some account of Christ's birth of a virgin. At any rate, the idea was completely foreign to earlier Buddhism, which saw nothing marvellous in Buddha's conception and birth. There can also be no doubt that Christian teachers reached the western shores of India even in Apostolic times (*vide* George Smith, 'The Conversion of India,' pp. 8 and 9). The most important of Aṣvaghosha's words on the subject are: 'Having gained her [Māyā], he [Śuddhodana] often mastered desire, ever woman's practice, and darkness [*or* anger] then too [he mastered], not at all by night having approached the brilliant moon-plant' (book i., ṣl. 17).

We proceed to give the passages referred to in their original languages, giving first the Pāli and then the Sanskrit extracts, that the student may perceive how the myth arose and grew. Of course, the account in the Lalita-Vistara is still more marvellous.

(a) MĀYĀ'S DREAM.

Tadā kira Kapilavatthunagare āsāḥhinakkhattaṃ ghuṭṭhaṃ ahoṣi. Mahājano nakkhattaṃ kiḷati. Mahāmāyā Devī pure puṇṇamāya satta-madivasato paṭṭhāya vigatasurāpānaṃ mālāgandhavibhūṭisampannaṃ

nakkhattakīlaṃ anubhavamānā sattamadivase pāto va uttāhāya gandh-
odakena nahāyitvā cattāri satasahassāni vissajjetvā mahādānaṃ datvā
sabbālaṃkāravibhūsitā varabhojanaṃ bhuñjitvā uposathaṅgāni adhiṭ-
tāhāya alaṃkatapaṭiyattaṃ sirigabbhaṃ pavisitvā sirisayane nipannā
niddaṃ okkamamānā imaṃ supinaṃ addasa : Cattāro kira naṃ mahā-
rājāno sayanen' eva saddhiṃ ukkhipitvā Himavantaṃ netvā saṭṭhi-
yojanike Manosilātale sattayojanikassa mahāsālarukkhaṃsa heṭṭhā
tṭhapetvā ekamantaṃ atṭhaṃsu. Atha nesam deviyō āgantvā devim
Anotattadahaṃ netvā mānusamalaharaṇatthaṃ nahāpetvā dibbavattaṃ
nivāsāpetvā gandhehi vilimpāpetvā dibbapupphāni pilandhāpetvā (tato
avidure Rajata-pabbato, tassa anto kanakavimānaṃ atthi), tattha
pācīnasisakam dibbasayanaṃ paññāpetvā nipajjāpesum. Atha Bodhi-
satto setavaravāraṇo hutvā (tato avidure eko Suvanna-pabbato), tattha
caritvā tato oruyha Rajatapabbataṃ abhirūhitvā uttaradisato āgamma
rajatadāmaṇṇāya soḍḍāya setapadumaṃ gahetvā koṭṭānādaṃ naditvā
kanakavimānaṃ pavisitvā mātu sayanaṃ tikkhattuṃ padakkhiṇaṃ
katvā dakkhiṇapassaṃ tājetvā kucchiṃ pavitṭhasadisō ahoṣi. Evaṃ
uttarāsāḷhanakkhattena paṭisandhiṃ gaṇhi. Punadivase pabuddhā devī
taṃ supinaṃ rañño ārocesi (Nidānakathā Jātaka, i. 50, 51).

(b) BUDDHA'S BIRTH.

Mahāmāyā Devī pattena telam viya dasamāse kucchiyā Bodhisattaṃ
pariharitvā paripuṇṇagabbhā ṇātigharaṃ gantukāmā Suddhodana-
mahārājassa ārocesi : 'Icchāma' ahaṃ, deva, kulasantaṃ Devadaha-
nagaraṃ gantun' -ti. Rājā, 'Sādhū' -ti sampatīcchitvā Kapilavattutho
yāva Devadahanagarā maggaṃ samaṃ kāretvā kadalipuṇṇaghatadha-
japatākādīhi alaṃkārapetvā devim sovaṇṇasivikāya nisidāpetvā amacca-
sahassena ukkhipāpetvā mahantena parivārena pesesi. Dvinnaṃ pana
nagarānaṃ antare ubhayanagaravāsīnaṃ pi Lumbinivanaṃ nāma man-
galasālavanaṃ atthi. Tasmim samaye mūlato paṭṭhāya yāva aggasākhā
sabbam ekaphāḷipullaṃ ahoṣi, sākhantarehi c' eva pupphantarehi ca
pañcavaṇṇabhamaragaṇā nānappakārā ca sakunasamghā madhuras-
sarena vikūjantā vicaranti. Sakalaṃ Lumbinivanaṃ Cittalatāvana-
sadisaṃ mahānubhāvassa rañño susajjita-āpānamāṇḍalaṃ viya ahoṣi.
Deviyā taṃ disvā sālavanakīlaṃ kīlitukāmatā udapādi. Amaccā devim
gahetvā sālavanaṃ pavisiṃsu. Sā maṅgalasālamūlaṃ gantvā sālāsākh-
āyaṃ gaṇhitukāmā ahoṣi. Sālāsākhā suseditavettaṃ viya oṇamitvā
deviyā hatthapathaṃ upagañchi. Sā hatthaṃ pasāretvā sākhāṃ aggaheṣi.
Tāvad eva c' assā kammajavātā calīṃsu. Ath' assā sāṇim parikkhipitvā
mahājano paṭikkami. Sālāsākhāṃ gahetvā tiṭṭhamānāya eva c' assā
gabbhavuṭṭhānaṃ ahoṣi. Tam khaṇaṃ yeva cattāro pi suddhacittā

Mahābrahmāno suvaṇṇajālaṃ ādāya sampattā tena suvaṇṇajālena Bodhisattaṃ sampatiṅcchivā mātu purato ṭhapetvā, 'Attamanā, devi, hohi; mahesakkho te putto uppanno,' ti āhaṃsu. Yathā pana aṅṅhe sattā mātukucchito nikkhamantā paṭikkūlena asucinā makkhitā nikkhamanti na evaṃ Bodhisatto. Bodhisatto pana dhammāsanato otaranto dhammakathiko viya nissenito otaranto puriso viya ca dve ca hatthe dve ca pāde pasāretvā ṭhitako mātukucchisambhavana kenaci asucinā amakkhito suddho visado Kāsikavatthe nikkhittamaṇiratanam viya jotanto mātukucchito nikkhami. Evaṃ sante pi Bodhisattassa ca Bodhisattamātuyā ca sakkārattham ākāsato dve udakadhārā nikkhamitvā Bodhisattassa ca mātu c' assa sarīre utum gāhapesum (Nidāna-kathā Jātaka, i. 52, 53).

(c) BUDDHA'S CONCEPTION AND BIRTH.

Kāmaṃ sadā strīcaritaṃ tamisraṃ tathāpi tāṃ prāpya bhṛīṣaṃ vireje, na hīndulekhāmupagamyā ṣubhrāṃ naktam; tathā saṃtamasatvameti. atīṃdriyenātmani dushkuho' yaṃ mayā jano yojayitum na śakyah, itīva sūkshamāṃ prakṛitiṃ vihāya dharmeṇa sākshādvihitā svamūrtiḥ. cyuto 'tha kāyātushitāt trilokīmuddyotayannuttama Bodhisattvaḥ, viveśa tasyāḥ smṛita eva kukshau nandāguhāyāmiva nāgarājah. dhṛitvā Himādrīdhavalam guru śaḍvashāṇam dānādhivāsitamukham dvīradasya rūpaṃ, Śuddhodanasya vasudhādhīpatermahīshyāḥ kukshim viveśa sa jagad-vyasanakshayāya. rakshāvidhānam prati lokapālā lokaikanāthasya divo 'bhijagmuḥ, sarvatra bhānto 'pi hi candrapādā bhajanti Kailāśagirau viśeṣam. Māyāpi tam kukshigataṃ dadhānā vidyudvilāsam jaladāvalīva, dānābhivarshaiḥ parito janānām dāridryatāpaṃ śamayāñcakāra. sāntahpurajanā devī kadācidatha Lumbinīm, jagāmānumate rājñah saṃbhūtottamadohadā. śākhāmālam bamānāyāḥ pushpabhārāvalambinīm, devyāḥ kukshim vibhidyāṣu Bodhisattvo viniryayau. tātaḥ prasannaśca babhūva pushpastasyāśca devyā vratasañskṛitāyāḥ, pārśvātsuto lokahitāya jajñe nirvedanam caiva nirāmayam ca. prāptaḥ payodādiva tigmabhānuḥ samudbhavanso 'pi ca mātṛīkuksheh, sphuranmayūkhairvihātāndhakāraiścakāra lokaṃ kanakāvadātam. tam jātamātramatha kāñcanayūpagauram prītaḥ sahasranayanah śana-kairagrihñāt, mandārapushpanikarīḥ saha tasya mūrdhni khānnirmale ca vinīpetaturambudhāre.

Buddha-Carita, i. 17-27.

The writer proceeds to mention other marvels, as, for instance, the fact that Buddha walked and spoke immediately after his birth. With these, however, we are not now concerned, though the story of our Lord's speaking when an infant in the cradle, as given in the Arabic 'Gospel of the Infancy,' and thence adopted into the Qu'rân, is probably taken from this or some similar Buddhist source.

According to Aṣvaghosha, in the passage quoted above, Buddha was born from his mother's side. This idea is of early date, for the incident is depicted on a column erected at Lumbinī by Aṣoka. It is remarkable that, as Kemble has pointed out ('Solomon and Saturnus,' p. 240, quoted by Whitney Stokes in the preface to his edition of the 'Saltair na Rann,' an Irish work of the eleventh century), in the Anglo-Saxon 'Adrian and Ritheus' it is said that Christ was born 'þurh þæt swíðre breóst' (through the right breast) of the Virgin Mary. The Buddhist origin of this fable can hardly be questioned, though the sculptures represent Buddha as proceeding from Māyā's *left* side.

Of Christ's birth it is said in the 'Saltair na Rann,' lines 7529 and 7530, that He came forth from the crown of Mary's head.¹ But this is doubtless taken from the classical myth of the birth of Athēnē from the head of Zeus.

¹ 'Ri ro-genair, ni bine, do mulluch na h-Ingine'—'A king was born, without sin, from the crown-of-the-head of the Virgin.' Is Rabelais ridiculing this idea when, in his 'Gargantua' (cap. vi.), he represents his hero as born from his mother's *left ear*: 'Sortit par l'oreille senestre. Soudain qu'il fut né, ne cria, comme les aultres enfans, *Mies, mies, mies*; mais, à haulte voix, s'escricit: "A boire, à boire, à boire!"'

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